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ABSTRACT
We consider a sequential decision process in a periodic review 
production system. At the beginning of each period, marketing decides how 
much money to be invested in demand forecasting. After its decision, marketing 
obtains the forecast and passes the forecast to production, which then determines 
production quantity. Centralized and decentralized models are formulated. In 
the centralized model, the two divisions make their decisions by considering the 
total profit of the company. In the decentralized model, marketing pays 
production a unit transfer price for every product sold. Three types of policies 
about the unit transfer price are considered. In the company with the marketing- 
oriented policy, the unit transfer price is decided by marketing; in the company 
with the production-oriented policy, it is decided by production; and, in the 
company with the coordination policy, it is determined by considering the 
overall profit of the company.
We find that, in the decentralized companies, production favors a larger 
unit transfer price, but marketing prefers a lower unit transfer price. In the 
company with the marketing-oriented policy, marketing tends to spend more 
money on forecasting, but production becomes less likely to start a run. 
However, in the production-oriented company, production is more likely to 
produce, but marketing spends less money on forecasting. The results in the 
company with the coordination policy can be considered as outcomes of 
cooperation, and it has the best performance among the decentralized
xi
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companies. Furthermore, we find that the centralized company has a larger total 
profit than do the decentralized companies. Most of time, it spends more money 
on forecasting, and it is more likely to produce.
We develop two multi-period models. For the multi-period centralized 
model with a finite planning horizon, we find that the learning effect can induce 
the system to adopt a forecasting method with high cost and precision. As to the 
other multi-period model, we study a system with a fixed batch size, a fixed lead 
time, and an infinite planning horizon. The important result is that there exists a 
threshold inventory level, which property is similar to that of an (s, Q) inventory 
management system.
xii
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find that, under most situations, the companies can not cover the increase in 
production cost
Moreover, we develop two multi-period models: a general multi-period 
centralized model with a finite planning horizon and a specific multi-period 
model with an infinite planning horizon. In the multi-period centralized model, 
we find that the learning effect can induce the system to adopt a forecasting 
method with high cost and high precision. As to the specific multi-period 
model, we study a periodic system with a fixed production batch size, a fixed 
lead time, and an infinite planning horizon. The important result is that there 
exists a threshold inventory level. The property of the threshold inventory level 
is similar to that of an (s, Q) inventory management system. Furthermore, we 
find that forecast mean has a greater influence on the threshold inventory level 
than does forecast variability.
xiii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview and Motivation
Marketing and production are two important divisions (functions) in a 
manufacturing company, but conflicts often arise between the two. Conflicts are 
common because traditional management practice divides a company into 
several functions with specialized jobs of narrow scope and limited variability. 
Although specialization makes the operations of each division more efficient, it 
may also cause conflicts among divisions since different divisions have different 
goals, roles, philosophies, specialized knowledge and languages.
First, the goals of marketing and production are different. The main goal 
of marketing is to maximize sales revenue subject to a fixed budget of various 
costs related to promotion, demand forecasting, marketing research, etc. The 
main goal of production is to minimize production cost or maximize product 
quality subject to limited production resources. As a result, the marketing 
division acts as a profit center, while the production division acts as a cost 
center.
Second, the two divisions have different roles in the daily operation of the 
company. Marketing people behave as pioneers whose mission is to deal with 
customers, and accept customer orders that specify the product type and 
quantity, delivery day, etc. Then, the requirements in customer orders become 
the production constraints. Given these constraints, production people consider
1
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the limited resources and try to focus on process efficiency and to fulfill 
customer orders on time.
Third, the philosophies of the two groups are different because they work 
in different environments. Marketing people are on the front line facing a 
changing environment, so their minds are prone to an uncertain world. To their 
way of thinking, everything is changeable. Production people are on the shop 
floor dealing with machines, materials, and workers. They prefer a steady world 
over an uncertain world. To their way of thinking, everything should be 
stabilized.
Fourth, the knowledge and languages of these two groups are different 
because of their education and training. Marketing people deal with customers 
every day. Their knowledge and language are more emotion-driven, and their 
first priority is to satisfy customer demand. Production people, however, 
confront numbers and statistics every day; thus, their knowledge and language 
are more rational, and their first priority is to smooth daily operations.
Because of the differences in goals, roles, philosophies, and specialized 
knowledge and language, the two groups conflict in many areas, e.g., the area of 
activities planning. Demand forecasting is one of the main activities of 
marketing that interacts with production planning. Silver (1978) proposed a 
framework for production planning to incorporate demand forecasting. In his 
framework, the long-term forecast is used to develop the long-term resource plan 
(strategic plan); the medium-term forecast, the aggregate production plan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3(tactical plan); and the short-term forecast, the master production schedule 
(operational plan). The planning horizon for strategic planning is usually more 
than two years. Strategic planning involves determining product mix, size of 
facilities, location of the facilities, type of production system (flexible or 
dedicated), and long-range choices concerning raw material, energy, and labor 
skills. Tactical planning requires a planning horizon from six months to two 
years and involves determining work force level, amount of overtime, number of 
work shifts, rate of production, amount of inventory, and amount of 
subcontracting. Operational planning provides the day-to-day flexibility needed 
to meet customers’ requirements within the constraints established by the 
aggregate production plan.
From the point of view of activities planning, marketing and production 
depend on each other, because marketing needs information about product 
quality and production cost from its counterpart before forecasting the future 
demand. Production also needs forecast information from marketing before 
finalizing the production plan.
In this research, we focus on the effect of demand forecasting on 
production policy. We hope that the results from this research not only provide 
useful insights about the two groups, but also help to decrease the gap between 
them. There is no doubt that if marketing and production could cooperate with 
each other, it would be a win-win situation.
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1.2. Purposes and Structure of the Dissertation
To get a complete picture of the coordination between marketing and 
production, we survey literature that discusses the relation between the two 
groups. Then, we narrow the scope to investigate the effect of demand 
forecasting on production policy. The objectives of this research are as follows.
1. Discuss the available management approaches in the literature to decrease 
the gap between the two groups.
2. Identify the factors that influence communication and coordination between 
marketing and production.
3. Analyze the effect of demand forecasting on the production policy of a 
general production system and on coordination between the two groups.
4. Study the effect of demand forecasting on the production policy of a specific 
production system.
The structure of this dissertation follows the order of the above objectives. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature discussing the relation between marketing 
and production. Papers relevant to the topics of later chapters are also included.
Chapter 3 presents models to analyze the effect of demand forecasting on 
the production policy and on the divisional coordination of a general production 
system. The decision variables are production quantity and the investment in 
forecasting. An approach to calculate the upper bound of the cost invested in 
forecasting is proposed. Then, two models are formulated. In the decentralized 
model, marketing pays production a fixed unit transfer price for every product
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sold. In the centralized model the two groups consider the overall profits of the 
company when making decisions. One-period decentralized and centralized 
models are developed. An example is presented for the one-period models. 
Then, three types of policies about the decision on the unit transfer price in the 
decentralized model are considered. For the marketing-oriented, production- 
oriented, and coordination policies, the unit transfer price is decided by 
marketing, or production, or by considering the overall profit of the company, 
respectively. New one-period decentralized models are developed for the above 
three types of companies.
Chapter 4 gives numerical analyses for the one-period decentralized 
models. The divisional coordination between the two groups and the effect of 
demand forecasting in the decentralized model are studied through numerical 
analyses.
Chapter 5 continues to provide numerical analyses for the one-period 
models. The results of numerical analyses for the one-period models are 
compared with one another. Then, the interaction effects of model parameters 
are investigated.
Chapter 6 consists of two parts. In the first part, the multi-period 
centralized model is developed. Several examples are given. In the second part 
of this chapter, a model is formulated for a specific production system with fixed 
production batch size and lead time. The production policy in the model is to 
decide whether to start a new production run when the production system is idle.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Models based on dynamic programming and Maikov decision processes are 
developed; then, the results are analyzed. Several numerical examples are also 
given at the end of this chapter.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the results obtained in the dissertation and 
shows the possible directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we review the literature that is relevant to this research. 
Based on the topic discussed by these papers, we classified the papers into the 
following three categories: (1) the interdependence between marketing and 
production, (2) demand forecasting and production policy, and (3) dynamic 
programming and Markov decision processes.
2.2. The Relation Between Marketing and Production
The papers in this category can be further divided into the following four 
groups: (1) management literature, (2) marketing literature, (3) production 
literature, and (4) production/ marketing literature.
The papers from the management literature try to define the problem from 
the view point of top managers, which discuss the interdependence among all 
divisions in an organization, not just that between marketing and production. 
The papers from the marketing literature also discuss the interdependence 
between marketing and production, but do so from the view point of marketing 
managers, whereas the papers from the production literature discuss the 
interdependence from the view point of production managers. The papers in the 
production/ marketing literature try to evaluate the benefits of coordination 
between the two divisions by formulating centralized and decentralized models.
7
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Management Literature
The most important contribution of management literature is that it 
provides a broader view of the interdependence among all functions in an 
organization. Therefore, we can obtain useful insights about the big picture of 
the company.
Divisional conflicts are one of the most popular subjects in management 
literature. Shapiro (1977) pointed out that there are eight problem areas in 
which conflicts may arise between marketing and production: (1) capacity 
planning and long-range sales forecasting, (2) production scheduling and short- 
range sales forecasting, (3) delivery and physical distribution, (4) quality 
assurance, (5) breadth of product line, (6) cost control, (7) new product 
introduction, and (8) service after sales. He further classified the reasons for 
conflicts in the problem areas into two categories: basic causes and complicating 
factors. The basic causes are evaluation and reward, inherent complexity, 
orientation and experience, and culture. Complicating factors involve the 
personnel of other divisions, the effects of changes in environment, technology 
changes, capital constraints, and the increase in the size of the company. He also 
proposed several methods to manage conflicts between these two divisions. 
These methods are explicit corporate policies, modified measurements of 
performance, and a people-oriented approach.
An effective communication channel among divisions is important to 
reduce divisional conflicts. Griffen and Hauser (1992) examined the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communication patterns for two matched product-development teams- One team 
used a phase-review development process, and the other used “Quality Function 
Deployment (QFD).” They found that QFD provides better communication 
within the core team (marketing, engineering, and manufacturing), but lead to 
weaker communication with members of the firm external to the team.
Some authors focus on establishing frameworks to link the production 
strategy with other strategies. Skinner (1969) pointed out that the technically 
oriented idea of manufacturing is too prevalent He considered production 
policy to be a part of the strategic plan that relates a company’s strengths and 
resources to the opportunity in the market He proposed an interactive process 
to decide production policy. From his decision process, we can find the contents 
of communication between the two groups.
Hill (1989) proposed the concept of order-winning criteria to link 
production decision making with marketing decision making. Order-winning 
criteria are necessary for a company to win orders from the market The order- 
winning criteria are price, delivery speed, delivery reliability, product quality, 
etc. The production manager must decide what kinds of production process and 
infrastructure are needed to support the order-winners. He also pointed out that, 
“The can’t say no syndrome is still the hallmark of the production culture. The 
role of production manager shouldn’t be a reactor but a proactor.”
Based on an interaction model of system and environment, Swamidass and 
Newell (1987) used a path analytic approach to show that environmental
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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uncertainties (the scarcity of information and resources) influence 
manufacturing strategy variables such as manufacturing flexibility and the role 
of production managers in strategic decision making.
Perhaps one of the most important surveys of management literature about 
interdependence among divisions comes from the study by Adam and 
Swamidass (1989). They identified seven missing themes in manufacturing 
strategy research and service strategy research (marketing strategy research): (1) 
the need for distinct research streams for strategy content and strategy process, 
(2) strategic planning, (3) effect of operations strategy on performance, (4) 
empirical theory building, (5) taxonomic research, (6) international strategies, 
and (7) operations management themes (JIT, TQC, etc.). They pointed out that 
manufacturing strategy and service strategy researchers should concentrate their 
efforts to develop the missing themes.
Marketing Literature
Although the results of the papers in marketing literature are market- 
oriented, these papers may help us to achieve a better understanding about how 
marketing people deal with divisional interdependence.
Linking the marketing strategy with other strategies is very important for a 
successful marketing division. Ruekert and Walker (1978) presented a 
conceptual framework to investigate how marketing interacts with other 
divisions in planning, implementing, and assessing marketing activities. The 
framework includes three dimensions: environment, organizational structure,
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and process. Based on this framework, they proposed fourteen principles to 
enhance the cooperation of all divisions, and they tested these principles with 
empirical data.
Hutt and Speh (1980) introduced the concept of the marketing strategy 
center as a possible organization structure for exploring the nature of a 
multifunctional decision making process of marketing. Kiel (1984) suggested 
that the way to avoid new product failure is to integrate marketing and 
technology, conduct marketing feasibility studies at the earliest possible time, 
and develop the cooperation between marketing and R&D.
Demand forecasting is one of marketing’s main activities which interacts 
with production. Bolt (1982) discussed the relation between demand forecasting 
and production activities as follows. Short-term forecasting is necessary for 
immediate planning and the scheduling of existing resources. Medium-term 
forecasting has the effect of either adapting company resources to match the 
marketing situations or adjusting the marketing mixes to match company 
resources. Long-term forecasting is important for the planning of resources such 
as finance, plant and equipment, R&D, etc.
Production Literature
One of a production manager’s main activities is to decide manufacturing 
strategy. Wheelwright and Hayes (1985) proposed a framework for 
understanding how manufacturing organizations contribute to the overall 
strategic goals of a company. They presented a development continuum of four
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stages that can help managers identify the company’s current position. They 
also suggested approaches enabling the company to advance to a higher stage of 
competitive effectiveness through manufacturing.
Some authors focus on formulating mathematical models for the 
production manager to use in making production policy. One of the most 
popular production models was proposed by Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon 
(1955). The authors developed two linear decision rules (LDRs) to determine 
the aggregate production rate and the size of the work force. Customer orders 
are assumed to fluctuate substantially. The following three alternatives are 
considered to deal with these fluctuations: (1) to adjust the size of the work force 
by hiring and firing, (2) to adjust the production rate by working overtime and 
“undertime” with a constant work force, and (3) to allow inventory and 
backorders to fluctuate while maintaining a constant work force and a constant 
production rate. The authors assumed that the demand forecast was unbiased, 
and no further information was required on the probability distribution of 
forecast errors. They discussed the empirical results of applying the decision 
rules to a paint plant and claimed a minimum 8.5% cost saving can be obtained 
by using the decision rules.
Many authors have extended and applied the above model (HMMS) to real 
practice. Bergstonn and Smith (1970) extended the LDRs to multi-item 
decision rules (MDRs) to determine the optimal sales, production, and inventory 
levels in a production system with a fixed planning horizon. Kioulafas and
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Kapralos (1980) applied the HMMS model to the problem of production 
planning of a kernel oil factory facing seasonal demand. They proposed and 
tested two possible production policies.
Production/Marketing Literature
Most authors develop centralized (integrated) models and decentralized 
models to analyze the effect of coordination between marketing and production. 
The results of their papers indicate that divisional cost factors, cost functions, 
and constraints are communicative subjects between marketing and production.
Tuite (1968) developed a model that combines the decisions of 
determining a marketing strategy and selecting a production schedule when 
demands are highly seasonal in nature. He considered not only the three 
alternatives in the HMMS model, but also the option that the marketing division 
can shift the demand pattern by offering seasonal discounts. He assumed that 
the seasonal discounts will result in no change in total volume of sales over the 
entire planning horizon. Under this assumption, a shift in sales volume from a 
higher demand season to a lower demand season may cause a decrease of total 
revenue, since price discounts are accompanied by such a shift. However, 
production cost is reduced since a smoother production schedule can be 
achieved.
Under the above similar setting, Leitch (1974) extended the HMMS model 
to study the problem in the production sector. He developed integrated models 
for monopoly, perfect competition, dominance and nondominance markets. He
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found that the importance of coordination between the production plan and the 
marketing strategy increases as the market moves toward perfect competition. 
This conclusion may explain the situation that the role of a marketing manager is 
more passive in some monopoly companies in which the promotion plans are 
considered to be less important
Welam (1977) also developed a “P-model” for the production sector, 
which is similar to the HMMS model, and a “D-model” for the marketing sector. 
Then, he defined a sequential solution procedure in which the D-model is solved 
then the P-model, and a “PD-model” in which the decisions of marketing and 
production are determined simultaneously. By comparing different pricing and 
production strategies, he found that the PD-model always has a lower total cost 
than that of the sequential model.
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) presented a decentralized model 
considering the interdependence between marketing and production in a 
distribution channel of industrial goods. They implicitly treated the marketing 
division as a distributor in their model. The structure of their system is similar 
to that of a one warehouse and one retailer inventory system. Eight propositions 
for the strategies of the distributor and manufacturer, based on the cost structure 
and the nature of demand, are proposed and proved.
Damon and Schramm (1972) tried to integrate the problems of production 
and marketing as well as finance into a simultaneous decision model. In the 
production sector, they used the similar decision variables in the HMMS model,
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a quadratic production function, and constraints such as non-negative material 
balances, finished product inventory relation, demand satisfaction constraints, 
etc. In the marketing sector, they assumed that demand is a function of 
advertising and price. In the finance sector, the decision variables are the 
amount of the investment in marketable security and short-term debt. They 
compared the results of an integrated model with those of a decentralized model. 
A 27% improvement of total cost is reported in an example. The results indicate 
that the integrated model takes advantage of economies of scale when 
production levels are higher, thus offering a lower price that creates a higher 
demand.
Promotion is another marketing activity that interacts with production 
planning. Sogomonian and Tang (1993) studied the problem of coordinating 
promotion and production decisions within a finite planning horizon in a firm. 
They formulated the problem over a directed network. In the network, each 
node has a label denoting a promotion level in the period and the length of each 
arc representing the total net revenue generated from the promotion activities 
(level) in the period. They developed an integrated model and a baseline 
(decentralized) model into a shortest path problem and a longest path problem, 
respectively. The complexity of computation in each problem depends on the 
number of nodes and arcs. However, they showed that the optimal solution of 
both problems can be obtained in a finite number of computational operations.
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They concluded that the integrated model enables the firm to obtain higher net 
profit and lower inventory levels than the baseline model.
One of production’s decisions, other than production quantity, is also 
considered. Freeland (1980) proposed a one-period model that allows marketing 
to choose price and promotion strategies and allows manufacturing to decide 
production level by selecting a decision variable called “a production technology 
variable.” He found that, under some circumstances, marketing and production 
people might have incentives not to be truthful with each other. To avoid such a 
situation, he suggested an interactive decision procedure. In this procedure, the 
marketing division would identify its problem and communicate the results to 
the production division. Then, a possible solution proposed by the production 
division based on the information provided by the marketing division is passed 
back to the marketing division for use in revising its initial strategy. He showed 
that this process of interaction may iterate for a finite number of times.
Some economics models are also used to evaluate the benefits of divisional 
coordination. Porteus and Whang (1991) adopted the concept of the principal- 
agent paradigm that assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of 
the firm are risk-neutral and will act in their self-interest. They formulated a 
multi-product newsboy model for a firm with one marketing manager per 
product, a single production manager, and flexible manufacturing capacity. 
They proposed and tested an optimal incentive plan that will induce the 
managers to coordinate with one another.
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The authors of the above papers attempt to formulate the centralized and 
decentralized models to study the interdependence between marketing and 
production. Other approaches have also been proposed. Deane, McDugall, and 
Gargeya (1991) performed an empirical study of new venture firms in the 
computer and communication industry. They found that the interaction of 
manufacturing and marketing decisions is only moderately successful in 
predicting the firm’s success. They suggested that a complete model for 
predicting the firm’s success should incorporate the strategies of other divisions. 
Chakravarty and Baum (1992) considered the product attributes to be the 
contents of communication between marketing and production. It is marketing’s 
responsibility to identify the product attributes that are desired by customers; 
however, it is manufacturing’s responsibility to translate these attributes into the 
manufacturing processes. They compared two types of manufacturing processes 
and found that flexible cells are desired when low sale volume products are 
required, and dedicated cells are wanted when the sales volume is higher. Stam 
and Gardiner (1992) proposed three interactive approaches: a multiple objective 
programming model, an interactive solution procedure, and a group decision­
making mechanism, for the decision of order selection. The decision of order 
selection is to decide which order should be accepted or rejected. Using the 
above approaches, a compromise decision can be achieved.
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Summary of the Above Literature
The above four categories of literature are summarized as follows. To 
decrease the gap and enhance the collaboration and communication between 
marketing and production, top managers must provide an environment (the 
infrastructure) to enhance collaboration and communication between the two 
groups. The factors that influence the infrastructure can be divided into two 
types: personal factors and organizational factors. Personal factors include the 
individual attitude and personal involvement in each group, the atmosphere of 
team work, the manners of top managers toward the collaboration, etc. 
Organizational factors include the reward system, the organizational design, the 
mixed career paths, etc.
Moreover, the contents of communication between the two groups involve 
two kinds of factors: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative factors refer to 
numbers or quantities and include factors such as cost, decision variables, 
objectives, and constraints in marketing and production. Qualitative factors 
refer to category information or rules; for example, product type, order-winner, 
production and inventory policy, etc.
2.3. Demand Forecasting and Production Policy
Many forecasting techniques have been developed, but each has its special 
use and restrictions. A marketing manager should be cautious when choosing 
the forecasting technique. Chambers, Mullick, and Smith (1971) surveyed a
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range of forecasting techniques and proposed several criteria for the selection of 
the right technique. Dancer (1977) performed an empirical evaluation of one 
constant and two adaptive forecasting models. He found that the performances 
of constant and adaptive models are almost the same when average absolute 
error and average bias are used as test criteria.
For effective decision making in production and inventory management, 
the production manager needs appropriate forecasts from marketing. 
Forecasting, however, requires money and effort. It is important, therefore, to 
control the cost invested in forecasting and forecast error. Biggs and Campion
(1982) are among the first researchers to include forecast errors in the MRP lot- 
sizing problem. Based on the results of simulation, they found that allowance 
can be made for forecast errors in the aggregate planning process; and if the 
underlying cost functions can be determined, the costs may be controlled even if 
only the direction of the error is known. Under a similar setting, Bodt and Van 
Wassenhove (1983) concluded that forecast errors have a great influence on the 
cost effectiveness of lot-sizing techniques even when the forecast errors are 
small.
Some authors are interested in measuring the impact of demand forecasting 
on the performance of systems. Lee and Adam (1986) built a computerized 
simulation to investigate the impact of demand forecasting on MRP systems. 
They found that, in most cases, forecast errors (especially the mean error), lot- 
sizing rules, and product structure (BOM) do affect the inventory costs and
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shortages of the MRP systems. In another later paper, Lee, Adam, and Ebert 
(1987) showed that, when forecast errors and the costs of the MRP systems are 
analyzed, bias has a better predictive ability to system performance than other 
measures such as mean square error, mean absolute deviation, etc. In further 
investigations of bias, they discovered the superiority of loss functions as 
measures over typical forecast error measures. They suggested that constructing 
and monitoring a specific loss function for an MRP system could enhance the 
performance of operations.
Jackson, Heath, and Muckstadt (1988) developed a methodology based on 
the Martingale Model of Forecast Evolution (MMFE) to evaluate the impact of 
the forecast variability and bias on inventory levels, customer service levels, and 
order expediting costs for assembly lines with long lead time components. They 
applied the methodology to several cases and tested the result based on 
hypothetical data. Ritzman and King (1993) used the Manufacturing System 
Simulator (MASS) to study the impact of forecast errors in a multistage 
manufacturing system. They found that reducing forecast bias is better than 
reducing forecast variability to improve the performance of the system.
Solving a multi-period model requires forecasts for several periods ahead. 
As a result, rolling horizon procedures are proposed for the multi-period 
problem. Rolling horizon procedures require forming a rolling schedule by 
solving a finite horizon multi-period problem and implementing only the first 
period’s decision. One period later, the multi-period problem is updated when
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new forecasts are available, and the procedure is repeated. To evaluate rolling 
schedules, Baker and Peterson (1979) constructed a model that is similar to the 
HMMS model. They found that the most significant factor affecting the 
performance of a rolling schedule is cost structure, while the uncertainty in 
demand forecasts and the nature of demand have only a moderate effect.
Chand (1983) considered a multistage inventory problem with 
nonstationary demand. He developed several rolling horizon procedures for 
solving such a problem. Wemmerlov (1989) studied the impact of forecast 
errors on a time-phase (periodic) order point system in a rolling horizon 
environment. He found that forecast errors not only lead to stockout but also 
induce larger inventories. Introduction of safety stocks generates even larger 
inventories.
One of the main problems of a rolling horizon schedule is how long an 
appropriate forecast horizon should be. Chand, Sethi, and Proth (1990) 
considered a discrete-time undiscounted dynamic lot size model. They obtained 
an upper bound for the forecast horizon, which guarantees that EOQ is the 
optimal production lot size in the first period. They also acquired conditions for 
the existence of a finite forecast horizon.
In rolling horizon procedures, forecasts are revised in each period. The 
mechanism of revision may affect the performance of a production system. 
Several assumptions in the process of forecast revisions are proposed. Matsuo 
(1990) proposed a heuristic rule which simultaneously determines a production
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sequence and production quantities of style goods for a production system with 
hierarchical structure and forecast revisions. He assumed that the demand 
forecasts of items in each family are revised over time, and are assumed to 
follow a joint normal distribution. The covariance matrix of the joint normal 
distribution is assumed to be known and is a decreasing function of time, but 
means are revised over time. They showed that the means also follow a joint 
normal distribution. Hausman and Peterson (1972) consider the problem of 
scheduling production quantities for a group of products through a facility with 
limited capacity and facing seasonal demand. In their model, the forecasts of 
total demand of products are revised each period. They assumed that the ratios 
of successive forecasts can be treated as independent random variables and 
follow the Lognormal distribution. Then, they formulated the problem by 
dynamic programming and tested the performances of three heuristic solution 
procedures.
Crowston, Hausman, and Kampe II (1973) considered the problem of 
production planning for a seasonal product produced in a multi-stage production 
system. By Baysian forecast revisions, they assumed that the total demand in 
the initial period follows a normal distribution, and forecasts in each period are 
used to update the prior normal distribution to obtain a posterior normal 
distribution. Four heuristic decision rules are proposed and tested.
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2.4. Finite-Stage Dynamic Programming and Markov Decision Processes
Since the methods of dynamic programming and Markov decision 
processes are used in the later chapters, we provide a brief review of these two 
methods.
Literature Review of Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming (DP) is one of the most popular application tools in 
business and engineering. The history of DP can be traced back to the early part 
of this century. As for the general form of DP, the study began just decades ago. 
It is well known that DP was first proposed by Richard Bellman. In his first 
book on DP, published in 1957, Bellman developed the basic structure of DP 
and discussed various applications of DP in multi-stage allocation, gold-mining, 
optimal inventory, and bottleneck problems.
At the same time, Dreyfus (1957) studied the computational aspect of DP 
problems with high-dimension state variables and suggested several alternatives 
to overcome the computational complexity of high dimensionality. Through 
numerical analysis, Bellman and Dreyfus (1962) obtained useful results on the 
accuracy and stability of DP techniques when high dimensionality exists. 
Techniques to reduce the dimensionality were also studied by Aris (1964). 
Mitten- (1964) showed that, with certain restrictions on the form of return 
function, optimal processes (high dimensional processes) may be constructed 
efficiently from optimal subprocesses (low dimensional processes).
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Other research, such as branched, cyclic, and looping multi-stage systems, 
stochastic control processes, and adaptive control processes were also studied 
dining this period by Bellman (1961), Aris (1964), Nemhauser (1966), and 
Wilde (1964). Nemhauser (1966) discussed the basic theory and computation 
methods of DP as well as the nonserial systems and infinite-stage systems. Ross
(1983) studied negative DP (the problems of minimizing costs) and positive DP 
(the problems of maximizing rewards) and discussed the applications of DP in 
stochastic scheduling.
Since the first appearance of DP, a number of papers about the applications 
of DP have evolved. For instance, DP was applied to solve multi-stage 
decisions, sequential machines, chemical reactors design, and other problems 
(see Bellman [1961], Aris [1961], Bellman and Dreyfus [1962] and Bellman
[1984].) To avoid the overlap with these references, we list only the recent 
developments here. Kamien and Li (1990) and Saniee (1995) applied the DP 
approach to the production planning and inventory problem. Federgruen and 
Tzur (1991) and Potts and Van Wassenhove (1992) studied the production 
scheduling problem.
As a branch of DP, the studies of Markov decision processes (MDPs) were 
started in the late 1950s. A brief literature review about MDP is presented later. 
Models of Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Finite-stage stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) is a branch of DP. 
The problem of finite-stage SDP involves a process evolving in a discrete and
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finite time horizon. In each period (stage), the process state is observed and, 
corresponding to the observed process state, an action is taken. According to the 
transition mechanism decided by the chosen action, the process moves to the 
next period. The above procedure is repeated until the end of the time horizon. 
Moreover, associated with the current process state and action selected in each 
period, a cost or reward is obtained. The objective of the decision selection 
process is to minimize the discounted total system cost or to maximize the 
discounted total system return over a given time span.
To give a mathematical formulation of general SDP, we define some 
notations as follows. Denote the T  = (0, 1, 2,..., N) as the index set of the 
process, which represents the time horizon of interest. Let S, be the process state 
at time t e T, which is a random variable, and S  be the state space of the random 
variable St. Further, let a, be the action selected at time /, and A  be the 
corresponding action space.
In SDP, the transition function is described as a recursion relationship 
between the process states of time t and t + 1. Generally, the transition function 
and immediate cost may depend not only on the present process state S, and 
action a„ but also on the past process states and actions. Therefore, the general 
transition function can be expressed as Sn-i _ Tt(St, a„ St_i, a , i S l5 a{). On the 
other hand, the general immediate cost could be represented by C, = C,(S„ a„ S,. 
i, a(.i,..., Si, ax).
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Figure 2.1 . A process of SDP at Time t 
Let g,(Cp CN) represent the utility measurement or criterion
function at stage t. Note that g, may be an expectation. The objective at stage t
is to find a set of decisions {ah k = t, t + 1, t + 2,..., N] such that g,(C„
CN) is maximized. Hence, we have the following general SDP formulation:
K(St) = 0Pl {gi(Ct, 1,..., Cp/)},
subject to C, -  C{(S„ a„ Shl, Su
*Sf+-i= T,(S„ a„ S\, a{), t = 0, 1, 2,..., N, (2.1)
where V,(St) is the total reward or cost of the system from period t to the end of 
the time horizon. The complexity of (2.1) depends on the forms of transition 
functions and cost functions, and the number of decision variables. 
Furthermore, the transition function and cost function are dependent on time t, 
present process state S„ past states SM, Su present action a„ and past
actions a„ a,.,,..., ax. To simplify the process, consider the following Markov 
property (Phillips, Ravindran, and Solberg, 1976).
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Markov Property:
The knowledge of the current state and decision at any point of time is 
sufficient to predict the future of the process after that point. In other 
words, given the present, then the future is independent of the past. That 
is, “the process is forgetful or memoryless.”
With the Markovian assumption on the state transition, the transition 
function of the process becomes one-stage dependent. In other words, St+l 
depends only on the current state St, and the chosen action a,. As a result, the 
one-stage dependent transition function is ■Sf+i = Tt(S„ a,). Note that the new 
transition function is still dependent on the current time t. Moreover, Tt may 
represent addition, subtraction, multiplication or division (+, - ,  x, or it could 
be a probability function that is determined by St and a,.
In the same way, we can impose the Markovian assumption on the cost 
function. Therefore, the one-stage dependent immediate cost can be expressed 
asC, = C,(S„ a,). Note that no other restriction is placed on the form of the new 
cost function. However, it is usually additive and discounted.
From the above, (2.1) can be simplified into the following equation:
) = °pt {£i(Cf, Ct+i,..., Cv)},
O,
subject to C, = Ct(S„ a,),
= TfiSp at), t = 0 ,1 ,2 ,..., N. (2.2)
In real applications, the objective function and cost functions usually 
satisfy the following properties of separability and monotonicity:
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1. Separability:
&(Q> C(+b"-5 Cfj) = h£Ct,g t{.y(Ct¥\,..., Cff)). (2.3)
The h, and g/+1 are real-value functions.
2. Monotonicity:
The ht is a monotonically nondecreasing (or increasing) function of for 
every C,.
Given separability and monotonicity, SDP can be proved to possess the 
following decomposition property.
Decomposible SDP:
If the total reward or cost function satisfies the properties of separability 
and monotonicity, then the SDP problem of (2.2) is decomposible and is 
equivalent to 
^ (5 ,)=  opt {g,(c„ Cy)}
a, o.v
= opt {ht(C„ opt {&(C„C*i,...,Cy)}}
a t  o , . i - " O x
= opt {ht(C„ Pi+^S^i))} = opt {h,(Ct, V'+tCT'CS', at))}
a, a,
subject to SVh = Tt(S„ at),
Ct = C,(Sh at), f = 0 ,1 ,2 ,..., N. (2.4)
A proof of the above decomposible problem can be found in Chapter 2 of 
Nemhauser (1966). In fact, the method of decomposition is equivalent to that of 
Bellman’s (1957) “The Principle of Optimality.”
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Principle of Optimality:
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial 
decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy 
with regard to the state resulting from the first decision.
The decomposition property allows the decision maker to break down the 
original problem into N  subproblems with a single decision variable in each 
period. This property is critical to develop a recursion solution procedure.
The backward recursion solution procedure is to solve the problem from 
stage N  to stage 0. Assume the values of ending condition, the values of 
V^CSj^i) for all possible SN+l, are given. Since ^ ( S ^ )  is known at stage t, 
the number of variables in (2.4) is always one. Thus, it is easier to solve (2.4) 
than (2.2). By the principle of optimality and backward recursion, the solution 
procedure moves from one stage to the next, each time finding an optimal 
action for each stage, until the last stage is reached. Once the last stage is 
reached, the optimal solution and action at each stage can be obtained by tracing 
back through the transition functions. Further, in certain problems, it may be 
better to start from stage 0 and continue to stage N. This is called forward 
recursion.
Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Assume that the state space is finite or countable. Then, we can define the 
state space S  = {jj, s2,—, or, for convenience, let S  = {/, i e integer}.
Assume that the one-stage dependent transition function is a probability
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function. Let p\ja^ = PriS^ = j | St = i, at) be the transition probability for the 
state J  at time t + 1 given the current state at time t is / and action at is chosen. 
Furthermore, assume that the transition probability is stationary (time 
independence); thus,p'.(<3f) =
Let a  denote the discount factor, 0 < a  < 1. Because the objective of the 
system is to minimize the discounted total cost over a time span of [1, N\, (2.4) 
can be rewritten as
Vfi) = min {Q7, a,) + a £  pij(at)Vl+l(f)}, t = 0 ,1,2,..., N. (2.5)
J
We can use the method of backward recursion to solve (2.5).
Literature Review of Markov Decision Processes with Infinite Horizon
As a special case of SDP, the origin of Markov decision processes (MDPs) 
can also be traced back to the beginning of this century. However, the term 
“Markov decision processes” was first used by Bellman (1957).
Howard (1960) developed the policy iteration algorithms for the 
discounted and undiscounted MDPs. Manne (1960), Derman (1963), and Osaki 
and Mine (1969) independently developed a linear programming (LP) model for 
the MDPs. Optimality of stationary strategies of MDPs was given by Derman
(1962) and Blackwell (1962). White (1963) proposed a method of successive 
approximations by using the approximation in policy space of DP, when the 
number of states is large.
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The development of other standard MDP problems are as follows. Mine 
and Osaki (1970) developed the mathematical theory and algorithms of MDPs 
and extended models. D.J. White (1978) formulated a general structure for finite 
DP to solve finite MDPs. Ross (1980, 1983) wrote two books on MDPs. D.J. 
White (1987) studied MDPs with variable discounted factor. MDPs with 
weighted discounted criteria was discussed by Feinberg and Eugene (1994). 
C.C. White (1994) proposed an algorithm to solve the problem of MDPs with 
imprecise transition probabilities.
Denumerable MDPs with average cost criterion as well as discounted cost 
models were analyzed by Derman (1965, 1966), and the undiscounted models 
were studied by Ross (1968). Further, Altman (1994) gave the LP formulation 
for denumerable and constrained MDPs.
Semi-Markov decision processes, or Markov renewal processes, were first 
introduced by Jewell (1963). The optimality of stationary strategies was given 
by Denardo (1967) for discounted models, and Fox (1966) for undiscounted 
models. Howard (1964) and Osaki and Mine (1968) developed the LP 
formulation. Moreover, the continuous time MDPs were first discussed by 
Howard (1960). Rykov (1966) gave the optimality stationary strategies for 
discounted models.
As for nonhomogeneous MDPs, Hopp, Bean, and Smith (1987) gave the 
definition of optimality for discounted and undiscounted nonhomogeneous 
MDPs. Alden and Smith (1992) showed that the expected cost error of
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approximating the solution to the nonhomogeneous MDP with infinite horizon 
by a series of rolling finite horizon solution is bounded. Sufficient conditions to 
guarantee the existence of an expected average-cost optimal stationary policy for 
the nonhomogeneous MDPs with unbounded costs was presented by Sennott 
(1989). Bean, Hopp and Duenyas (1992) formulated a mixed integer program to 
determine whether a finite time horizon is a forecast horizon in a 
nonhomogeneous MDP.
MDPs have been extensively used in the fields of operations research, 
reliability theory, control theory, and many other areas. A survey of applications 
of MDPs was conducted by D. J. White (1993). To avoid too much overlap, we 
list only papers that we consider to be important. Manne (1960), D’Epenoux
(1963), and Wein (1992) applied MDPs to the inventory and production 
problem. Klein (1962), Derman (1963), Derman and Lieberman (1967), Kolesar 
(1966, 1967), Federgruen and So (1990) made similar applications to the 
machine maintenance and replacement problem. Klein (1966) and L. S. White 
(1967) studied the reject allowance problem.
Markov Decision Processes
Let T = {0, 1, 2,...} be the index set of the process, which represents the 
infinite time horizon. Define S,= i to be the process state at time t e  T, which is 
a random variable, and S  to be the state space of the random variable St. Assume 
that S' is a countable integer set. Let a, be the action taken at the time t, and A t
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be the finite set of possible actions when the process is in state i. Thus, we have 
cit s  Aj when St — i.
Let a  represent the discount factor, 0 < a  < 1, and p be a policy for taking 
actions at each time point. Then, the objective o f a MDP is to find a policy P 
such that the expected sum of discounted system costs over an infinite time 
horizon is minimized. This means to find a policy P such that
F(/)= inf Fp(0- (2.8)
P
^ B ( 0 - £ s [2 ;a 'C (S „a ,)|S , =(],  (2.9)
1=1
where £ p represents the conditional expectation, given that policy P is employed. 
Vp(i) represents the expected discounted total cost incurred when policy P is 
employed and the initial process state is /. A policy p* is said to be a-optimal if 
Fp.(0 = F(z), for all i > 0. (2.10)
That is, a policy is a-optimal if its expected a-discounted cost is minimal 
for every initial state. Note that V(j) is a function of a. Further, under the 
assumption that all immediate expected costs are bounded, it can be shown that 
the objective function at each point of time converges (Ross 1980, 1983). The 
following theorem yields an equation satisfied by the optimal cost function that 
also minimizes the sum of the discounted system cost over an infinite time 
horizon. Interested readers can find the proof in Ross (1980,1983).
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Theorem 2.1 The optimality equation is as follows.
V(i)= nun{C(i,a) + a '£ lp IJ(a )r ( j)} , for all i> 0 .  (2.11)
j
Comparing the optimality equation (2.11) with the recursion equation (2.5) 
in SDP, we find that the difference is that the time index of (2.5) has been 
eliminated. This means that, under certain conditions, we can derive the 
optimality equation (2.11) by using the SDP approach. For a detailed 
description, refer to D. J. White (1978).
There are two approaches to solve the problem of MDPs: the policy- 
iteration method and the LP method. Mine and Osaki (1970) showed that the 
policy-iteration and LP methods are equivalent to mathematical programming 
for the discounted MDP. Concisely, the policy-iteration method is a special 
extension of LP method such that pivot operations for many variables are 
performed simultaneously. For more details about the former method, please 
refer to Howard (1960). However, we use the following approach to derive the 
LP model for (2.11). Another way to derive the LP model by using z-transform 
is described in Mine and Osaki (1970).
Note that most parts o f the following discussion are obtained from D. J. 
White (1978). Let Xj be the probability of initial state j . Rather than considering 
only stationary policies, we shall consider randomized stationary policies. 
Define za(i), i = 1, 2,..., to be the “stationary probability.” For za(i), in a 
discounted sense, an average probability of being in state i and choosing action a
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when the probability of initial state is p(Xl =/) = Xj,j e  S, and policy p e  ps is 
used. Then, the LP formulation of (2.11) is as follows.
min£2X(0C(/,a)
i a
subject to 2 > fl( 0 za(i)Pij(a) = ,
a i a
za(f)>0, for ally, a. (2.12)
We can solve (2.12) by the simplex method in LP. Note that different 
combinations of Xj do not influence the optimal policy. One of the interesting 
results of (2.12) is as follows (Ross, 1980). The optimal value of za(i) is zero 
for all but one value of a, which implies that the optimal policy is not 
nonrandomized. In other words, the action it prescribes when in state i is a 
deterministic function of i. Furthermore, it can be Shown that the stationary 
policy is given by f a(i) = za( f ) / ^ z a(i) .
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CHAPTER 3
THE ONE-PERIOD MODELS WITH DEMAND FORECASTING
3.1. Introduction
Demand forecasting, one of the main activities of the marketing division in 
a company, is an important integrated part of production and inventory 
management Accurate demand forecasts can improve operations by avoiding 
undesirable situations such as inventory shortages or excesses, missed due dates, 
expensive expediting, etc. On the other hand, when demand forecasts deviate 
significantly from actual demands, corporate profit may be affected substantially 
even though the production division carries out the production plan efficiently. 
Generally, the precision of forecasts is closely related to the effort or money 
invested in forecasting and the nature of demands. Therefore, a suitable amount 
of effort or money should be allocated in demand forecasting to obtain 
appropriate forecasts to support the operation of the company. In this chapter, 
we study the effect of demand forecasting on the divisional coordination and on 
the decisions of marketing and production through a simple periodic review 
production system.
Consider a periodic review production system that produces only one 
type of product. Assume that the system operates as follows. In the marketing 
sector of the system, at the beginning of each period, the marketing manager 
decides how much effort or money should be invested in forecasting to estimate 
the customer demand in the current period. After obtaining the forecast, the 
marketing manager passes the forecast to the production manager. Then, in the
36
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production sector, the production manager has to determine the production 
quantity in the current period based on the forecast and the prior information 
about customer demand. Assume that the production lead time is one period. 
However, the setup time and maintenance of the system are not considered.
From the above description, the decision process in each period is a 
sequential process. In the sequential process, if both managers could coordinate 
effectively with each other when making their decisions, the overall profit of the 
company will be improved. The problem of coordination of divisional decisions 
in a firm and its related issues has led to considerable research in the production, 
marketing, and management fields. For a detailed literature review, refer to 
Chapter 2. In this chapter, we study two types of production systems: 
decentralized and centralized systems.
In a decentralized system, we assume that the marketing manager agrees to 
pay a unit transfer price to production for every product sold. In addition, we 
assume that the unit transfer price is given and decided by negotiation between 
marketing and production (this assumption is relaxed later). Hence, the marketing 
manager must consider sales volume and dollar amount paid to production when 
deciding the investment in forecasting, whereas the production manager is 
concerned with the revenue received from marketing and costs within its division.
Similar settings have been studied by other authors. Eliashberg and 
Steinberg (1987) assumed that the distributor (the marketing manager) attempts to 
maximize the divisional total profit, which is equal to sales revenue minus the sum
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of procurement cost (cost charged by production), inventory holding cost, and 
other costs. Damon and Schramm (1972) assumed that in the sequential model 
(the decentralized model), marketing seeks to maximize the sales revenue minus 
the sum of the cost charged by production, promotion cost, and other costs. 
Freeland (1980) and Welam (1977) also made a similar assumption.
In a centralized system, we assume that both managers consider the overall 
profit of the company when making decisions. Since all decisions are centralized, 
no transfer price exists between marketing and production.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the 
assumptions and process of demand forecasting imposed in the one-period 
models (with one-period planning horizon) are described. In Section 3.3, an 
approach is proposed to derive the value of forecasting, which can be 
interpreted as the maximal amount of money that could be invested in 
forecasting. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, the one-period decentralized and 
centralized models are formulated. Then, in Section 3.6, a simple example is 
presented for the one-period models discussed in the previous sections. In 
Section 3.7, we consider three types of policies about the decision on the unit 
transfer price for the decentralized companies. For a marketing-oriented policy, 
we assume that unit transfer price is decided by marketing; for a production- 
oriented policy, it is determined by production; and, for a coordination policy, it 
is decided by considering the overall profit of the company. We formulate the
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new one-period decentralized models for the companies with the three types of 
policies, which are further studied in the next two chapters.
3.2. The Assumptions and Process of Demand Forecasting in the 
One-Period Models
In the one-period models, we study a periodic production system with a 
one-period planning horizon and production lead time. We assume that at the 
end of the period leftover products are disposed of, and unsatisfied customer 
demands are totally lost.
As for the process of demand forecasting, Crowston, Hausman, and Kampe 
II (1973) proposed a multi-period model with a process of Bayesian forecast 
revisions. They assumed that total demand in the initial period follows a normal 
distribution, and forecasts in each period are used to update the prior distribution 
to obtain a posterior normal distribution. The process of demand forecasting in 
our model is similar to theirs.
Let X  be a random variable denoting the demand per period in the future. 
Define h(x) to be the probability density function ofX  Note that the distribution 
of X  is considered as the prior information of customer demands that can be 
obtained by the past demand records. Further, we assume that X  follows a 
normal distribution with known mean 0 and standard deviation t.
At the beginning of the current period, the actual demand x, the outcome of 
X, is unknown, and the marketing manager needs to forecast x. The marketing 
manager may use any method to predict x. Let W be the forecast (a random
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variable) for x, and let <y be the efforts in terms of monetary units spent on 
forecasting. Since the precision of W depends on the efforts or money spent on 
forecasting and the nature of the demand, we assume that the mean of IT is a 
function of x and cyand is denoted by \i{cp x); the standard deviation of IT is a
more precise the forecast is. Hence, we assume that c(cj) is a decreasing function 
of Cf. In other words, the first-order derivative of a(cfi with respect to cy is 
negative.
Assume that the realized forecast is w, which can be explained as an 
observation from W. Then, the demand X  for given w can be treated as a posterior 
random variable, and the density function of X\W = w is obtained by the 
following equation.
Recall that W \x = x  follows a normal distribution N(x, cr2(cy)), andX follows
function of cyand is denoted by a 2(cy). If IF is unbiased, as a special case, p(cy x) 
is equal to x. Thus, we further assume that W \x  = x follows N(x, o2(cj)), and its 
density function is g(w | X =x). Usually, the more money spent on forecasting, the
fix\W= w) = g( y\ X  = x)h(x) (3.1)
=*)*(*)<*
a normal distribution N(Q, t 2). After tedious but simple algebra, we have
ftx\W=w) =
J z T P(cf )
1 (3.2a)
where w) = E(X[ W=w) =
x z w + g 1 ( c / )Q
2 /  \  i  9a (cf )+ 1 -
(3.2b)
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,  t 2c t 2 (c ,)
p'(cj, = VarW W= w) = y \ . (3.2c)
a 2(cf )+ x 2
For a detailed proof of the above equations, refer to Appendix A.
From Appendix A, the posterior distribution of X\W = w is also a normal 
distribution. Moreover, the posterior mean p(<y w) can be considered as weighted 
average of w and 0, and the weights are related to their variances. It is interesting 
to show that the posterior mean p(<y w) is influenced by eleven though the mean 
of w \ x  = x  does not depend on <y Furthermore, if <y increases, then forecast 
variance cr2(<y) decreases, and the posterior mean approaches the observation w. 
This means that the effect of realized forecast w on the posterior mean increases 
when forecast variance a  (<y) decreases. Since the first derivative of p(<y) with 
respect to cyis less than zero, p(<y) is a decreasing function of <y.
Moreover, we derive the distribution of the random variable W conditioned 
on prior customer demand X. Note that this random variable is used in the later 
sections. The density function of W \X is  obtained by the following equation.
= x)h(x)dx
= £  , ~ ~ exp( j -  - ) ~~7?==~exp(-v— -2 — )dx. (3.3)
■k° v2ti CT(Cy) 2ct (c7 ) V27t t  2x
After simple integration, we find that w\x is a normal distribution with 
mean 0 and variance a2(cj) + x2.
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3.3. The Value of Information for Forecasting
In this section, we propose the following approach to find the value of 
demand forecasting, which can be interpreted as the upper limit of money or effort 
that may be invested in forecasting.
Assume that x is known with certainty. Let Y be the production quantity in 
the period. Since all unfulfilled orders are lost and leftover products are disposed, 
the beginning inventory level in the period is 0. Let p  be the unit selling price. 
The objective of the system is to decide a production quantity to maximize the 
total profit, which equals the sales revenue minus the sum of the costs in 
forecasting and production. Define H(Y) = 1, if Y> 0; H(Y) = 0, otherwise. Then, 
“the actual total profit” with perfect information of x, T P ^  is as follows.
mac TPm =p(Y, x ) ~  -  [Cj&CY) + cuY + c / Y - x f  + cfx -  T)4], (3.4)
where c„ cu, cd and ct are setup cost, unit production cost, emit inventory disposal 
cost, and unit Iost-sales cost, respectively. Note that unit inventory disposal cost 
cd is positive if it costs money to dispose of the leftover products; cd may be 
negative if the leftover products could be sold to generate a net revenue. However, 
if there is a revenue from disposal, die revenue is assumed to be less than cu and c,; 
otherwise, the production manager would produce an unlimited quantity of 
products to dispose of rather than to satisfy demand.
Let Yw* be the optimal production quantity defined by (3.4), then Y^J equals 
to x  or 0. The corresponding total profits for the production quantity to be x  or 0 
are as follows.
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TP JY= 0)= -cpc,
TPJY=  x) = ( p - c J x - c F (3.5)
The optimal production quantity is decided by the following equation.
. fx , if -c ,x < (/> -cu) x - c „  
wf [0, otherwise. ( }
Define x* to be the threshold such that if x < x \  = 0; otherwise, Y ^ ' = 
x. Hence, from (3.6) we have
x*= -----$ ------. (3.7)
P  +  C i ~ C u
Recall that x is the outcome of X. Further, X  is the demand in the future, 
which follows a known 7/(0, t 2) with the density function h(x). Assume that the 
probability for negative demand is negligible (when 3t «  0, the probability for 
negative demand is very small). Then, the expected total profit under perfect 
information is as follows.
E (T P J Y j))=  £B-c,xh(x)dx+ £ { ( p - c u)x-c ,}h(x)dx. (3.8)
Consider the case when there is no forecast Let TPv/o be the total profit 
without forecasting. Because no forecast is available, the prior distribution of 
customer demand is used. Then, the optimal production quantity of the system is 
determined by the following equation.
TP«0 = p[ £  xh(x)dx + §Yh{x)dx ]
-  [cJXY) + cuY+ cd ( jY -x )K x )d x + c , fc -Y )h (x )d x } .  (3.9)
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If we ignore the setup cost, (3.9) becomes a problem similar to the well- 
known newsboy problem. Let O denote the cdf of the standard normal random 
variable and O-1 denote the inverse of O. Then, the optimal production quantity 
without considering the setup cost is
Yx = (T(B-1( £ t f r - ~ cj».) + e f ,  (3.10)
p  + c,+cd
When setup cost and discontinuity of (3.9) at Y  = 0 are considered, the 
optimal production quantity defined by (3.9) must satisfy the following 
equation.
Y j  = Arc{max{TPw/o(0), T P M )} } ,  (3.11)
where Arc means selecting an optimal production quantity Y^*  such that 
TPiY^o) is maximized. Let TP(Yw/o') be the expected total profit without 
forecasting. Note that TP(Yw/o*) may be negative. This situation may happen in 
the one-period model. However, in the multi-period model, the company may 
be out of business. Clearly, the difference E(TPj(Yw*)) -  TPw/o(Yw/o') can be 
regarded as the upper bound of the investment in forecasting.
3.4. Formulation of the One-Period Decentralized Model
In the decentralized model, when determining investment in forecasting, the 
marketing manager must consider the sales and the dollar amount paid to 
production and forecasting. On the other hand, the production manager must 
consider the revenue from marketing and the costs in production when deciding
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the production quantity. To simplify the model formulation, we analyze the 
problem in die production sector first 
The Production Sector
At the beginning of the period, based on the information on the posterior 
distribution of demand, the production manager must decide an optimal 
production quantity to maximize the total profit T P ^  that is equal to the revenues 
received from marketing minus the costs in the production sector. Assume that the 
realized forecast is w. Recall that the distribution of X  given w is N(p.(cfi w), 
p2(cy)) with the density function fix  | W = w). Let p x be the unit transfer price, 
which is given and decided by the negotiation between production and marketing. 
Then, the problem in the production sector can be formulated as follows.
The optimal production quantity without considering setup cost is obtained 
by the following equation.
Note that Y j  is related to cyand the realized forecast w.
When Yd* > 0, from (3.13), the optimal production quantity is affected by the 
transfer price, the costs in production, the investment in forecasting, and the
max TPjpp =Pl[ jV ( x |J F  = w)dx + £  Yf(x\W = w)dx ] -  \cfl(Y)
+ C./+C, jV - x ) / ( x |J s r  = w)dx + c, f  (x -  Y ) f  (x\W = w)dx ]. (3.12)
(3.13)
Thus, the optimal production quantity Yd is as follows. 
Yd = Arc{max{7P^,p(0), T P ^ Y ^ } } . (3.14)
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distribution of forecast More precisely, the optimal production quantity is an 
increasing function of transfer price, lost-sales cost, posterior mean, and posterior 
standard deviation, but it is a decreasing function of production and inventory 
disposal costs. Besides, the optimal production quantity is an increasing function 
of w) and p(cj) since a larger production quantity is usually used against a less 
precise forecast However, the effect of Cf on optimal production quantity depends 
on the forms of w) and p(cj).
Moreover, the term p(c/-)cD~1(—1 — ) can be considered as representing
Pt+C'+Cj
D — c
the safety stock. A case of interest is that when the value of —— ■— -  gets closerp,+c,+c„
to 1 or 0, Y j  becomes more sensitive to the change of Px +-c‘——. This implies/7,+C,+C,
that when the sum of unit transfer price and unit lost-sales cost minus unit 
inventory disposal cost is relatively close to the sum of unit transfer price, unit 
lost-sales cost, and unit inventory disposal cost, the production manager should 
produce in each period. On the other hand, when unit production cost is relatively 
close the sum of unit transfer price and unit lost-sales cost, the production manager 
should delay the production run. Note that in practice unit transfer price, p u is less 
than unit selling price p.
The Marketing Sector
In the decentralized model, the marketing manager’s objective is to decide 
the investment in forecasting to maximize the total profit, which equals the sales
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revenue minus the dollar amount paid for forecasting and production. The 
marketing manager must incorporate the production manager’s policy into 
decision making since production quantity can affect the total profit of marketing.
From the result in the production sector, a necessary condition for production 
to start a run is that the right side of (3.13) is greater than 0. That is
)+ M fa» )> o . (3.i5)
P i  + C /
From (32b) and (3.2c), the above inequality can be rewritten into
w > -C72( C ^ ^ = - y p ( c ^  + e/T2} «n(C/) (3.16)
P l + C , + C *
Note that n(cj) is a function of Cy. The following proposition shows the 
relation between the forecast and production quantity, which marketing has to 
incorporate into its decision making.
Proposition 3.1. Given an amount o f money invested in demand 
forecasting Cy then there exists a threshold forecast wd such that the optimal 
production quantity Yd satisfies the following two properties.
1. For any realized forecast w, Yd = p(cy)0-1( Pl +c‘ ) + p(cy w) > 0, if w >
Pi +ct +c</
w /; Yd = 0, if w < wd .
2. Moreover, wd > n(cj).
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PROOF.
We prove the second property first From (3.16), it is obvious that wd > 
rt(cj). To prove the first property, (3.15) and the following inequality must be 
held simultaneously.
TP(p(fj)<Sr\P,+C'~C' ) + nOfr w)) -  7P (0) >  0 . (3 . 17)
Pl+C,+Cd
Only when (3.17) and (3.15) are held, then Yd > 0. We can rewrite (3.17) as 
follows.
Define Z to be the standard normal random variable. To simplify the 
calculation process, the following equation is needed to transform a normal density 
function n(y) into the standard normal density function «|>(z).
{- w)} > 0.
After rearrangement, we obtain the following inequality.
(3.18)
(Pi+C, + Cd)\i(cfi w ) - c s -  (cu + cJ)Y
-(P i+ c ,+ cd) ^ ( x - Y ) f ( x \W  = w)dx > 0. (3.19)
^yK{y)dy y {z-k)i}(z)dz + o fy (z )d z , k
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For a proof of the above equation, refer to Silver and Peterson (1985, pages 
695-698, Eq. B.3, B.6, and B.14). In our problem, we define the constant b as 
follows.
Y - a ( c f ,w)
b = , -'r  ■ (3.21)
P (cf )
By (3.20) and (3.21), and after rearrangement, (3.19) is reexpressed as follows. 
(Pi+ct + cj)\i(cfi w ) -c s -  (cu + cJY
~(pt +c, +cd)p(c/ ) { ^ ( z ) d z - b  ^ (z)dz}  >0. (3.22)
A special property of the standard normal distribution is as follows.
£z<f>(z)dz = 4>(z0) . (3.23)
Hence, (3.22) is rewritten as follows.
(Pi+C/ + cj)\i(cfi w) -  cs -  (cu + c£Y
~(Pi+c, + c M c / X m  -  6(1 -  m ) }  > 0. (3.24)
Since Y= p(cAO~l( -p- +c' ~c‘ ) + p(cfi w) > 0, (3.24) is simplified as follows.
P i  +C, + C j
(P\+ C,~ cu)p(cfi w) -  cs + (c, + c M c fm ~ \ pl +C/ c“ )) > 0. (3.25)
P i + c , + c d
The left side of (3.25) is a function of w and ey. From '3.2b) and (3.2c), we have 
the following inequality after rearrangement.
w > a  (C/)P (C/) {cs + (pl +c, + c M c M 's r \ P' +‘:' ~ C'  ))}p ,+ c ,- c .  p, +c, +cd
0 a 2 (cf )
 •tic ,). (3.26)
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Note that in (3.26) P\+ ct -  cu must be positive; otherwise, as discussed 
in the production sector, the production quantity will be 0. The threshold 
forecast wd is a function of c/, hence, we redefine wd to be wd (cj). Since (3.26) 
and (3.16) must be held simultaneously, w /(cy) is obtained by the following 
equation.
wd\cj) = max{«(cy), q(cf)} (3.27)
QED
The threshold forecast has an interesting property. If the realized forecast 
w is greater than the threshold, production will start a run; otherwise, production 
quantity is 0. Since w is an observation of W that follows a normal distribution, 
we have the following conclusion. If the threshold is low, production is more 
likely to produce; otherwise, production is less likely to produce.
From proposition 3.1, given a fixed cy and w > wd (cj), then the optimal
production quantity Yd > 0. Hence, when Yd = p(Cy)$~‘(--‘ -+ c'~ c‘ ) + p(cy w) >
P i  + c i
0, the total profit TPX is as follows.
TPx(w, cj) = (p -/?,)[ W)dx + w)dx] -  cf. (3.28)
On the other hand, given a fixed Cy and w < w/(cy), then the optimal 
production quantity Yd = 0. Thus, when Yd* = 0, the total profit TP2 is
TP2(w,cf ) = - 9.  (3.29)
Moreover, from Section 3.2, the realized forecast w is an observation of the 
random variable W conditioned on prior customer demand X, which follows a
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normal distribution N(Q, c 2(cj) + t 2). Let the cdf of the random variable w \x b e  
M(W\X). Hence, the expected total profit of marketing is as follows.
m ax77> ^=  ^ T P x(w,cf )dM(W\X)  + ^  TP2{w,Cy)dM{W\X).
(3.30)
The optimal value of Cyin (3.30) can be found by a one-dimensional search 
algorithm. Define TP3(w, cj) to be the total profit of the company when Y> 0 and 
TP4(w, cj) to be the total profit of the company when 7 = 0 . After the optimal 
investment in forecasting Cy/ is found, the total profit of the company TP^ and the 
total profit of production TP^ are obtained by the following equations.
TP3(w, cf) = p [  £  xf(x\W =  w)dx +  £  Y'df{x\W  = w)dx ] -  C y -  [cM Y/)
+ cuY j  + cd ^ ( Y ^ -  x )f(x \w  = w)dx + c,£ '( x -YZ  )f(x\W  = w)dx ],
(3.31)
TP4(w, cj) = ~{cf + cp(cfi w)], (3.32)
(3.33)
7^+(<)^ (■) = JT,*(cJa ') - ^ P i .(cJa•). (3.34)
Note that T P T P & and TP^ may not all be positive. This indicates that 
some divisions or the entire company may lose profit because of the inappropriate 
value of unit transfer price. However, it does not happen in practice.
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Another situation is that the threshold forecast may be negative, i.e., xvj(cj) 
< 0. From (3.16), (3.26) and (3.27), this situation may happen. Since the 
probability for w < 0 is negligible, this suggests that production will always start 
a run. Therefore, (3.30) and (3.33) can be rewritten into following equations.
m axTPdm = p  TPx{w,cf )dM{W\X). (3.35)Cf'Z. 0 «mo J
TPdcicfj) s  £  TP3(w,c'fJ) dM{W\X). (3.36)
3.5. Formulation of the One-Period Centralized Model
In the centralized model, both managers consider the sales revenue and the 
costs in forecasting and production when making decisions.
The Production Sector
Recall that the distribution of X  given w is MP-Oy, vv), p2(c/)) with the density 
function./^ I W= w). In the centralized model, the production manager’s objective 
is to determine an optimal production quantity such that the total profit of the 
company TPcp is maximized. Hence, the problem in the production sector can be 
formulated as follows.
max TPcp = p[ ^ x /(x \fV  = w )d x+ [ Yf{x\W = w)dx ] -  cf -[cJKY)
+ cuY + cd^ ( Y - x ) f  {x\IV = w)dx + c, £ (x -Y )f(x \W  = w)dx].
(3.37)
The optimal production quantity when setup cost is excluded from TPcp is
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r ,  = (stcptrXB.± £ ! ^ £ i .) + ^  »))*. (3J8)
p  + c,+ cd
Therefore, the optimal production quantity is obtained by the following 
equation.
Y* = Arc{max{ JP(0), 7?(F3)}}. (3.39)
When Y* > 0, the optimal production quantity is an increasing function of
unit selling price. When comparing (3.38) with (3.13), we find that P+c‘~c« >p+c, +cd
—~+—  — ■ since p  > p v Besides, d>-1(-) is a nondecreasing function; thus, the 
P i  + c i + c i
optimal production quantity in the centralized model is always greater than that in 
the decentralized model. Moreover, p  is greater than cd, ch and cw therefore, 0 <
D  C  -  C—— — -  < 1. Like the classic newsboy problem, p  + c, -  cu is the underage cost, 
p+c, +cd
and cu + cd is the overage cost (Silver and Peterson, 1985, Chapter 10).
The Marketing Sector
The marketing manager’s task is to decide the investment in forecasting to 
maximize the total profit of the company, which equals sales minus the costs in 
forecasting and production.
As discussed in the decentralized model, a necessary condition for Y* > 0 is 
that the right side of (3.38) be greater than zero. Hence,
P ) + p(cfi w) > 0. (3.40)p  + c, + cd
From (3.2b) and (3.2c), the above inequality can be represented as follows.
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w > -a \c}{< tr\p- +- i l. c--y P(cj) + e/T2} = r(cj) (3.41)
p+ c,+ cd
Then, the following proposition shows the relation between the forecast and 
production quantity.
Proposition 3.2. Given an amount of money invested in demand 
forecasting cfi then there exists a threshold forecast w* such that the optimal 
production quantity Y* satisfies the following two properties.
1. For any realized forecast w, Yc* = p(c/)0~t(—- C/ w) > 0, if w >p+c,+cd
wc'; Kc* = 0 ,ifw <w c*.
2. Moreover, w* > r(cj).
PROOF.
We also prove the first property first From (3.41), it is obvious that w* 
> r(cj). Further, (3.40) and the following inequality must be held simultaneously 
to prove the second property.
m p< cjflrX P + C' ~ C- ) + w)) -  TP(0) > 0 . (3.42)
p  + c,+ cd
Following the same process in the decentralized model, we have
w> g (c/ )P_J f / ) (Ci + (p + C/ + crf)p(c/)<t>(0~l(^-+C/ ~- u- ))}
P + Ci~c« P + c,+ cd
0 a 2 (c ,)
 (3-43)
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Again, the threshold w* is a function of Cf. Hence, we redefine wc* to be 
wc (cj). Since (3.41) and (3.43) must be held simultaneously, w*(cj) is obtained 
the following equation.
w*(cj) = max{r(cj), s(cj)}. (3.44)
QED
From proposition 3.2, given a fixed cf  and w > w*(cj), the optimal 
production quantity Y* > 0. Hence, when Y* = p(cj)<b~l( p- - ' ~c°- ) + \i(cfi w) >p+c, +cd
0, the total profit TP3 is as follows.
TPs(w, cj) =p[ £ xfix\W= w)dx + £X J(x \W =  w)dx] -  cf
-[ c s + cuY+cd ^ (Y j-x ) flx \W = w )d x  + cl ^,(Y’e -x)fix\W=w)dx].
(3.45)
On the other hand, given a fixed Cy-and w <wc (cj), the optimal production 
quantity Y* = 0. Hence, when Y* = 0, the total profit TP6 is as follows.
TP6(w, cj) = -[cy+ CAi(cfi w)]. (3.46)
Then, the expected total profit of marketing is as follows.
max27>c = f  TPi(w,cJ )dM(W\X)+ & Cf)TP6(w,cJ )dM(W\X).+*e(ef) J
(3.47)
The optimal Cj* can also be found by a one-dimensional search algorithm. 
Again, if the threshold forecast is negative, i.e., w*(cj) < 0, (3.47) can be 
rewritten into following equation.
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3.6. An Experimental Example for the One-Period Models
In this section, an example is given to analyze the effect of forecasting on the 
decision of production quantity and the coordination between marketing and 
production for the one-period models discussed in the previous sections.
Consider a magazine company that publishes a weekly news magazine. The 
company is assumed to operate as follows. At the beginning of each week, the 
marketing manager has to determine how much money should be invested in 
forecasting to estimate the customer demand in the present week. Then, the 
marketing manager passes the result of forecasting to the production manager, who 
decides how many copies of the magazine to publish in the present week.
Considering the past demand data, the marketing manager assumes that the 
customer demand in each week follows a normal distribution with a prior mean 
equal to 300,000 issues and a prior standard deviation equal to 100,000 issues. 
All magazines are published in the company’s own plant The setup cost is 
$35,000 per production run, and the production cost is $0.65 per issue. The new 
magazines are sold at a price of $2.00 per issue. However, the unsold magazines 
are disposed of at the end of the week at a disposal cost of $0.10 per issue. All 
unsatisfied demands are lost, at an estimated cost of $0.05 per issue. We have
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implemented several FORTRAN programs to solve the problem, and we discuss 
the results as follows.
Value of Information
From the computer printout, we find that the total profit with perfect 
information is $370,126, and the total profit without forecasting is $290,461. The 
difference in the two values is $79,665, which can be interpreted as an upper 
bound of the amount of money that could be invested in forecasting. The 
difference implies that demand forecasting may significantly improve the total 
profit of the company.
The Results of the Decentralized and Centralized Models
We assume that, from the past data, the forecast is unbiased and its standard 
deviation can be approximated as a(cj) = l/(yCf+ P), where p = 0.000001 and y = 
0.0005 per thousand dollars.
Assume that, in the decentralized company, the marketing division agrees to 
pay a unit transfer price to the production division for every product sold. The 
transfer price is assumed to be equal to the sum of all variable costs in the 
production division. Thus, the unit transfer price is $0.80, which is the sum of unit 
production cost, unit lost-sales, and unit inventory disposal cost The results in the 
marketing divisions of the decentralized and centralized companies are given in 
the following table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: The Results of a Simple Example in the One-Period Models—(I)
The decentralized model The centralized 
model
Total profit of company $343,159 $362,365
Total profit of marketing $333,037
Total profit of production $10,122
The investment in forecasting $5295 $3,776
Threshold forecast 179,828 27,166
Forecasting STD 5,295 5,030
From table 3.1, we find that the total profit of the company in the centralized 
model is 5.6% greater than that in the decentralized model. Further, the total 
profits of the company in both the decentralized and centralized models are much 
greater than the total profit without forecasting but less than the total profit with 
perfect information. This shows that the total profit without forecasting can be 
considered as the lower bound of the total profit in the centralized and 
decentralized models, and the total profit with perfect information is the upper 
bound.
Another interesting situation is that the marketing in the decentralized model 
spends more money on forecasting than is the case in the centralized model. This 
situation may be explained as follows. From Section 3.5 and 3.6, for a given 
investment in forecasting, the production quantity in the decentralized model is 
always less than that in the centralized model. Therefore, marketing in the 
decentralized company may need to invest more money in forecasting to obtain 
more precise forecast to improve its total profit
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Besides, the threshold forecast for the production division to set up a 
production run in the centralized model is much less than that in the decentralized 
model. This means that in the centralized model the production division is more 
likely to response to customer demand. This situation may also be explained as 
follows. The main factor affecting the threshold forecast is the overall cost If the 
overall cost increases, the threshold increases. Since the production quantity in the 
centralized model tends to be greater than that in the decentralized model, the 
overall cost shared by each product in the centralized model is less than that in the 
decentralized model. Therefore, the threshold forecast in the centralized model is 
less than that in the decentralized model. Furthermore, since marketing in the 
decentralized model spends more money on forecasting, the forecast standard 
deviation in the decentralized model is smaller than that in the centralized model.
As a special case, assume that the realized forecast is 310,000 issues. Based 
on the discussion in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 and from the computer printout, we 
summarize the results in the decentralized and centralized models as table 3.2.
Table 3 J2: The Results of a Simple Example in the One-Period Models—(II)
The decentralized model The centralized model
Total profit of company $373,158 $375,694
Total profit of marketing $362,657
Total profit of production $10,501
Production quantity 307,060 311,926
Post STD 3,637 5,024
Post mean 309,987 309,975
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From table 3.2, the total profit of the company and production quantity in the 
decentralized model are less than those in the centralized model. Since total profit 
and production quantity are affected by the realized forecast and the investment in 
forecasting, it is meaningless to compare the results for these two models. 
However, as expected, the production quantity in the decentralized model is less 
than that in the centralized model. Furthermore, since the marketing division in 
the decentralized model spends more money on forecasting, the posterior standard 
deviation in the decentralized model is smaller than that in the centralized model. 
The posterior standard deviations of these two models are much smaller than the 
prior standard deviation, that is 100,000. Thus, from (3.2c), the posterior means of 
these two models are close to the realized forecast, that is 310,000.
3.7. The Decision on Unit Transfer Price
In this section, we assume that unit transfer price is no longer given. In the 
following scenarios, we consider the decentralized companies with three types of 
policies about the decision on the unit transfer price.
Scenario 1: Marketing decides the unit transfer price and the investment in 
forecasting, simultaneously. The policy of the company in scenario 1 can be 
considered as a marketing-oriented policy because marketing has more powers 
and authorizations than does production.
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From the discussion in Section 3.4, the new problem o f marketing is to 
decide an optimal unit transfer price and an optimal investment in forecasting to 
maximize its expected total profit, which can be expressed as follows.
nuaZ P * .
= [" 77> {M>,cf ,p x) dM{W\X) + P  C/ TP2(w,cf ,p x)dM(W\X). (3.49)
Because the unit transfer price is not fixed, 7?! and TP2 in (3.49) become 
functions of w, andp x. Moreover, the optimal values of Cy andp x in (3.49) can 
be found by a two-dimension search algorithm. After the optimal c ^  and p  Xm are 
found, the total profit of the company TP^ and the total profit of production TPmp 
are obtained by the following equations (note that TP2 and TP4 also become 
functions of w, Cy and p x).
T P ^ c'm p \ J  = £ ., . T P ^ ,c M, p \ , ) m w \ X )\cJa )
+ £ £ ‘"'TPt {w,Cj.,p\m)dM(W\X). (3.50)
TPmp{cfi„ ,p \m) = TPm£ c fin,p 'Xm) -  T P „ J c j^ p \^ ,  (3.51)
TPmp(c'jm,p\j, TP ^C fivP*, J ,  T P ^ C f r p '^  > 0. (3.52)
In (3.52), we restrict that all the total profits should not be negative. In 
other words, marketing’s decision should not cause production or the company 
to lose money. If (3.52) is violated, marketing should decide a unit transfer 
price to maximize its divisional profit subject to the constraint that the profits of
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production and the company are positive. Therefore, the nonegativity condition 
in (3.52) becomes a constraint for (3.49).
Note that the threshold forecast may be negative, i.e., w /(c ^ )  < 0. Assume 
that the probability for the forecast to be negative is negligible. Then, (3.49) and 
(3.50) can be rewritten into the following equations.
mzxTPm, = £ oTP,(w,c/ ,p,)dM(fP\jO. (3.53)
TPUc'm p ' im) = £ iy ,(w ,c i .p L .)  dM(W\X>. (3.54)
Scenario 2: Production decides the unit transfer price before marketing
determines the investment in forecasting. Compared with that of the company 
in scenario 1, the policy of the company in scenario 2 can be considered as a 
production-oriented policy.
The problem of production is to decide an optimal unit transfer price to 
maximize its expected total profit, which is equal to the revenue received from 
marketing minus its divisional cost.
max TPpp = j* ^  {/>,[ [^xf(x\W  = w)dx + JT Yf{x\W = w)dx ]
-  [cJi(Y) + cuY+ cd[ i(Y -x ) f(x \W  = w)dx
+c, J f (x -  Y)f(x\W  = w)dx ]}dM(W\X) + £ (e/) {- W)}dM(W\X).
(3-55)
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Note that (3.55) is related to Cp and Cf is decided by marketing. To solve
(3.55), we fix the value of the unit transfer price, and solve the follow ing 
problem for marketing.
max TP,pm
= [ :^ T P l(w,cf ,p l)dM(W\X) + £ iC' )TP2(w,cf ,p l)dM(W\X). (3.56)
After the optimal investment in forecasting for a given unit transfer price in
(3.56) is found, it is substituted in (3.55) to obtain the value of TPpp for a given 
unit transfer price. In this way, we can find the values of TPpp for the entire range 
of px. Then, the optimal c ^  and p  Xp are found when the corresponding TPpp is at 
a maximum. Furthermore, the total profit of the company TP^ and the total 
profit of marketing TP pm are obtained by the following equations.
TPpAc'jj»p'ip) =  l .^ T P ,iw .o t „p ,p)dM(W\x,
+ £ ‘‘#> rp4 (w,4  \X). (3.57)
TPpJc'frp'xp) = TPpJp Jp,p\p) -  TPpp(c Jp,p\p), (3.58)
TPpm{c jp ,p \p), TPpj/jp ,p\p), TPppicjp,p\p) > 0. (3.59)
Again, if (3.59) is violated, the nonegativity condition in (3.59) becomes a 
constraint for (3.55). Moreover, if wd\ c ^ )  < 0, (3.55) and (3.56) can be 
rewritten into the following equations.
max TPpp = JT {px[ = w)dx + £  Yf (x\W = w)dx ]
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-  [CsH(Y) + c„7+ c ,£ (T -x ) /(x |F T  = w)<fc
+c, £  (x -  r)/(*|r= w)dx ]}dM(w\X). (3.60)
^ r P /OTI =  £ 7 ? ,(w ,c / ,/71) d M ^ rl^). (3.61)
Scenario 3: Unit transfer price is decided by considering the overall profit of 
the company, before marketing determines the investment in forecasting. 
Compared with those of the companies in the previous two scenarios, the policy 
of the company in scenario 3 can be considered as a coordination policy. That 
is, the decision on the unit transfer price is coordinated, but each division makes 
its own divisional decision.
The problem can be formulated into the following equation.
max TP™.
* 2 0  00
= [ :^ T P 3{w,cf ,Pl)dM{W\X) + £ C/)TP4iw,cf ,Pl) dM(W\X). (3.62)
(3.62) is also related to cfi and Cj is decided by marketing. Let TPom = 
TPpm. By the same solution procedure in scenario 2, the optimal investment in 
forecasting for a given unit transfer price in (3.56) is found; then, it is substituted 
in (3.62) to obtain the value of TP^ for a given unit transfer price. Until the values 
of TPoc for the entire range of p x are obtained, then the optimal c jQ and p*Xo are 
found when the corresponding TPX is at a maximum. Furthermore, the total 
profit of the company TPop and the total profit of marketing TP ^  are obtained by 
the following equations.
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TPop(Pfo,p\o)  =  f . ( c i )  {p\o[[^*f(.Aw  = " 0 *  +  J f  Yf(x\W =  w)dx ]
-  [CsH(Y) + cuY+cd[ j y - x ) M W  = w)dx
+ c, £ (X-  Y)f(x\W  = w)dx]}dM(W\X)
+ £ (C>) ( -  ™)}dM(w\X). (3.63)
TPomte*fo>p\o) = TPJc'f^p*  J0) -  TPop(cfo, p \ 0\  (3.64)
TPomte fo>p\o\ T P J c fo, p \ 0), TPop(cfo, p \ 0) > 0. (3.65)
If (3.65) is violated, the nonegativity condition in (3.65) becomes a
constraint for (3.62). Furthermore, if threshold forecast is negative, i.e., c fo)
< 0, then (3.56) and (3.62) can be rewritten into the following equations.
max TPom = (" TPX (w,cf  ,P l) dM{W\X). (3.66)
20
TPolcfo,p Xo) = ^ T P 2(w,cf ,Pi)dM(W\X). (3.67)
After formulating the new one-period decentralized models, we further 
study the effect of demand forecasting on production policy, using the numerical 
analyses in next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
NUMERICAL ANALYSES FOR THE ONE-PERIOD 
DECENTRALIZED MODELS
4.1. Introdnction
In Section 3.7, we discussed three types of policies about the decision on 
the unit transfer price in the decentralized companies. For the three types of 
policies, we made different assumptions about the unit transfer price, the price 
that is paid by marketing to production for every product sold. For a marketing- 
oriented policy, the unit transfer price is decided by marketing; for a production- 
oriented policy, it is decided by production; and for a coordination policy, it is 
determined by considering the overall total profit of the company. In this 
chapter, we provide numerical analyses for the one-period decentralized models 
of the companies with the three types of policies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss 
two cases of forecast standard deviation, cy(cj), which are used in this and the 
next chapters. In Section 4.3, we analyze the results of numerical analysis. 
Finally, we summarize the results in Section 4.4.
4.2. Two Special Cases of Forecast Standard Deviation
In this section, we discuss the following two cases of a(cj), which are used 
in the later numerical analyses. Note that, in this and the next chapters, the 
system setting of the example for the numerical analyses is the same as that in 
Section 3.6.
66
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Case 1 :cr(cy) = 1 / (ycf + p), p ,y >0. (4.1)
where, Cj is the investment in forecasting, and y and p are parameters 
relating to the precision of the forecast. We assume y = 5.0E-8 and 1/p = 
100,000.
Case 2:a(cf) = (1/p) exp(-y cf), P ,y>0. (4.2)
Similarly, we assume that y = 5.0E-4 and 1/p = x = 100,000.
In both cases, when Cy= 0, then a(0) = 1/p = 100,000 issues, which is equal 
to the prior standard deviation of demand. The relations between the two cases of 
a(cy)’s and Cy are described in figure 4.1. Note that, in figure 4.1, fstd, and fstd2 
represent the forecast standard deviations in cases I and 2, respectively.
100000 
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80000 
70000 
— 60000 
I  50000 
■3 40000
30000 
20000 
10000 
0
Figure 4.1: Forecast STD Case 1 vs Case 2 
From (4.1), (4.2), and figure 4.1, a(<y)’s in the two cases are decreasing 
functions of Cy. This indicates that the forecast becomes more precise when 
more money is invested in forecasting. It is easy to verify that there exists a 
constant C such that, if Cj< C, then a(cy) in case 1 is greater than that in case 2;
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otherwise, if cf> C, c(cj) in case 1 is less than or equal to that in case 2. We call 
C a break-even value in the later discussion. In our example, the break-even 
value is about $7,230, and it is close to the tail parts of the two curves in figure
4.1.
From the above, we have the following conclusion. Assume that, in case 1 
of the centralized and decentralized models, the values of prices, costs, and the 
investment in forecasting are the same as their counterparts in case 2. We 
conclude that, if the investments are greater than the break-even value $7,230, 
then the company in case 1 has a smaller total profit than its counterpart in case
2. On the other hand, if the investments are less than the break-even value, then 
the company in case 1 has a larger total profit than its counterpart
4 3 . Sensitivity Analyses for the One-Period Decentralized Models
There are eight model parameters that may influence the results of 
sensitivity analyses for the one-period decentralized models. We divide them 
into two groups. The first group, concerning the price and cost structure of the 
model, includes five parameters: unit selling price, unit production cost, unit 
inventory disposal cost, unit lost-sales cost, and setup cost. The second group, 
relating to customer demand and the forecast, includes prior mean, prior 
standard deviation, and the precision coefficient y.
In this section, for each parameter, we discuss the results of sensitivity 
analyses for the one-period decentralized models of the three types of
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companies. Our purpose is to evaluate the effect of each parameter on the 
performances of the companies and on the decisions (behaviors) of marketing 
and production. We also study the effects of the two cases of a(cy) on the 
performances of the companies. In the following discussion, when analyzing the 
results in case 2, we describe the results that are different from those in case 1.
4.3.1. The Effect of Selling Price
We increase the unit selling price from $0.9 to $2.5 by increments of $0.1. 
The results of the performances of the three types of companies and the 
decisions of marketing and production are discussed as the follows.
The Results in Case 1
The effect of selling price on the total profits is shown in figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of Selling Price on the Total Profits of the Company
in the Decentralized Models
From figure 4.1, we find that all tire total profits increase. Among the
decentralized companies, the company with the coordination policy has the best
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performance since its total profit of the company, TPoc, is the largest (this 
statement is true throughout the analysis). Moreover, the total profit of the 
company with the marketing-oriented policy, TPmc, is larger than the total profit 
of the company with production-oriented policy, TPpc, when the unit selling 
price is relatively high or low. This indicates that the performance of the 
company with the marketing-oriented policy is better than that of the company 
with the production-oriented policy when the unit selling price is relatively high 
or low. As to the unit transfer price, the result is shown in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The Effect of Selling Price on the Unit Transfer Prices 
in the Decentralized Model
From figure 4.3, we find that all the unit transfer prices increase.
Moreover, the unit transfer price of the company with production-oriented
policy is the largest, and the unit transfer price of the company with the
marketing-oriented policy is the smallest. In other words, the relationship p lp >
P\o > P\m Is tiue. This indicates that production prefers a larger unit transfer
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price, but marketing favors a lower unit transfer price, and the result in the 
company with coordination policy can be considered as an outcome of 
cooperation (this statement is true throughout the analysis). Sincep lm represents 
the unit transfer price that marketing wants to pay to production, and p Xp denotes 
the unit transfer price that production wants to receive from marketing, the 
difference between p ]p and p lm can be considered as divisional conflicts on the 
unit transfer price. From figure 4.3, we find that the difference between p lp and 
Pim increases. This reveals that the conflicts become more intense when the unit 
selling price increases.
In regard to the investment in forecasting, the result is shown in figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: The Effect of Selling Price on the Investments in Forecasting 
in the Decentralized Models
From figure 4.4, most the investments seem to increase in a concave
pattern. Furthermore, the investment of the company with marketing-oriented
policy is the largest, and the investment of the company with the production-
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oriented policy is the smallest. That is, the relationship Cfm > Cj0 > Cfp is true. 
This suggests that when the unit transfer price is decided by itself, marketing 
tends to spend more money on forecasting; however, when the unit transfer price 
is decided by production, marketing tends to invest less money in forecasting, 
and the result in the company with coordination policy can be considered as an 
outcome of cooperation (this statement is true throughout the analysis).
With respect to threshold forecast, the result is shown in figure 4.5.
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From figure 4.5, all the threshold forecasts seem to decrease in a convex 
pattern. The threshold of the company with marketing-oriented policy is the 
largest, and the threshold of the company with the production-oriented policy is 
the smallest; namely, the relationship thresholdm > threshold0 > thresholdp is 
true. This means that, when the unit transfer price is decided by itself, 
production is more likely to start a new run; however, when the unit transfer
150000
100000
50000
. _ .  Ihresholdo
(. thresholdm
\  thresholdp
unit se llin g  p r ice  ($ )
Figure 4.5: The Effect of Selling Price on Threshold Forecasts 
in the Decentralized Models
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price is decided by marketing, production becomes less likely to produce, and 
the result in the company with the coordination policy is an outcome of 
coordination (this statement is true throughout the analysis, except that, in case 2 
in the analysis of setup cost, threshold,,, may be less than threshold0).
The same results in the above figures can also be found in table 4.1 in the 
next page. For the definitions of the notations in the table, refer to Appendix B.
From the second, fifth, eighth, and eleventh columns of table 4.1, we 
discuss the result in the company with the coordination policy as follows. The 
total profit of the company increases with the unit selling price (we assume the 
increase in unit selling price does not affect the distribution of demand). 
Moreover, marketing is willing to spend more money on forecasting. Because 
the unit transfer price also increases, production is more likely to start a new run.
From the third, sixth, ninth, and twelfth columns of table 4.1, we find that 
the result in the company with the marketing-oriented policy is the same as that 
of the previous company. As for the company with the production-oriented 
policy, from the fourth, seventh, tenth, and thirteenth columns of table 4.1, the 
result is almost the same as that of the company with the coordination policy, 
except that the investment in forecasting fluctuates. The fluctuation of the
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Table 4.1: The Effect of Selling Price on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
p T Pk k  OC T Pkk me T P*  p c P lo Plm P ip c fo cfm cfP threshold0 thresholdm threshold0
0.9 33722 32319 28271 0.81 0.77 0.88 1274 1855 353 182686 219106 149047
1.0 63075 58810 56590 0.85 0.77 0.97 1514 2525 401 152754 215998 110312
1.1 92677 85342 83046 0.89 0.77 1.07 1685 3061 335 131526 214398 82557
1.2 122366 111938 112609 0.93 0.77 1.16 1820 3517 386 115574 213388 67933
1.3 152105 141785 139869 0.96 0.78 1.26 1989 3711 343 105702 201429 52872
1.4 181874 171921 167144 0.99 0.79 1.36 2131 3865 306 97441 190797 40066
1.5 211664 199703 197413 1.03 0.79 1.45 2203 4199 349 88491 190315 35854
1.6 241473 230357 225115 1.06 0.80 1.55 2311 4300 319 82670 180852 26925
1.7 271297 258528 252777 1.09 0.80 1.65 2407 4563 291 77581 180541 18509
1.8 301133 286729 280511 1.13 0.80 1.75 2452 4859 267 71824 180229 10626
1.9 330980 317928 311319 1.16 0.81 1.84 2529 4896 303 67969 171760 11339
2.0 360839 346421 341793 1.19 0.81 1.93 2599 5140 332 64511 171536 11147
2.1 390705 374925 367110 1.22 0.81 2.04 2662 5363 260 61394 171348 0
2.2 420580 406389 395078 1.25 0.82 2.14 2720 5343 241 58567 163703 0
2.3 450462 435121 426181 1.28 0.82 2.23 2773 5537 272 55992 163553 0
2.4 480350 463871 454379 1.32 0.82 2.33 2790 5775 255 52945 163382 0
2.5 510246 492617 482577 1.35 0.82 2.43 2836 5921 239 50835 163283 0
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investment in forecasting may be caused by the changes in the unit selling price 
and the unit transfer price.
The Results In Case 2
The results in case 2 are given in table 4.2 in the next page. From table
4.2, the relationship TP^ > TPmc > TPpc is true. This means that the company 
with the marketing-oriented policy has a better performance than does the 
company with the production-oriented policy. Moreover, P\p is always equal to 
the unit selling price, and Cjp is always equal to 0.
The results for the companies in case 2 are discussed as follows.
From the second, fifth, eighth, and eleventh columns of table 4.2, we find 
that the result in the company with the coordination policy is the same as that in 
case 1. From the third, sixth, ninth, and twelfth columns of table 4.2, we also 
find that the result in the company with marketing-oriented policy is also the 
same as that in case 1.
In regard to the company with the production-oriented policy, the total 
profit of the company increases with unit selling price (from the fourth column 
of table 4.2). Because the unit transfer price also increases (from the seventh 
column of table 4.2), production is more likely to produce (from the thirteenth 
column of table 4.2). In addition, since production takes all profits, marketing 
invests nothing in forecasting (from the tenth column of table 4.2).
Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
Comparing tables 4.1 with 4.2, we have the following findings.
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Table 4.2: The Effect of Selling Price on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
p TP1 1  OC TP11 me TP1 1  P C P\o Plm Pip Cfo cJm c fP threshold0 thresholdm threshold
0.9 30290 29562 15536 0.79 0.77 0.9 4059 4709 0 200685 218800 101578
1.0 59977 56603 40228 0.83 0.77 1.0 4431 5836 0 164774 213420 25256
1.1 89864 83568 65852 0.86 0.77 1.1 4854 6538 0 144438 211242 0
1.2 119806 110581 92287 0.90 0.77 1.2 5026 7062 0 125134 210029 0
1.3 149764 140663 119134 0.93 0.78 1.3 5284 7268 0 113268 198117 0
1.4 179723 168327 146311 0.96 0.78 1.4 5491 7637 0 103521 197508 0
1.5 209684 199120 173757 0.98 0.79 1.5 5741 7744 0 97596 187063 0
1.6 239643 227250 201427 1.01 0.79 1.6 5876 7994 0 90342 186733 0
1.7 269603 258402 229286 1.03 0.80 1.7 6059 8064 0 85873 177393 0
1.8 299564 286895 257309 1.06 0.80 1.8 6156 8291 0 80230 177140 0
1.9 329526 315396 285472 1.09 0.80 1.9 6241 8473 0 75288 176956 0
2.0 359491 346959 313757 1.11 0.81 2.0 6370 8510 0 72196 168555 0
2.1 389456 375725 342152 1.13 0.81 2.1 6484 8647 0 69361 168431 0
2.2 419422 404506 370642 1.16 0.81 2.2 6539 8804 0 66649 168300 0
2.3 449390 436244 399218 1.18 0.82 2.3 6634 8823 0 63306 160683 0
2.4 479359 465228 427872 1.20 0.82 2.4 6720 8942 0 61131 160592 0
2.5 509329 494225 456595 1.23 0.82 2.5 6757 9101 0 58235 160478 0
-j
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The company with coordination policy in case 2 invests more in 
forecasting than does its counterpart in case 1 (compare the eighth column of 
table 4.1 with that of table 4.2). However, its total profit is less than that o f its 
counterpart (compare the second column of table 4.1 with that of table 4.2). 
Furthermore, since it invests more money in forecasting, less profits can be 
shared with production; thus, its unit transfer price is smaller (compare the fifth 
column of table 4.1 with that of table 4.2), and it is less likely to produce 
(compare the eleventh column of table 4.1 with that of table 4.2).
The company with the marketing-oriented policy in case 2 also invests 
more money in forecasting (compare the ninth column of table 4.1 with that of 
table 4.2). The larger investment may improve its total profit to the point that it 
is larger than that of its counterpart (this may occur when cy in case 2 is larger 
than the break-even value). However, the difference in investment seems not to 
affect the decision on the unit transfer price since the unit transfer prices in the 
two cases are almost the same (compare the sixth column of table 4.1 with that 
of table 4.2).
The production division of the company with production-oriented policy in 
case 2 takes all profits (compare the seventh column of table 4.1 with that of 
table 4.2). As a result, in case 2, the production division is more likely to 
produce (compare the thirteenth column of table 4.1 with that of table 4.2), and 
the marketing division does not invest any money in forecasting (compare the 
tenth column of table 4.1 with that of table 4.2).
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4.3.2. The Effect of Production Cost
We increase the value of the unit production cost from $0.0 to $2.0 by 
increments of $0.1. The results in the companies are discussed as follows.
The Results in Case 1
The effect of production cost on the total profits is shown in figure 4.6 in 
the next page. From figure 4.6, we find that all the total profits decrease. 
Furthermore, TPpc is larger than TPmc when the unit production cost is less than 
$0.1. This suggests that the performance of the company with production- 
oriented policy is better than that of the company with the marketing-oriented 
policy when the unit production cost is relatively low.
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Figure 4.6: The Effect of Production Cost on the Total Profits of the Company in
the Decentralized Models 
As for the effect of production cost on the unit transfer price is shown in
figure 4.7. From figures 4.7, most the unit transfer prices increase. Moreover,
the difference between p lp and p Xm decreases. This implies that the divisional
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conflicts on the unit transfer price become less intense when the unit production 
cost increases.
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Figure 4.7: The Effect of Production Cost on the Unit Transfer Prices 
in the Decentralized Models
In respect to the effect of production cost on the investment in forecasting
is shown in figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: The Effect of Production Cost on the Investments 
in Forecasting in the Decentralized Models
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From figure 4.8, the shapes of most the investments in forecasting seem 
like concave curves. The effect of production cost on threshold forecast is 
shown in figure 4.9.
250000
200000
I  150000
I00000
th resholdo
50000 thresholdm
thresholdp
o '  o* o '  o ' —' — —
unit production cost ($ )
Figure 4.9: The Effect of Production Cost on Threshold Forecasts 
in the Decentralized Models
From figure 4.9, most the threshold forecasts seem to decrease in a convex 
pattern.
The same results in the above figures are summarized in tables 4.3 in the 
next page. We discuss the results in the companies as follows.
The total profit of the company with coordination policy decreases when 
the unit production cost increases. To compensate the increase in the unit 
production cost, more profits should be given to production; thus, the unit 
transfer price increases. However, the increase in the unit transfer price does not 
compensate the increase in production cost. As a result, production is less likely 
to produce. Moreover, when the unit production cost is relatively low,
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Table 4.3: Effect of Production Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case i
Cu TP1 1  OC TPmc TP** pc Plo Plm Pip C/o cfm cfp threshold0 thresholdm thresholdp
0.00 560051 549506 550202 0.65 0.20 2 1081 2690 0 47624 142535 0
0.10 528635 514031 509700 0.76 0.28 2 1567 3835 0 50404 155498 0
0.20 497716 481022 471238 0.85 0.37 2 1896 4470 0 52485 162799 0
0.30 467058 451336 434277 0.93 0.47 2 2143 4789 0 54799 163073 0
0.40 436570 421889 398551 1.01 0.57 2 2318 4893 0 56975 163382 0
0.50 406207 392629 381762 1.08 0.67 1.94 2469 4978 189 60033 163629 0
0.60 375940 360839 353289 1.15 0.76 1.94 2577 5124 250 63292 171434 0
0.70 345755 332009 325117 1.22 0.86 1.94 2648 5066 310 66827 171711 11211
0.80 315640 303264 296832 1.29 0.96 1.94 2686 4972 367 70710 172003 21555
0.90 285588 271991 265916 1.36 1.05 1.95 2692 4998 357 75022 180587 26247
1.00 255595 243651 238005 1.43 1.15 1.95 2669 4829 409 79856 180937 35327
1.10 225655 212686 210176 1.50 1.24 1.95 2613 4774 462 85339 190470 43962
1.20 195770 184815 179649 1.57 1.34 1.96 2576 4522 428 91621 190942 50417
1.30 165942 154380 152305 1.63 1.43 1.96 2459 4388 480 101210 201628 60858
1.40 136171 127093 125029 1.69 1.53 1.96 2364 4023 535 113036 202373 72754
1.50 106475 97587 95189 1.76 1.62 1.97 2161 3786 474 124425 214558 86513
1.60 76872 71070 68712 1.82 1.72 1.97 1978 3244 538 142953 216034 106873
1.70 47450 44665 42524 1.88 1.82 1.97 1729 2593 626 168254 218493 136842
00
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marketing is willing to invest more money in forecasting. However, when the 
unit production cost is relatively high, most profits have been given to 
production; therefore, the investment begins to fall.
In the company with the marketing-oriented policy, the result is the same 
as that in the previous company. As for the company with the production- 
oriented policy, the total profit of the company decreases. Furthermore, when 
the unit production cost is relatively low, forecasting is not useful; hence, 
production tends to take all profits. As a result, the unit transfer price is $2, and 
threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting are 0. When the unit 
production cost is in mid-range, forecasting becomes more important, and 
production begins to share profit with marketing. Thus, the unit transfer price 
decreases, marketing begins to invest money in forecasting, but production 
becomes less likely to produce. When the unit production cost is relatively high, 
forecasting becomes not useful again, and production becomes reluctant to share 
profits with marketing. Therefore, the unit transfer price increases slowly, but 
production is still less likely to produce since production cost is too high. 
Moreover, marketing is still willing to increase the investment in forecasting.
The Results in Case 2
The results in case 2 are summarized in tables 4.4. We find the trends (the 
increase or decrease) of the total profit, unit transfer price, investment in 
forecasting, and threshold forecast in case 2 are the same as their counterparts in 
case 1.
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Table 4.4: Effect of Production Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
TP11 oc TP11 me TP1 1  P C P \o Plm Pip Cfo c fm cfP threshold0 thresholdm thresholdD
0.00 556550 525681 550202 0.49 0.14 2 3599 7211 0 63141 185653 0
0.10 525770 510196 509700 0.62 0.27 2 4794 7577 0 63430 160740 0
0.20 495314 480679 471238 0.72 0.37 2 5422 7997 0 64095 160741 0
0.30 465015 451362 434277 0.82 0.47 2 5771 8251 0 64364 160749 0
0.40 434803 419276 398551 0.90 0.56 2 6065 8493 0 66756 168311 0
0.50 404650 390315 363907 0.99 0.66 2 6210 8521 0 68113 168404 0
0.60 374536 361402 330243 1.07 0.76 2 6331 8526 0 70778 168497 0
0.70 344452 332522 297494 1.15 0.86 2 6394 8479 0 73681 168626 0
0.80 314395 300997 265616 1.23 0.95 2 6411 8530 0 76854 177016 0
0.90 284354 272424 234582 1.31 1.05 2 6380 8425 0 80354 177193 0
1.00 254333 243875 204375 1.38 1.15 2 6367 8287 0 85997 177414 0
1.10 224327 212842 174995 1.45 1.24 2 6319 8246 0 92517 186775 0
1.20 194333 184671 178021 1.53 1.34 1.88 6154 8030 2321 97800 187127 57346
1.30 164352 154067 150231 1.60 1.43 1.89 6011 7914 2447 106449 197643 68119
1.40 134378 126388 119705 1.67 1.53 1.91 5805 7575 2243 116884 198292 79110
1.50 104424 96592 92180 1.74 1.62 1.92 5525 7341 2313 129733 210340 95934
1.60 74508 69686 65090 1.80 1.72 1.93 5286 6778 2398 150847 211851 118859
1.70 44674 42611 38829 1.86 1.82 1.94 4952 5933 2572 180356 215035 152710
OOU>
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Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
When comparing tables 4.4 with 4.3, we find an interesting situation. In 
case 2, the company with the marketing-oriented or coordination policy has a 
larger investment in forecasting than its counterpart in case 1 (the investment of 
case 2 could be two times larger than that of case 1). However, in case 2 of the 
company with the production-oriented policy, marketing spends nothing on 
forecasting at first, but it spends three times more money than its counterpart in 
case 1 if it decides to invest This suggests that, in case 2 of the company with 
the production-oriented policy, marketing’s behavior is much extreme.
We discuss the results of the comparison between cases 1 and 2 as follows. 
In the company with the coordination or marketing-oriented policy, the 
result is the same as that in the corresponding analysis of the unit selling price.
The situation in the company with the production-oriented policy is 
described as follows. If  the production divisions in both cases take all profits, 
then total profits, unit transfer prices, investments in forecasting, and threshold 
forecasts in the two cases are the same. When only the production division in 
case 2 takes all profits, the total profit of the company in case 2 is less than that 
of its counterpart in case 1 since marketing spends nothing on forecasting. 
However, the production division in case 2 is more likely to produce. When the 
production divisions in both cases do not take all profits, the company in case 2 
invests more money in forecasting. In spite of the larger investment in 
forecasting, its total profit is less than that of its counterpart. Because it invests
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more money in forecasting, less profits can be shared between divisions. Thus, 
its unit transfer price is lower, and it is less likely to produce.
4.3.3. The Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost
After increasing the value of the unit inventory disposal cost from $0.0 to 
$2.0 by increments of $0.1, we summarize the results in tables 4.5 and 4.6 in the 
next two pages.
The Results in Case 1
From table 4.5, the relationship TP0C > TPmc > TPpc is true. This indicates 
that the performance of the company with the marketing-oriented policy is better 
than that of the company with the production-oriented policy. Moreover, from 
figure 4.10, the difference between p lp andp lm is rather stable.
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Figure 4.10: The Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost on the Unit Transfer Prices
in the Decentralized Models
This suggests that the change in the unit inventory disposal cost may have
little influence on the divisional conflicts on the unit transfer price.
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Table 4.5: Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
Cd TP1 1  OC TPx * me TPDC P\o P\m P\p cfo Cfm cfp threshold0 thresholdm threshold„
0.0 361184 346780 339530 1.19 0.81 1.94 2453 4953 240 64281 171457 0
0.1 360839 346421 341793 1.19 0.81 1.93 2599 5140 332 64511 171536 11147
0.2 360536 346111 338900 1.19 0.81 1.94 2727 5291 316 64696 171611 11004
0.3 360267 345835 338572 1.19 0.81 1.94 2842 5391 348 64846 171703 15521
0.4 360026 345592 338268 1.19 0.81 1.94 2944 5481 377 64975 171782 19015
0.5 359807 345379 337963 1.20 0.81 1.94 2999 5588 403 64105 171830 21777
0.6 359608 345188 337728 1.19 0.81 1.94 3122 5687 428 65182 171870 24089
0.7 359425 345014 337457 1.20 0.81 1.94 3161 5777 450 64290 171907 25972
0.8 359257 344855 337227 1.20 0.81 1.94 3233 5859 471 64368 171941 27590
0.9 359100 344708 337028 1.20 0.81 1.94 3299 5935 491 64439 171971 28993
1.0 358955 344572 336807 1.20 0.81 1.94 3361 6004 509 64502 172001 30196
1.1 358818 344447 336603 1.20 0.81 1.94 3419 6069 526 64561 172027 31257
1.2 358690 344329 336448 1.19 0.81 1.94 3514 6130 543 65586 172052 32216
1.3 358570 344219 336258 1.19 0.81 1.94 3565 6187 558 65635 172076 33056
1.4 358457 344115 336107 1.20 0.81 1.94 3573 6241 573 64711 172097 33823
1.5 358349 344018 335954 1.20 0.81 1.94 3618 6291 587 64755 172118 34515
1.6 358248 343925 335794 1.19 0.81 1.94 3703 6339 600 65763 172137 35143
1.7 358150 343838 335664 1.19 0.81 1.94 3744 6384 613 65801 172157 35722
1.8 358058 343755 335524 1.20 0.81 1.94 3741 6427 625 64871 172174 36252
1.9 357970 343676 335371 1.19 0.81 1.94 3821 6468 636 65870 172190 36739
2.0 357887 343600 335241 1.19 0.81 1.94 3857 6506 647 65901 172208 37194
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Table 4.6: Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
Cd TP1  1  OC TP11 me TP1 1  P C P\o P\m Pxp cfo cfm cfP threshold0 thresholdm threshold0
0.0 359619 347087 318362 1.10 0.81 2 6221 8393 0 73583 168571 0
0.1 359491 346959 313757 1.11 0.81 2 6370 8510 0 72196 168555 0
0.2 359380 346850 309531 1.12 0.81 2 6488 8599 0 70868 168550 0
0.3 359286 346763 305626 1.11 0.81 2 6684 8702 0 72088 168520 0
0.4 359202 346687 301997 1.12 0.81 2 6759 8789 0 70770 168497 0
0.5 359130 346621 298609 1.12 0.81 2 6871 8866 0 70725 168477 0
0.6 359064 346562 295433 1.12 0.81 2 6970 8934 0 70684 168459 0
0.7 359003 346509 292444 1.12 0.81 2 7057 8995 0 70650 168443 0
0.8 358949 346461 289622 1.13 0.81 2 7091 9050 0 69393 168429 0
0.9 358898 346416 334031 1.13 0.81 1.84 7163 9094 2415 69364 168422 31673
1.0 358853 346375 332004 1.13 0.81 1.85 7230 9131 2348 69336 168418 31506
1.1 358811 346336 332731 1.13 0.81 1.85 7291 9162 2460 69310 168417 33280
1.2 358772 346300 333343 1.13 0.81 1.85 7348 9190 2560 69286 168417 34681
1.3 358735 346267 333893 1.13 0.81 1.85 7401 9218 2652 69263 168415 35819
1.4 358701 346236 331574 1.13 0.81 1.86 7450 9243 2550 69242 168414 35558
1.5 358666 346209 332074 1.13 0.81 1.86 7493 9276 2630 69227 168405 36549
1.6 358637 346182 332523 1.14 0.81 1.86 7495 9300 2704 68028 168403 37380
1.7 358608 346158 332917 1.14 0.81 1.86 7535 9331 2772 68012 168394 38082
1.8 358581 346135 333283 1.14 0.81 1.86 7573 9357 2836 67996 168388 38683
1.9 358555 346114 333619 1.14 0.81 1.86 7609 9381 2896 67981 168383 39202
2.0 358531 346092 333922 1.14 0.81 1.86 7643 9402 2952 67967 168379 39651
oo
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From table 4.5, the results in the companies are analyzed as follows.
In the company with the coordination policy, marketing is willing to spend 
more money in forecasting when the unit inventory disposal cost increases. 
However, the investment does not compensate its cost; thus, the total profit 
declines. The unit transfer price is stable because the increase in unit inventory 
disposal cost seems to have little impact on the decision on the unit transfer 
price.
The total profit of the company with the marketing-oriented policy 
decreases slowly when the unit inventory disposal cost increases, but the unit 
transfer price is stable. However, threshold forecast and the investment in 
forecasting increase. This situation can be partially explained by the previous 
reason. Moreover, to avoid holding too many inventories, production is less 
likely to produce.
The situation in the company with the production-oriented policy is 
analyzed as follows. The same reasons as those in the previous two companies, 
the unit transfer price is stable, and threshold forecast increases. Furthermore, 
when the unit inventory disposal cost is relatively low, marketing is willing to 
spend more money on forecasting, and this may improve the total profit. 
However, when the unit inventory disposal cost is relatively high, the benefits of 
forecasting disappear, and the total profit decreases.
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The Results In Case 2
Based on table 4.6, we find that the difference between p Xm and p lp 
decreases, then increases. This indicates that the divisional conflicts on the unit 
transfer price are more intense when the unit inventory disposal cost is relatively 
low or high.
The results in the companies in case 2 are analyzed as follows.
In the company with the coordination policy, marketing is willing to spend 
more money on forecasting when the unit inventory disposal cost increases, but 
the investment does not compensate for its cost. Thus, the total profit of the 
company decreases. Furthermore, to encourage production to start a new run, 
the unit transfer price increases slowly. Because the unit transfer price and the 
investment increase, production is more likely to produce.
The total profit of the company with the marketing-oriented policy 
decreases when the unit inventory disposal cost increases. However, the unit 
transfer price is stable. Moreover, the investment in forecasting increases, but 
threshold forecast decreases. The situation can be partially explained by the 
previous reason. In addition, since the total profit decreases and marketing is 
reluctant to share profits with production, the unit transfer price is stable. 
Furthermore, because the investment in forecasting increases, production is 
more likely to produce.
The result of the company with the production-oriented policy is described 
as follows. The total profit of the company fluctuates when the unit inventory
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disposal cost increases. The reason is that when the unit inventory disposal cost 
is relatively low, production takes all profits. Consequently, the total profit 
decreases,/?^ = 2, Cjp = 0, and thresholdp = 0. However, when the unit inventory 
disposal cost is relatively large, the benefits of forecasting become more 
important Production begins to share profits with marketing; hence, p Xp
decreases, increases, and thresholdp increases. In addition, the fluctuation of
the total profit may be caused by changes in the unit inventory disposal cost, the 
unit transfer price, and the investment in forecasting.
Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
Comparing tables 4.6 with 4.5, we discuss the following findings.
The company with the coordination policy in case 2 invests more money in 
forecasting, and the investment may cause its total profit to be greater than that 
of its counterpart (this could happen when its investment is much larger than the 
break-even value). Because it invests more money in forecasting, less profits 
can be shared with production; thus, its unit transfer price is lower, and its 
threshold forecast is higher.
The company with the marketing-oriented policy in case 2 invests more 
money in forecasting. Since the investment compensates its cost, its total profit 
is larger than that of its counterpart (when cy is much larger than the break-even 
value). However, the unit transfer prices in these two cases are the same. 
Furthermore, since the company in case 2 invests more money in forecasting, its 
threshold forecast is lower.
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The company with the production-oriented policy in case 2 has a smaller 
total profit than that of its counterpart The situation is explained as follows. 
When only the production division in case 2 takes all profits, the company has a 
smaller total profit than that of its counterpart in case 1 since it spends nothing 
on forecasting. However, it is more likely to produce. When the production 
divisions in both cases do not take all profits, the company in case 2 invests 
more money in forecasting, but the investment does not compensate its cost. As 
a result, its total profit is less than that of its counterpart Furthermore, because 
it invests more money in forecasting, less profits can be shared with production; 
hence, its unit transfer price is lower, and its threshold forecast is higher.
43.4. The Effect of Lost-Sales Cost
We increase the value of the unit lost-sales cost from $0.0 to $1.8 by 
increments of $0.1. The results are given in tables 4.7 and 4.8 in the next two 
pages.
The Results in Case 1
From table 4.7, the relationship TP^ > TPmc > TP^ is always true. This 
shows that the company with the marketing-oriented policy has a better 
performance than does the company with the production-oriented policy. 
Moreover, the difference between p Xp and p Xm increases, then becomes stable. 
This means that the divisional conflicts on the unit transfer price increase, but 
with a limit when the unit lost-sales cost increases.
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Table 4.7: Effect of Lost-Sales Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
Cl TPoc TP** me TPi l  P C P \o Plm Pip c fo cfm c fp threshold0 thresholdm threshold,,
0.0 360909 347165 323180 1.22 0.86 1.94 2584 4982 292 66729 171679 8189
0.1 360770 348319 320838 1.16 0.77 1.93 2614 5075 322 62436 163928 8554
0.2 360642 358026 318863 1.09 0.78 1.94 2675 4100 250 59513 110983 0
0.3 360520 359591 316931 1.02 0.78 1.93 2731 3680 281 56854 86136 0
0.4 360406 360064 315069 0.95 0.78 1.93 2782 3384 263 54425 70569 0
0.5 360296 360198 313201 0.88 0.78 1.93 2828 3152 246 52199 59878 0
0.6 360194 360185 311405 0.81 0.78 1.93 2872 2962 231 50147 52062 0
0.7 360086 360086 309565 0.79 0.79 1.92 2773 2773 259 45576 45576 0
0.8 359933 359933 307923 0.79 0.79 1.92 2635 2635 243 40948 40948 0
0.9 359748 359748 306231 0.79 0.79 1.92 2514 2514 229 37176 37176 0
1.0 359540 359540 304564 0.79 0.79 1.92 2407 2407 216 34035 34035 0
1.1 359312 359312 302931 0.79 0.79 1.92 2310 2310 204 31372 31372 0
1.2 359072 359072 301293 0.79 0.79 1.91 2223 2223 227 29080 29080 0
1.3 358821 358821 299815 0.79 0.79 1.91 2144 2144 216 27084 27084 0
1.4 358521 358521 298211 0.80 0.80 1.91 2055 2055 204 25160 25160 0
1.5 358250 358250 296979 0.80 0.80 2 1989 1989 0 23609 23609 0
1.6 357974 357974 296162 0.80 0.80 2 1928 1928 0 22216 22216 0
1.7 357691 357691 295373 0.80 0.80 2 1871 1871 0 20953 20953 0
1.8 357404 357404 294609 0.80 0.80 2 1818 1818 0 19802 19802 0
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Table 4.8: Effect of Lost-Sales Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
Cl TP** oc TP11 me tpdc P\o P\m Pip 7* cfm Cfp threshold0 thresholdm threshold,,
0.0 359508 347575 314600 1.15 0.86 2 6307 8417 0 73709 168643 0
0.1 359472 348810 312942 1.07 0.77 2 6427 8470 0 70751 160985 0
0.2 359439 357385 311389 1.00 0.77 2 6488 7741 0 66889 111713 0
0.3 359406 358910 309920 0.92 0.77 2 6588 7311 0 64455 85881 0
0.4 359375 359313 308536 0.84 0.78 2 6678 6942 0 62199 68738 0
0.5 359343 359343 307225 0.78 0.78 2 6677 6677 0 58333 58333 0
0.6 359239 359239 305981 0.78 0.78 2 6443 6443 0 50773 50773 0
0.7 359058 359058 304797 0.78 0.78 2 6233 6233 0 45024 45024 0
0.8 358825 358825 303668 0.78 0.78 2 6042 6042 0 40497 40497 0
0.9 358552 358552 302589 0.78 0.78 2 5867 5867 0 36829 36829 0
1.0 358191 358191 301557 0.79 0.79 2 5671 5671 0 33532 33532 0
1.1 357846 357846 300568 0.79 0.79 2 5520 5520 0 31003 31003 0
1.2 357474 357474 299618 0.79 0.79 2 5378 5378 0 28825 28825 0
1.3 357080 357080 298705 0.79 0.79 2 5245 5245 0 26920 26920 0
1.4 356660 356660 297826 0.79 0.79 2 5118 5118 0 25234 25234 0
1.5 356222 356222 296979 0.79 0.79 2 4998 4998 0 23721 23721 0
1.6 355671 355671 296162 0.80 0.80 2 4856 4856 0 22220 22220 0
1.7 355187 355187 295373 0.80 0.80 2 4747 4747 0 20969 20969 0
1.8 354682 354682 294609 0.80 0.80 2 4642 4642 0 19810 19810 0
94
Besides, from figure 4.11, the differences among threshold0, thresholdm, 
and thresholdp decrease.
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Figure 4.11: The Effect of Lost-Sales Cost on Threshold Forecasts 
in the Decentralized Models
This means that production decisions about whether to produce in the 
decentralized companies are closer to one another when the unit lost-sales cost 
increases.
From table 4.7, the results in the companies are discussed as follows.
The total profit of the company with the coordination policy decreases 
when the unit lost-sales cost increases. The reason is that the higher unit lost- 
sales cost means a lower total profit. Moreover, production becomes more likely 
to produce since the increase in the unit lost-sales cost could prevent production 
from not producing. When the unit lost-sales cost is low, marketing is willing to 
invest more money in forecasting, but the investment does not compensate its 
cost. Because less profits are available to be shared, the unit transfer price
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decreases. When the unit lost-sales cost is in mid-range, marketing decreases 
the investment; however, unit transfer price is stable.
The situation in the company with the marketing-oriented policy is 
analyzed as follows. Production is more likely to produce because of the 
increase of lost-sales cost When the unit lost-sales cost is low, the decrease in 
threshold forecast is large, and this may cause improvement in the total profit 
since production is more likely to produce. However, when the unit lost-sales 
cost is relatively large, the decrease in threshold forecast can not improve the 
total profit. Therefore, the total profit begins to decrease. Besides, the situations 
of the unit transfer price, threshold forecast, and the investment in forecasting 
are the same as those in the previous company.
The total profit of the company with the production-oriented policy 
fluctuates, then decreases when the unit lost-sales cost increases. Furthermore, 
the investment in forecasting decreases to 0; the unit transfer price decreases, 
then increases to $2; threshold forecast decreases to 0. The above is explained 
as follows. When the unit lost-sales cost is low, production must share profits 
with marketing; otherwise, forecasting will become very unreliable. The total 
profit is affected by the investment in forecasting, which fluctuates, and by the 
unit transfer price, which decreases then increases. As a result, the total profit 
fluctuates. However, when the unit lost-sales cost is relatively high, production 
takes all profits. Hence, the unit transfer price is $2, threshold forecast and the 
investment in forecasting are 0, and the total profit decreases.
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The Results in Case 2
We analyze the results, from table 4.8, as follows.
The result in the company with the coordination or marketing-oriented 
policy is the same as its counterpart in case 1. In the company with the 
production-oriented policy, the total profit of the company decreases when the 
unit lost-sales cost increases. Moreover, threshold forecast and the investment 
in forecasting are 0, and the unit transfer price is $2. The reason is that 
production takes all profits.
Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
We have the following findings when comparing tables 4.8 with 4.7.
The company with the coordination policy in case 2 invests more money in 
forecasting, but the investment does not compensate its cost; hence, its total 
profit is smaller. Because less profits can be shared with production, its unit 
transfer price is no larger than that of its counterpart in case 1.
The company with the marketing-oriented policy in case 2 invests more 
money in forecasting. When the investment compensates its cost, its total profit 
is larger than that of its counterpart (this may happen when Cy is much larger than 
the break-even value). However, its unit transfer price is almost the same as that 
of its counterpart. In addition, when its investment in forecasting is much larger 
than the break-even value, its threshold forecast is less than that of its 
counterpart.
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The company with the production-oriented policy in case 2 has a total 
profit no greater than that of its counterpart in case 1 (their total profits are the 
same when the unit inventory disposal cost is relatively high). Furthermore, its 
unit transfer price is always $2, and it is no less likely to produce, but it invests 
nothing in forecasting. The reason is production in case 2 take all profits, thus 
marketing invests nothing in forecasting.
43.5. The Effect of Setup Cost
The value of setup cost increases from $0 to $100,000 by increments of 
$5,000. The results are given in tables 4.9 and 4.10 in the next two pages.
The Results in Case 1
Based on table 4.9, we find that TP^. is less than TPpc when the setup cost 
is relatively high. This reveals that the performance of the company with the 
marketing-oriented policy is better than that of the company with the 
production-oriented policy when the setup cost is relatively low. The difference 
between TP ^  and TP^ is close to 0 when the setup cost is between $75,000 and 
$80,000. Moreover, the difference between p Xp and p Xm decreases. This suggests 
that the conflicts regarding the unit transfer price between production and 
marketing decrease when the setup cost increases.
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Table 4.9: Effect of Setup Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
T P1  1  OC T P11 me T P* *  P C Plo Plm Pip c fo Cfm cfP thresholda thresholdm threshold„
0 395939 392312 374117 1.13 0.66 1.94 2788 6087 280 4968 5721 0
5000 390945 386922 369117 1.13 0.67 1.94 2789 5972 280 14444 77118 0
10000 385948 379952 364117 1.12 0.69 1.94 2828 5832 280 24289 116616 0
15000 380947 371737 359117 1.13 0.71 1.94 2793 5745 280 33391 141683 0
20000 375936 366149 354117 1.14 0.74 1.94 2760 5498 280 42156 148036 0
25000 370915 358289 349117 1.15 0.76 1.94 2729 5413 280 50601 161310 0
30000 365883 353585 343902 1.17 0.79 1.94 2663 5186 276 57799 162878 0
35000 360839 346421 341793 1.19 0.81 1.93 2599 5140 332 64511 171536 11147
40000 355784 339466 334306 1.21 0.83 1.94 2538 5088 281 70782 178685 9392
45000 350721 335588 329324 1.24 0.86 1.94 2445 4816 281 75537 177877 13768
50000 345649 329174 324344 1.25 0.88 1.94 2422 4751 281 82172 183307 18145
55000 340573 322951 319367 1.27 0.90 1.94 2368 4682 281 87356 188015 22521
60000 335490 316911 314392 1.30 0.92 1.94 2279 4608 281 91002 192139 26898
65000 330405 311049 309421 1.32 0.94 1.94 2227 4535 281 95586 195777 31274
70000 325320 305355 304399 1.34 0.96 1.94 2177 4469 280 99923 199005 35535
75000 320235 299821 299434 1.36 0.98 1.94 2128 4420 280 104033 201877 39914
80000 315146 294432 294473 1.38 1.00 1.94 2078 4377 280 107937 204456 44293
85000 310062 289160 289517 1.40 1.02 1.94 2030 4294 280 111646 206826 48672
90000 304977 281406 284565 1.42 1.03 1.94 1981 4322 280 115179 213689 53051
95000 299903 276460 279618 1.44 1.05 1.94 1935 4272 280 118542 215460 57430
100000 294823 271594 274677 1.45 1.07 1.94 1920 4166 280 123118 217134 61810
VO
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Table 4.10: Effect of Setup Cost on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
TP1 1  OC TP* *  m e TP* * PC P l o P l / n Pip Cf o c fm cfp threshold„ threshold,,, thresholdp
0 394816 393749 348757 0.98 0.66 2 6983 9189 0 3028 1883 0
5000 389819 388231 343757 0.98 0.67 2 6984 9113 0 16196 73323 0
10000 384812 381124 338757 0.99 0.69 2 6935 9007 0 28725 112994 0
15000 379787 372872 333757 1.00 0.71 2 6889 8960 0 40626 133196 0
20000 374741 364269 328757 1.03 0.73 2 6741 8940 0 49758 155616 0
25000 369675 359116 323757 1.06 0.76 2 6597 8728 0 57715 158098 0
30000 364591 351384 318757 1.08 0.78 2 6508 8695 0 65946 168479 0
35000 359491 346959 313757 1.11 0.81 2 6370 8510 0 72196 168555 0
40000 354377 339956 308757 1.14 0.83 2 6233 8449 0 77769 175801 0
45000 349252 333184 303757 1.16 0.85 2 6150 8391 0 84132 181888 0
50000 344119 326646 298757 1.19 0.87 2 6016 8332 0 88651 187076 0
55000 338977 323147 293757 1.21 0.90 2 5935 8184 0 94151 185288 0
60000 333832 317056 288757 1.23 0.92 2 5859 8123 0 99301 189466 0
65000 328680 311138 283757 1.26 0.94 2 5723 8058 0 102692 193160 0
70000 323531 305384 278757 1.28 0.96 2 5648 7989 0 107227 196451 0
75000 318372 297096 273757 1.30 0.97 2 5568 8084 0 111518 204599 0
80000 313212 291695 268757 1.32 0.99 2 5488 8005 0 115577 207058 0
85000 308067 286427 263757 1.34 1.01 2 5415 7916 0 119411 209292 0
90000 302912 281284 258757 1.36 1.03 2 5335 7827 0 123062 211325 0
95000 297756 276274 253757 1.38 1.05 2 5253 7788 0 126536 213134 0
100000 292627 271368 248757 1.39 1.07 2 5244 7750 0 131329 214788 0
100
We discuss the results in the three types of companies as follows.
In the company with the coordination policy, the total profit o f the 
company decreases when the setup cost increases. The reason is that the higher 
setup cost means a lower total profit Furthermore, when the setup cost 
increases, production becomes more reluctant to produce. Because more profits 
should be given to production, the unit transfer price increases. In addition, 
when the setup cost is relatively low, marketing is willing to spend more money 
on forecasting, but the investment does not compensate its cost When the setup 
cost is relatively high, the investment begins to fall.
The total profit of the company with the marketing-oriented policy 
decreases when the setup cost increases. Moreover, the unit transfer price and 
threshold forecast increase, and the investment in forecasting decreases. This 
situation can be partially explained by the reason given in the previous company. 
However, when the setup cost increases, marketing cuts the investment in 
forecasting because its original investment is relatively high and the marginal 
benefits of forecasting are small.
As to the company with the production-oriented policy, the total profit of 
the company decreases, and production becomes less likely to produce when the 
setup cost increases. However, the unit transfer price is stable. Because an 
appropriate precision of forecast is needed to support the operations, the 
investment in forecasting is also stable.
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The Results in Case 2
From figure 4.12, the relationship TP^ > TPmc > TP^ is true. Moreover, 
the difference between TPmc and TPpc decreases.
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Figure 4.12: The Effect of Setup Cost on the Total Profits of the Company
in the Decentralized Models
This suggests that the performance of the company with the marketing- 
oriented policy is better than that of the company with the production-oriented 
policy, but the advantages of the company with the marketing-oriented policy 
decrease when the setup cost increases.
From table 4.10, we find that when the setup cost is relatively low, 
thresholda is greater than thresholdm because p lo is much greater than p lm, and 
CjQ is much less than Cjm.
The results in the three types of the companies are summarized as follows.
In the company with the coordination policy, the total profit decreases, and 
production becomes less likely to start a new run when the setup cost increases.
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Because more profits should be shared with production, the unit transfer price 
increases. However, the investment in forecasting decreases.
In the company with the marketing-oriented policy, the result is the same 
as that in case 1. As to the company with the production-oriented policy, the 
total profit of the company decreases when the setup cost increases. 
Furthermore, the unit transfer price is $2, and threshold forecast and the 
investment in forecasting are 0. The reason is that production takes all profits 
since the forecasting is unreliable.
Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
Comparing tables 4.10 with 4.9, we discuss the following findings.
The company with the coordination policy in case 2 invests more money in 
forecasting, but its investment does not compensate its cost. As a result, its total 
profit is less than that of its counterpart in case 1. Because less profits can be 
shared, its unit transfer price is smaller.
In the company with the marketing-oriented policy, the result and reason 
are the same as those in the corresponding analysis on the unit selling price. 
About the company with the production-oriented policy, the total profit of the 
company in case 2 is less than that in case 1. Production in case 2 takes all 
profits, and it is more likely to produce, but marketing in case 2  spends nothing 
on forecasting.
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4.3.6. The Effect of Prior Mean of Demand
We change the value of prior mean from 300,000 to 1,000,000 issues by 
increments of 100,000 issues. The results are given in tables 4.11 and 4.12.
The Results in Case 1
From table 4.11, the relationship TP^ > TPmc > TP^ is always true. This 
indicates that the company with the marketing-oriented policy has a better 
performance than that of the company with the production-oriented policy.
From the following figure 4.13, we find that the difference betweenp Xp and 
p Xm increases. This indicates that the divisional conflicts on the unit transfer 
price become more intense when the prior mean increases. Also, the difference 
between p lo and p Xm, as well as the difference between p Xo and p Xp, increases. 
This indicates that the decisions on the unit transfer price in the decentralized 
companies are closer to one another when the prior mean is relatively low.
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Figure 4.13: The Effect of Prior Mean on the Unit Transfer Prices 
in the Decentralized Models
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Table 4.11: Effect of Prior Mean on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
0 T PX1 oc TPmc T P1 1  P C P lo Plm P ip c fo Cfm c fp threshold0 thresholdm threshold0
300000 360839 346421 341793 1.19 0.81 1.93 2599 5140 332 64511 171536 11147
400000 495870 485729 470770 1.13 0.76 1.95 2791 5358 223 70851 223810 0
500000 630880 625205 583757 1 .1 2 0.73 2 2827 5393 0 71703 274526 0
600000 765879 762373 718757 1.13 0.71 2 2789 5450 0 69958 323621 0
700000 900879 898396 853757 1.13 0.71 2 2789 5363 0 69510 323572 0
800000 1035879 1033235 988757 1.13 0.70 2 2789 5483 0 69062 355347 0
900000 1170879 1168028 1123756 1.13 0.69 2 2789 5616 0 68615 394209 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1305879 1303028 1258756 1.13 0.69 2 2789 5616 0 68167 394091 0
Table 4.12: Effect of Prior Mean on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
0 TP11  OC TPmc TP** pc Plo Plm Pip cfo cfm cfp threshold0 threshold,,, threshold„
300000 359491 346959 313757 1.11 0.81 2 6370 8510 0 72196 168555 0
400000 494713 482702 448757 1.01 0.75 2 6835 8858 0 88478 235098 0
500000 629758 625936 583757 0.98 0.73 2 6985 8712 0 95030 271197 0
600000 764759 763125 718757 0.98 0.71 2 6985 8757 0 94938 320189 0
700000 899759 899042 853757 0.98 0.71 2 6985 8700 0 94845 320229 0
800000 1034759 1034005 988757 0.98 0.70 2 6985 8786 0 94753 352005 0
900000 1169759 1168938 1123756 0.98 0.69 2 6985 8878 0 94660 390851 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1304759 1303938 1258756 0.98 0.69 2 6985 8878 0 94567 390837 0
o•4^
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Based on table 4.11, the results in the companies are analyzed as follows.
The total profit of the company with the coordination policy increases 
when prior mean increases. The reason is that the higher the prior mean, the 
higher the total profit. Moreover, when the prior mean is relatively small, 
marketing is willing to spend more money on forecasting. However, less profits 
can be shared with production. As a result, the unit transfer price decreases, and 
production is less likely to produce. When the prior mean is relatively large, 
marketing cuts the investment, then maintains a fixed amount of investment 
since an appropriate precision of forecast is still needed. The unit transfer price 
is also stable. Meanwhile, threshold forecast decreases because the increase in 
the prior mean can prevent production from not producing.
The total profit of the company with the marketing-oriented policy 
increases with the prior mean. Furthermore, the unit transfer price decreases, 
threshold forecast increases, and the investment in forecasting increases, then 
becomes stable. This situation can be explained by the previous reason. 
However, when the prior mean is relatively large, marketing maintains a fixed 
amount of investment Since marketing is reluctant to share profits with 
production, the unit transfer price decreases slowly. As a result production 
becomes less likely to produce.
As for the company with the production-oriented policy, the total profit of 
the company also increases. Furthermore, when the prior mean is relatively low, 
production must share profits with marketing; otherwise, forecasting will be
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very unreliable. However, when the prior mean is relatively large, production 
takes all profits. Therefore, the unit transfer price increases to $2, and threshold 
forecast and the investment in forecasting decline to 0 .
The Results in Case 2
From table 4.12, we find that TP^ is equal to TP^  when the prior mean is 
relatively high. This suggests that the performance o f the company with the 
marketing-oriented policy is the same as that of the company with the 
production-oriented policy when the prior mean is relatively high.
The results in the three types of companies are analyzed as follows.
In the company with the coordination policy, the total profit of the 
company increases. Moreover, the unit transfer price decreases, then becomes 
stable; threshold forecast increases, then decreases; and the investment in 
forecasting increases, then becomes stable. The reason can be found in the 
corresponding analysis in case 1. However, when the prior mean increases, the 
marketing in case 2  spends more money in forecasting, then maintains a fixed 
amount of investment.
The result in the company with the marketing-oriented policy is the same 
as that in case 1. About the company with the production-oriented policy, the 
total profit of the company increases with the prior mean. Furthermore, 
threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting are 0 , and the unit transfer 
price is $2. The reason is that production takes all profits.
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Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
We discuss the following findings obtained from tables 4.12 and 4.11.
In the company with the coordination policy, the result is the same as that 
in the corresponding analysis on the unit selling price. Moreover, the company 
with the marketing-oriented policy in case 2  invests more money in forecasting. 
When the investment compensates its cost, its total profit is larger than that of its 
counterpart. However, unit transfer prices in the two cases are almost the same. 
In the company with the production-oriented policy, the result is the same as that 
in the corresponding analysis on the unit lost-sales cost
4.3.7. The Effect of Prior Standard Deviation of Demand
Prior standard deviation x can be considered as an inherent uncertainty of 
demand. If x increases, demand becomes more ambiguous. We increase the 
value of the prior standard deviation from 1 0 ,0 0 0  to 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  issues by 
increments of 10,000 issues. The results are shown in tables 4.13 and 4.14 in the 
next two pages.
The Results in Case 1
From table 4.13, TPpe is larger than TP^ when the prior standard deviation 
is relatively small (no larger than 10,000 issues). This means that the company 
with the production-oriented policy has a better performance than does the 
company with the marketing-oriented policy when the prior standard deviation is 
relatively low. Moreover, the difference between p lp and p Xm decreases. This 
indicates that the divisional conflicts on the unit transfer price become less
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intense when the prior standard deviation increases. This result is also shown in 
figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14: The Effect of Prior STD on the Unit Transfer Prices 
in the Decentralized Models
Based on table 4.13, we analyze the results in the companies as follows.
The situation in the company with the coordination policy is discussed as 
follows. When the prior standard deviation is relatively small, marketing is 
willing to spend more money on forecasting. However, the investment does not 
compensate its cost. As a result, the total profit decreases. Because less profits 
are available to be shared, the unit transfer price declines, and production 
becomes less likely to produce. When the prior standard deviation is relatively 
large, demand becomes too ambiguous to predict. Therefore, marketing begins 
to cut the investment, and the saving causes the total profit to increase when the 
prior standard deviation is relatively large. More profits are given to production 
to prevent it from not producing. Thus, the unit transfer price increases.
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Table 4.13: Effect of Prior Standard Deviation on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
T TP11 oc TP11 me TP1 1  PC P \o P\m P ip c fo c fm c fp threshold0 thresholdm thresholdp
1 0 0 0 0 364376 361598 364376 2 0.78 2 0 2169 0 0 177697 0
2 0 0 0 0 361749 360305 358751 1.11 0.78 2 1812 3712 0 46594 195843 0
30000 361376 359461 353127 1.11 0.77 2 2296 4305 0 63537 210049 0
40000 361196 356625 347503 1 .1 2 0.77 2 2474 4896 0 67203 210447 0
50000 361088 354964 341879 1 .1 2 0.78 2 2596 5020 0 69552 199116 0
60000 361016 353500 336254 1 .1 2 0.79 2 2676 5034 0 70799 188968 0
70000 360952 352338 330630 1.13 0.80 2 2696 5014 0 70231 179818 0
80000 360888 348869 325006 1.15 0.80 2 2669 5175 0 68266 179794 0
90000 360836 348756 338785 1.17 0.81 1.94 2636 5084 241 66350 171522 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 360839 346421 341793 1.19 0.81 1.93 2599 5140 332 64511 171536 11147
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Table 4.14: Effect of Prior Standard Deviation on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
X TP11 oc TPme tpdc P lo Pirn P ip c fo cfm c fp threshold0 thresholdm threshold
1 0 0 0 0 364376 363987 364376 2 0.77 2 0 3544 0 0 205652 0
2 0 0 0 0 362972 362588 358751 0.97 0.77 2 3752 4996 0 93173 207628 0
30000 362165 361523 353127 0.98 0.77 2 4548 5879 0 93271 207913 0
40000 361591 358747 347503 0.98 0.77 2 5138 6740 0 94220 207758 0
50000 361144 356778 341879 0.98 0.78 2 5591 7194 0 94649 196309 0
60000 360763 354990 336254 1 .0 0 0.79 2 5856 7521 0 90307 186094 0
70000 360403 350759 330630 1 .0 2 0.79 2 6071 7960 0 86339 185994 0
80000 360053 349933 325006 1.05 0.80 2 6198 8137 0 80977 176840 0
90000 359734 346656 319382 1.09 0.80 2 6244 8433 0 74853 176793 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 359491 346959 313757 1.11 0.81 2 6370 8510 0 72196 168555 0
I l l
The result in the company with the marketing-oriented policy is as follows. 
The total profit of the company decreases when the prior standard deviation 
increases. Furthermore, the investment in forecasting increases, then fluctuates; 
the unit transfer price decreases, then increases; and threshold forecast 
increases, then decreases. This situation can be partially explained by the reason 
given in the previous company. Moreover, when the prior standard deviation is 
relatively large, marketing tries to maintain the investment in forecasting, but 
customer demand is too ambiguous to predict; hence, the total profit decreases, 
and the investment fluctuates.
As for the company with the production-oriented policy, the situation is 
discussed as follows. When the prior standard deviation is relatively small, 
forecasting is less useful; thus, production takes all the profits. As a result, the 
unit transfer price is $2 , threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting are 
0, and the total profit decreases because of the increase in uncertainty. When the 
prior standard deviation is relatively large, forecasting becomes crucial and 
production begins to share the profits with marketing; otherwise, forecasting will 
be very unreliable. Consequently, the unit transfer price decreases, and 
threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting increase. Since the 
investment compensates its cost, the total profit increases.
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The Results in Case 2
From table 4.14, the difference between p Xm and p Xp decreases. This 
indicates that the divisional conflicts on the unit transfer price become less 
intense when the prior standard deviation increases.
We discuss the following results in the three types of companies.
The situation in the company with the coordination policy is analyzed as 
follows. When the prior standard deviation is relatively small, marketing is 
willing to spend more money on forecasting. However, since the investment 
does not compensate its cost, the total profit decreases. Because less profits are 
available to be shared, the unit transfer price declines, and production becomes 
less likely to produce. When the prior standard deviation is relatively large, 
marketing is still willing to invest more money in forecasting; however, 
customer demand is still too ambiguous to predict Therefore, the total profit 
still decreases. To prevent production from not producing, the unit transfer price 
increases; thus, production becomes more likely to produce.
The situation in the company with the marketing-oriented policy is 
described as follows. When the prior standard deviation is relatively small, 
marketing is willing to spend more money on forecasting. However, the 
investment does not compensate its cost; hence, the total profit declines, and 
production becomes less likely to produce. Moreover, the unit transfer price is 
stable. When the prior standard deviation is relatively large, marketing is still 
willing to invest more money in forecasting. Since the investment compensates
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its cost, the total profit increases. Because uncertainty increases, the unit 
transfer price increases to prevent production from not producing; thus, 
production is more likely to produce.
The total profit of the company with the production-oriented policy 
decreases when the prior standard deviation increases. Furthermore, threshold 
forecast and the investment in forecasting are always 0 , and the unit transfer 
price is always $2. The reason is that production takes all profits. Furthermore, 
the uncertainty of demand increases; thus, the total profit decreases.
Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2
Comparing tables 4.14 with 4.13, we analyze the following results.
In the company with the coordination policy, in most situations, the 
company in case 2  invests more money in forecasting than does its counterpart. 
The investment compensates its cost when the prior standard deviation is not 
relatively high. Because it spends more money on forecasting, less profits can 
be shared with production; hence, its unit transfer price is no greater than that of 
its counterpart. Since its unit transfer price has much influence on threshold 
forecast, its threshold forecast is no less than that of its counterpart in case 1 .
In the company with the marketing-oriented policy, the result and reason 
are the same as those given in the corresponding analysis on the unit selling 
price.
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The total profit of the company with the production-oriented policy in case 
2 is no larger than that in case 1. Production in case 2 takes all profits, and it is 
always more likely to produce, but marketing spends nothing on forecasting. 
43.8. The Effect of the Precision of Forecast
When y increases, the standard deviation of forecast decreases, and this 
means that the precision of forecast increases. In case 1, we increase the value 
of y from 1.0E-8 to 1.5E-7 by increments o f 1.0E-8. In case 2, we increase the 
value of y from 1.0E-4 to 1.5E-3 by increments of 1.0E-4. The results in cases 1 
and 2 are shown in the following tables 4.15 and 4.16 in the next two pages. 
From tables 4.15 and 4.16, we find that the results of the two cases are the same, 
we discuss the results in cases 1 and 2  as follows.
Results in Cases 1 and 2
The relationship TPX > TP^ > 77^  is true. This means that the company 
with the marketing-oriented policy has a better performance than does the 
company with the production-oriented policy. The difference between p Xp and 
P\m decreases, then becomes stable, and this means that the divisional conflicts 
on the unit transfer price decrease, then is stable when y increases.
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Table 4.15: Effect of Coefficient y on the Decentralized Models—Case 1
Y TP1  1  OC TP11 me TP* * pc Plo Pirn Pip cfo c fm cfp threshold0 thresholdm threshold„
1.0E-8 350119 335694 313757 1.16 0.82 2 5416 10575 0 71207 169558 0
2.0E-8 355715 339943 313757 1.17 0.81 2 4017 7913 0 68618 174228 0
3.0E-8 358255 343153 313757 1.18 0.81 2 3318 6500 0 66626 172938 0
4.0E-8 359786 345095 335094 1.19 0.81 1.94 2877 5717 267 64969 172090 0
5.0E-8 360839 346421 341793 1.19 0.81 1.93 2599 5140 332 64511 171536 11147
6.0E-8 361620 347400 342193 1.19 0.81 1.94 2390 4699 283 64152 171134 11534
7.0E-8 362228 348164 341693 1 .2 0 0.81 1.95 2195 4356 234 62873 170818 10069
8 .OE-8 362723 348780 343674 1 .2 0 0.81 1.95 2063 4078 233 62631 170563 13976
9.0E-8 363131 349292 345267 1 .2 0 0.81 1.95 1952 3848 230 62427 170349 16728
1.0E-7 363478 349726 346583 1.21 0.81 1.95 1833 3652 226 61297 170169 18758
1.1E-7 363777 350099 344895 1 .2 0 0.81 1.96 1776 3484 183 62094 170012 15731
1.2E-7 364038 350425 346040 1 .2 0 0.81 1.96 1704 3338 181 61957 169875 17578
1.3E-7 364269 350713 347064 1.21 0.81 1.96 1619 3208 179 60883 169754 19094
1.4E-7 364475 350970 347903 1.21 0.81 1.96 1563 3093 176 60772 169645 20242
1.5E-7 364660 351200 348734 1.21 0.81 1.96 1512 2991 174 60672 169545 21300
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Table 4.16: Effect of Coefficient y on the Decentralized Models—Case 2
Y TP1  1  OC TPme TP1 * p c P lo P\m P ip c fo Cfm c fp threshold0 thresholdm threshold„
1.0E-4 334315 322189 313757 1.04 0.82 2 17233 25855 0 91032 168329 0
2.0E-4 348574 335207 313757 1.07 0.81 2 11825 16739 0 81842 171249 0
3.0E-4 354294 341397 313757 1.08 0.81 2 9167 12466 0 78287 169798 0
4.0E-4 357458 344790 313757 1 .1 0 0.81 2 7467 10058 0 74293 169039 0
5.0E-4 359491 346959 313757 1.11 0.81 2 6370 8509 0 72196 168556 0
6.0E-4 360916 348471 313757 1 .1 2 0.81 2 5568 7400 0 70379 168240 0
7.0E-4 361980 349591 313757 1.13 0.81 2 4958 6569 0 68739 168012 0
8.0E-4 362803 350456 313757 1.14 0.81 2 4473 5915 0 67238 167845 0
9.0E-4 363462 351146 313757 1.14 0.81 2 4106 5387 0 66988 167716 0
1.0E-5 364004 351711 313757 1.15 0.81 2 3776 4953 0 65633 167613 0
1.1E-5 364456 352182 313757 1.16 0.81 2 3496 4589 0 64354 167528 0
1.2E-5 364841 352581 313757 1.16 0.81 2 3277 4278 0 64208 167457 0
1.3E-5 365173 352924 345114 1.16 0.81 1.89 3087 4010 881 64082 167397 19407
1.4E-5 365462 353223 344335 1.17 0.81 1.9 2901 3777 790 62901 167345 17700
1.5E-5 365715 353485 346378 1.17 0.81 1.9 2753 3570 800 62807 167301 20810
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Moreover, from figure 4.15, the differences among cy0, Cfm and Cjp decrease. 
This means that the results of marketing’s decisions about the cost invested in 
forecasting in different companies are closer to one another when y increases, 
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Figure 4.15: The Effect of Coefficient y on the Investments in Forecasting 
in the Decentralized Models
We discuss the results in the three types of companies as follows.
The total profit of the company with the coordination policy increases with 
y. The reason is that when y increases, forecast becomes more accurate; hence, 
total profit increases, and production is more likely to produce. Since forecast is 
more accurate, a smaller investment in forecasting is needed, and more profits 
are available to be shared between production and marketing; therefore, the unit 
transfer price increases.
In the company with the marketing-oriented policy, the total profit of the 
company increases when y increases. The reason is that the precision of forecast 
increases with y; thus, the total profit increases, and a smaller investment is 
needed in forecasting. At first, the decline in the investment is too large; as a
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result, threshold forecast increases. Then, the increase in y begins to affect 
threshold forecast; hence, production becomes more likely to produce. Because 
the increase in y can encourage production to produce, and marketing is reluctant 
to share profit with production, the unit transfer price is stable.
As to the company with production-oriented policy, the total profit of the 
company is stable, then increases with y. The reason is that when y is relatively 
small, forecast is unreliable; therefore, production takes all profits. As a result, 
the total profit of the company is stable, the unit transfer price is $2 , and 
threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting are 0. When y is in mid­
range, forecast is more reliable, and production begins to share profits with 
marketing. Therefore, the total profit increases, the unit transfer price decreases, 
and threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting increase from 0. When 
y is relatively high, less investment is needed in forecasting. Thus, the 
investment begins to fall, but the unit transfer price remains stable. Since the 
investment declines, production is still less likely to produce.
4.4 Summary
The results of the numerical analyses in the previous section are 
summarized in several tables. For example, the results of the effects of 
parameters in cases 1 and 2 are reported in tables 4.17 and 4.18, respectively. 
The results of the comparisons among the three types of companies in cases 1 
and 2 are given in tables 4.19 and 4.20, respectively. In addition, the results of
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the comparisons between cases 1 and 2 are shown in table 4.21. Tables 4.17, 
4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 are in the next pages. Table 4.21 is at the end of this 
chapter.
In this section, we analyze the results in the previous section from a 
management point o f view and discuss some new findings as follows.
First, each division acts on its own interests in the decentralized 
companies. From tables 4.17 and 4.18, the production division of the company 
with the production-oriented policy favors a larger unit transfer price, but the 
marketing division of the company with the marketing-oriented policy prefers a 
lower unit transfer price. Furthermore, in the company with the marketing- 
oriented policy, marketing would seem to spend more money on forecasting, and 
production becomes less likely to produce. However, in the company with the 
production-oriented policy, marketing would seem to spend less money on 
forecasting, and production is more likely to satisfy customer demand. The 
results in the company with the coordination policy are outcomes of cooperation. 
The above results may indicate the divisional attitude toward the coordination.
Second, the differences in the effects of parameters among the three 
types of companies may be attributed to the differences in organization structure 
and authorization. From tables 4.17,4.18,4.19 and 4.20, we find that the effects 
of parameters on the company with the production-oriented policy are much 
different from those on the company with the marketing-oriented policy or the 
company with the coordination policy.
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Table 4.17: Summary of Sensitivity Analyses for the Decentralized Models—Case 1
TP11 oc TPx 1 me TP11 pc P\o P\m P\p Cfo cfm C/p threshold,0 threshold'm thresholdp total profit 
low medium high
unit
transfer
price
conflicts 
in Pi
cf threshold
p I i I I SIS I I I F D D DO OMP OPM OMP POM I MOP MOP
Cu D D D I I 2DI ID ID OIF I I 01 OPM OMP OMP POM D MOP MOP
Cd D D ID S s S I I I F I 01 OMP OMP OMP POM S MOP MOP
Cl D ID F DS DS DI2 ID ID F0 D D DO OMP OMP OMP POM IS MOP MOP
Cs D D D I I S ID D S I I 01 OMP OMP OPM POM D MOP MOP
0 I I I DS D 12 IDS IS DO ID I DO OMP OMP OMP POM I MOP MOP
T D1 D DI 2DI DI 2D OID IF 01 OID ID 01 OPM OMP OMP POM DI MOP MOP
y I I SI IS S 2DS D D OID D ID 01 OMP OMP OMP POM SDS MOP MOP
Symbol “1” represents “increase.”
Symbol “D” represents “decrease.”
Symbol “S” represents “stable.”
Symbol “F” represents “fluctuate.”
Symbol “low” represents “when the value of the parameter in the first column is low.”
Symbol “medium” represents “when the value of the parameter in the first column is medium.” 
Symbol “high” represents “when the value of the parameter in the first column is high.” 
Symbol “ID" represents “increase then decrease.”
Symbol “DO” represents “decrease then become 0.”
Symbol “2D” represents “decrease from 2.”
Symbol “OMP” represents “scenario 3 > scenario 1 > scenario 2.”
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Table 4.18: Summary of Sensitivity Analyses for the Decentralized Models—Case 2
TP* * oc TP* * me TP** pc P\o Plm P\p Cfo Cfm cfP thresholdc thresholdm thresholdp total profit 
small medium large
unit
transfer
price
conflicts 
>n Pi
cf threshold
p I i I I SIS I I I 0 D D DO OMP OMP OMP POM I MOP MOP
C» D D D I I 2DI ID ID OIF I I 01 OPM OMP OMP POM D MOP MOP
Cd D D F I s 2DI I I OIF D D 01 OMP OMP OMP POM DI MOP MOP
Cl D ID D DS DS 2 ID ID 0 D D 0 OMP OMP OMP POM IS MOP MOP
Cs D D D I I 2 D D 0 I I 0 OMP OMP OPM POM D MOP ♦MOP
e I I I DS D 2 IS IS 0 ID I 0 OMP OMP OMP POM I MOP MOP
X D DI D 2DI SI 2 I I 0 ID ID 0 OPM OMP OMP POM D MOP MOP
Y I I SI IS S 2DS D D OID D ID 01 OMP OMP OMP POM SD MOP MOP
*thresholdm is less than threshold0 when cs is relatively small.
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Table 4.19: Summary of the Comparisons Among Three Types of Companies
in the Decentralized Models—Case 1
T P  -I  1  OC
T PI I  me
T P  -1 1  OC
T P1 1 PC
T P  -11 me
T P pc
P\o-P\m P\o-P \p P lm 'P lp Cfo'Cfm Cfo'Cfp Cfm'Cfp thresholda-
thresholdm
threshold0-
thresholdp
thresholdm-
thresholdp
p i I DI I I I I I I I ID ID
(G) (G) (GLG) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
ID ID DID D D D ID ID ID ID ID ID
(G) (G) (LG) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
cd ID DI DI S S S IF I I DF D D
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
Cl D FI IF D IS IS D ID ID D D D
(GE) (G) (G) (GE) (L) (L) (LE) (G) (G) (LE) (G) (G)
cs I ID DI DS D D D ID D ID ID ID
(G) (G) (GL) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
0 DI IS IDS I IS I IDI IDS IDI I ID IDI
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
T DI ID DID I ID ID DIF ID ID D ID ID
(G) (G) (LG) (G) (EL) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (EG) (G)
Y ID ID ID IS DS DS D D D IF D ID
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
* Symbol “L” represents “less than 0.”
Symbol “G” represents “greater than 0.”
* Symbol “E” represents “equal to 0.” Jo
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Table 4.20: Summary of the Comparisons Among Three Types of Companies 
in the Decentralized Models—Case 2
T P  -11 oc
T P mc
T P  -
1 1  OC
T P1 1  P C
T P  -11 me
T P1 1  P C
P\o~Plm P\o-P\p P\m~P\p cfo~cfm Cfo 'Cfp cfm 'cfp threshold0-
thresholdm
threshold0-
thresholdD
thresholdm-
thresholdD
p I I I I I I I I I I ID ID
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
Cu D ID DID D D D D ID ID DFD ID DID
(G) (G) (LG) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
Cd D ID ID S D DI D ID ID I D D
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
Cl D I I D IS IS D ID ID D D D
(GE) (G) (G) (GE) (L) (L) (LE) (G) (G) (LE) (G) (G)
c s ID ID D S D D DIF D D DID I I
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (GL) (G) (G)
0 DI I ID DI IS I DI IS IDI I ID ID
(G) (G) (GE) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
T DID I DI DI ID D DID I I D ID ID
(G) (G) (LG) (G) (EL) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (EG) (G)
y ID ID ID IS DS SD D D D I D ID
(G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (L) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G)
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Third, from table 4.21 (in the next page), in case 2, the company with the 
marketing-oriented policy invests more money in forecasting than its counterpart 
in case 1. Its total profit could be larger or smaller than that of its counterpart, 
depending on whether its investment is much larger than the break-even value. 
Moreover, its unit transfer price is almost the same as that of its counterpart It 
is not always less likely to produce than its counterpart because their threshold 
forecasts are affected by the investments and the forms of a(cj).
Fourth, from table 4.21, in case 2, the company with the production- 
oriented policy has a investment in forecasting no greater than that of its 
counterpart in case 1 (except in the analyses of the effects of production cost, 
inventory disposal cost, and forecast precision y, its investment may be greater 
than that of its counterpart). Its total profit is no greater than that of its 
counterpart. Moreover, its unit transfer price is no less than that of its 
counterpart (except in the analyses of the effects of production cost, inventory 
disposal cost, setup cost, prior mean, and forecast precision y, its unit transfer 
price may be less than that of its counterpart). It is no less likely to produce than 
its counterpart (except in the analyses of the effects of production cost, and 
inventory disposal cost, it may be less likely to produce than its counterpart). 
The above situation is affected by whether both production divisions take all 
profits.
Fifth, form table 4.21, in case 2, the company with the coordination 
policy invests more money in forecasting than its counterpart in case 1. In most
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
situations, its investment is not worthwhile; thus, its total profit seems to be less 
than that of its counterpart (except in the analyses of the effects of inventory 
disposal cost and prior standard deviation, its investment may be worthwhile). 
Since it invests more money in forecasting, its unit transfer price is no greater 
than that of its counterpart Because its unit transfer price is lower, it is less 
likely to produce (except in the analyses of the effects of lost-sales cost and 
setup cost, it may be more likely to start a new production run).
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Table 4.21: Summary of the Comparisons Between Cases 1 and 2 for the Decentralized Models
difTP0C difTPmc difTPpc difP\o difP\m difP\p difcf0 d if cfm difcfp d if 
threshold0
dif
thresholdm
dif
threshold
p D F IF I S I I ID ID DF F ID
(L) (N) (L) (L) (E) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (N) (LE)
Cu DI F IDF D F IDI ID DFD IF DI F IDI
(L) (N) (EL) (L) (E) (EGL) (G) (G) (ELG) (G) (N) (ELG)
cd DI I IDF S S DI F FD IDI D I IDI
(LG) (G) (L) (L) (E) (GL) (G) (G) (LG) (G) (L) (ELG)
Ct DI I FD IDS S ID ID FD FD F F ID
(L) (GL) (LE) (LE) (E) (GE) (G) (G) (LE) (GLG) (LG) (LE)
Cs I F SI D S S D IF S DIF F I
(L) (N) (L) (L) (E) (L) (G) (G) (L) (LG) (N) (EL)
0 DS F D I S D IS ID D I F D
(L) (GLG) (LE) (L) (E) (GE) (G) (G) (LE) (G) (LGL) (LE)
X IDI F I ID S I I DI I ID F I
(EGL) (N) (EL) (EL) (E) (EL) (G) (G) (EL) (EG) (N) (EL)
7 DI DI IDI SF S IDI D D IDI D ID F
(LG) (LG) (EL) (L) (E) (EGL) (G) (G) (ELG) (G) (L) (EL)
*difTP0C = (TP0C in case 2) - (TP0C in case 1).
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CHAPTERS
COMPARISONS OF THE NUMERICAL ANALYSES 
FOR THE ONE-PERIOD MODELS AND 
THE INTERACTION EFFECTS OF MODEL PARAMETERS
5.1. Introduction
In Section 3.3, we study two special situations of a one-period system: the 
system with perfect information and without forecasting about customer 
demand. The difference in the total profits between these two situations can be 
considered as the value of information, or the upper bound of the investment in 
forecasting. For convenience, we consider these two situations a model and call 
it the model relating to the value of information in this chapter. In Sections 3.4 
and 3.5, we develop the decentralized and centralized models. In this chapter, 
we perform numerical analyses for the above three models. Our purpose is to 
analyze the benefits of forecasting and the coordination between marketing and 
production. Note that only the company with the coordination policy, in which 
the unit transfer price is decided by considering the overall profit of the 
company, is considered in the decentralized model since it has the best 
performance among three types of decentralized companies, as concluded in 
Chapter 4.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we compare the 
results of numerical analyses for the three one-period models. Then, in Section 
5.3, we summarize the results in the previous section. In Section 5.4, we study 
the interaction effects of model parameters on the models.
127
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5.2 Comparisons of the Numerical Analyses for the One-Period Models
In the one-period model, there are eight model parameters: unit selling 
price, unit production cost, unit inventory disposal cost, unit lost-sales cost, 
setup cost, prior mean, prior standard deviation, and the precision coefficient of 
forecast y. In this section, we perform sensitivity analyses for the one-period 
models for different parameters. Moreover, we continue to study the effects of 
two cases of forecast standard deviation o(cy), discussed in Chapter 4, on the 
performances of the models. From the numerical analyses in Chapter 4, we can 
expect the results of the two cases of a(cj) to be almost the same. Hence, in the 
following analyses, we focus on analyzing the results of case 1 , and differences 
between the two cases are discussed whenever they exist.
5.2.1. The Effect of Selling Price
In this section, we consider the effect of selling price on system 
performance. In the following analysis, we increase the unit selling price from 
$0.9 to $2.5 by increments of $0.1. The results of the optimal decision variables 
and system performances for different models are reported in table 5.1 in the 
next page. Note that all the definitions of notations in the tables of this chapter 
can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 5.1: The Effect of Selling Price on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
p TP »'/o TPw, upper Cf TPC Cfc thresholdc TPOC P\o Cfo threshold0 TPC Cfc threshold,e TPA l  OC P\o Cfo threshold0
0.9 4310 40394 36084 35350 2413 124725 33722 0.81 1274 182686 32703 5683 122995 30290 0.79 4059 200685
1 .0 27501 70241 42740 64667 2681 93869 63075 0.85 1514 152754 62165 6072 92118 59977 0.83 4431 164774
1.1 51707 100183 48476 94207 2882 75312 92677 0.89 1685 131526 91838 6342 73652 89864 0 .8 6 4854 144438
1 .2 76666 130155 53489 123854 3045 62904 122366 0.93 1820 115574 121605 6547 61356 119806 0.90 5026 125134
1.3 102207 160141 57934 153567 3181 54018 152105 0.96 1989 105702 151426 6712 52577 149764 0.93 5284 113268
1.4 128214 190132 61918 183324 3299 47335 181874 0.99 2131 97441 181282 6848 45996 179723 0.96 5491 103521
1.5 154602 220127 65525 213115 3401 42125 211664 1.03 2203 88491 211162 6963 40878 209684 0.98 5741 97596
1 .6 181307 250125 68818 242931 3492 37949 241473 1.06 2311 82670 241060 7063 36784 239643 1.01 5876 90342
1.7 208280 280123 71843 272767 3574 34525 271297 1.09 2407 77581 270972 7150 33435 269603 1.03 6059 85873
1 .8 235483 310124 74641 302620 3647 31667 301133 1.13 2452 71824 300895 7227 30644 299564 1.06 6156 80230
1.9 262885 340124 77239 332486 3715 29245 330980 1.16 2529 67969 330827 7297 28283 329526 1.09 6241 75288
2 .0 290461 370126 79665 362365 3776 27166 360839 1.19 2599 64511 360766 7359 26259 359491 1.11 6370 72196
2 .1 318190 400127 81937 392253 3833 25361 390705 1 .2 2 2662 61394 390711 7416 24505 389456 1.13 6484 69361
2 .2 346055 430130 84075 422149 3886 23780 420580 1.25 2720 58567 420661 7467 22971 419422 1.16 6539 66649
2.3 374042 460132 86090 452054 3935 22383 450462 1.28 2773 55992 450616 7515 21617 449390 1.18 6634 63306
2.4 402138 490134 87996 481964 3981 21140 480350 1.32 2790 52945 480574 7559 20413 479359 1 .2 0 6720 61131
2.5 430332 520137 89805 511881 4024 20027 510246 1.35 2836 50835 510536 7600 19336 509329 1.23 6757 58235
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The Model Relating to the Value of Information
From table 5.1, the total profits with perfect information and without 
forecasting, TP^ and rP Wo, both increase, but the former increases more rapidly. 
As a result, the difference between these two total profits, the upper bound of the 
investment in forecasting, upper increases.
The Centralized Model
From table 5.1, when a(c^) is defined as case 1, we find that the total profit 
TPC (the fifth column of table 5.1) and the investment in forecasting Cfc (the sixth 
column) both increase when the unit selling price increases. However, the 
threshold forecast threshold,, decreases. The reason is that the higher the unit 
selling price, the higher the total profit. Hence, marketing is willing to invest 
more money in forecasting, and production is more likely to start a new run.
The total profit in case 2 is less than that in case 1 (compare the fifth with 
the twelfth columns), and their difference decreases when the unit selling price 
increases. This indicates that the company in case 2 has disadvantages in the total 
profit, but the disadvantages decrease when the unit selling price increases. 
Furthermore, the investment in forecasting in case 2 is larger than that in case 1 
(compare the sixth with the thirteenth columns). The production in case 2 is 
more likely to produce than does its counterpart in case 1 (compare the seventh 
with the fourteenth columns).
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Comparisons Among the Models
Based on table 5.1, we find that the results of the comparisons in the two 
cases are the same. We discuss the results of the comparisons as follows.
First, from table 5.1 and the following figure 5.1, all the total profits 
increase, and the relationship TPwt > TPC > TP0C > TPwlo is true. This shows that 
the total profit with perfect information is the upper bound for the total profits in 
all models; on the other hand, the total profit without forecasting is the lower 
bound (this statement is true throughout the analyses). Furthermore, the total 
profit in the centralized model is greater than that of the decentralized model 
(this statement is also true throughout the analyses). Note that the subscriptions 
of 1 and 2 in the notations in figure 5.1 denote to which case they belong.
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Figure 5.1: The Effect of Selling Price on the Total Profits 
in the One-Period Models
We also find that the difference between TPm and TPC, as well as the
difference between TPC and TPw/o, increases with the unit selling price (note that
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all the differences in the total profits, the investments in forecasting, and 
threshold forecasts between the models usually do not increase or decrease 
exactly when one parameter increases). This means that the total profit in the 
centralized model deviates more significantly from the total profits with perfect 
information and without forecasting when the unit selling price increases. The 
difference between TPC and TP0C decreases, then increases. This suggests that 
the performance of the decentralized model deviates more significantly from that 
of the centralized model when the unit selling price is relative low or high.
Second, from figure 5.2, all the investments in forecasting increase in a 
convex pattern, and the relationship upper Cj> Cfc > Cfa is true. This means that 
the upper bound of Cy is greater than the investment in forecasting in any model 
(this statement is true throughout the analyses), and the investment in the 
centralized model is greater than that in the decentralized model, 
sooo ...   __ . ___________
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Figure 5.2: The Effect of Selling Price on the Investments in Forecasting
in the One-Period Models
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Third, the result about the effect of selling price on threshold forecasts is 
given in figure 5.3. From figure 5.3, all threshold forecasts decrease in a 
concave pattern, and the relationship threshold,0 > threshold,c is true (except in 
the analysis of the effect of prior standard deviation). Further, the difference 
between threshold,, and threshold0 increases, then decreases. This shows that in 
the decentralized and centralized models, production decisions (behaviors) about 
whether to produce are closer to each other when the unit selling price is 
relatively low or high.
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Figure 5.3: The Effect of Selling Price on Threshold Forecasts 
in the One-Period Models
Fourth, we summarize the comparisons between the centralized and 
decentralized models as follows. Comparing the sixth and thirteen with the 
tenth and seventeenth columns, we find that the company in the centralized 
model spends more money on forecasting than the company in the decentralized 
model (this statement is true throughout the analyses). Also, comparing the 
seventh and fourteenth with the eleventh and eighteenth columns, we find that
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the company in the centralized model is more likely to produce than the 
company in the decentralized model (this statement is true, except in the analysis 
of the effect of prior standard deviation in cases 1 and 2).
5.2.2. The Effect of Production Cost
The value of the unit production cost increases from $0.0 to $2.0 by 
increments of $0.1, and the results are shown in table 5.2 in the next page.
The Model Relating to the Value of Information
From the above figure 5.4 and table 5.2, the total profits with perfect 
information and without forecasting decrease, but the former decreases more 
slowly, then rapidly. As a result, the upper bound of the investment in 
forecasting increases, then decreases.
The Centralized Model
Based on table 5.2, we find that in case 1 the total profit decreases when 
the unit production cost increases. This shows that the higher the unit 
production cost, the lower total profit. Moreover, the investment in forecasting 
increases, then decreases. The reason is as follows. The company’s profits are 
relatively lower when the unit production cost is relatively high. Thus, 
forecasting becomes less important On the other hand, when the unit 
production cost is relatively low, costs associated with inventory will be low; 
thus, the producer always produces as many as possible to avoid lost sales, so 
forecasting becomes less important. Besides, threshold forecast increases since 
the company is less likely to produce when the unit production cost increases.
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Table 5.2: The Effect of Production Cost on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
Cu T P  w/o TPwi upper cf T P C Cfc thresholdc T P11 oc P lo c fo threshold0 T P C Cfc thresholdc T P* *  OC P \o Cf0 threshold0
0.00 544072 565141 21069 561257 1836 15353 560051 0.65 1081 47624 558453 4677 15429 556550 0.49 3599 63141
0.10 499220 535139 35919 529998 2465 17741 528635 0.76 1567 50404 527376 5759 18091 525770 0.62 4794 63430
0.20 457254 505136 47882 499167 2880 19413 497716 0.85 1896 52485 496796 6338 19508 495314 0.72 5422 64095
0.30 417409 475133 57724 468558 3183 20970 467058 0.93 2143 54799 466418 6713 20808 465015 0.82 5771 64364
0.40 379312 445131 65819 438095 3413 22565 436570 1.01 2318 56975 436153 6977 22169 434803 0.90 6065 66756
0.50 342743 415129 72386 407740 3590 24272 406207 1.08 2469 60033 405960 7167 23662 404650 0.99 6210 68113
0.60 307562 385127 77565 377471 3723 26147 375940 1.15 2577 63292 375820 7306 25337 374536 1.07 6331 70778
0.70 273675 355125 81450 347275 3821 28248 345755 1.22 2648 66827 345721 7403 27247 344452 1.15 6394 73681
0.80 241019 325124 84105 317145 3885 30641 315640 1.29 2686 70710 315656 7467 29451 314395 1.23 6411 76854
0.90 209555 295124 85569 287074 3920 33411 285588 1.36 2692 75022 285622 7501 32033 284354 1.31 6380 80354
1.00 179264 265124 85860 257062 3926 36669 255595 1.43 2669 79856 255616 7507 35101 254333 1.38 6367 85997
1.10 150140 235126 84986 227108 3904 40575 225655 1.50 2613 85339 225639 7486 38811 224327 1.45 6319 92517
1.20 122196 205129 82933 197215 3853 45359 195770 1.57 2576 91621 195693 7435 43391 194333 1.53 6154 97800
1.30 95461 175135 79674 167386 3770 51373 165942 1.63 2459 101210 165781 7353 49190 164352 1.60 6011 106449
1.40 69986 145147 75161 137633 3652 59183 136171 1.69 2364 113036 135912 7233 56771 134378 1.67 5805 116884
1.50 45846 115167 69321 107969 3493 69763 106475 1.76 2161 124425 106100 7065 67111 104424 1.74 5525 129733
1.60 23158 85206 62048 78427 3283 84949 76872 1.82 1978 142953 76372 6832 82054 74508 1.80 5286 150847
1.70 2095 55297 53202 49077 3002 108680 47450 1.88 1729 168254 46796 6497 105573 44674 1.86 4952 180356
u>Ui
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The total profit in case 2 is less than that of its counterpart. However, its 
investment in forecasting is larger than that of its counterpart. It is less likely to 
produce than its counterpart when the unit production cost is relatively small 
(the difference is close to 0 when the unit production cost is between $0.2 and 
$0.3).
Comparisons Among the Models
From table 5.2 and the following figure 5.4, we find that all the total 
profits decrease.
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Figure 5.4: The Effect of Production Cost on the Total Profits 
in the One-Period Models
The difference between TPwt and TPC, as well as the difference between
TPC and TPw/o, increases, then decreases. This suggests that the total profit of
the centralized model is closer to the total profits with perfect information and
without forecasting when the unit production cost is relatively low or high.
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The result of the effect of production cost on the investment in forecasting 
is shown in the following figure 5.5. From figure 5.5, the shapes of all the 
investments in forecasting like concave curves. The difference between Cfc and 
Cf0 increases, then decreases. This shows that marketing decisions about the 
investment in forecasting in the decentralized and centralized models are closer 
to each other when the unit production cost is relatively low or high.
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Figure 5.5: The Effect of Production Cost on the Investments in Forecasting
in the One-Period Models
As for threshold forecast, from figure 5.6, all the threshold forecasts 
increase in a convex pattern. Furthermore, the difference between threshold,. 
and threshold0 increases. This suggests that production decisions about whether 
to produce deviate significantly between the decentralized and centralized 
models when the unit production cost increases.
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Figure 5.6: The Effect of Production Cost on Threshold Forecasts 
in the One-Period Models
From table 5.2 and the above figures, we discuss the comparisons in case 2 
as follows. The difference between TPC and TP0C decreases, then increases. 
This means that the performances of the decentralized and centralized models 
deviate more significantly from each other when the unit production cost is 
relatively low or high. Moreover, the difference between Cfc and Cj0 decreases, 
then increases. This shows that marketing decisions about the investment in 
forecasting deviate significantly between the decentralized and centralized 
models when the unit production cost is relatively low or high. Furthermore, the 
difference between thresholdc and threshold0 decreases, then increases. This 
indicates that production decisions about whether to produce deviate 
significantly between the decentralized and centralized models when the unit 
production cost is relatively low or high.
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5.2.3. The Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost
We increase the value of the unit inventory disposal cost from $0.0 to $2.0 
by increments of $0.1. The results of the effect of inventory disposal cost on the 
models are reported in table 5.3 in the next page.
The Model Relating to the Value of Information
From figure 5.7 and table 5.3, the total profit with perfect information is a 
constant since there is no disposal under the situation of perfect information. 
However, the total profit without forecasting decreases. Hence, the upper bound 
of the investment in forecasting increases.
♦ _ T P \v /0
a  TPwt
upper c f ,
Figure 5.7: The Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost in the Model 
Computing Upper Cj
The Centralized Model
From table 5.3, in case 1, the total profit decreases, but threshold forecast 
and the investment in forecasting increase. The means that when the unit 
inventory disposal cost increases, to avoid holding too many leftovers, the 
company is less likely to produce.
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Table 5.3: The Effect of Inventory Disposal Cost on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
Cd TPw/o TPwt upper cf TPC Cfc thresholdc TP*  *  OC P\o Cfo threshold0 TPC Cfc thresholdc TP1 1  OC Plo Cfo threshold0
0.0 296973 370126 73153 362698 3610 26984 361184 1.19 2453 64281 360937 7188 26227 359619 1.10 6221 73583
0.1 290461 370126 79665 362365 3776 27166 360839 1.19 2599 64511 360766 7359 26259 359491 1.11 6370 72196
0.2 284484 370126 85642 362071 3923 27319 360536 1.19 2727 64696 360621 7504 26282 359380 1.12 6488 70868
0.3 278962 370126 91164 361808 4055 27452 360267 1.19 2842 64846 360496 7629 26300 359286 1.11 6684 72088
0.4 273830 370126 96296 361571 4173 27570 360026 1.19 2944 64975 360386 7739 26314 359202 1.12 6759 70770
0.5 269039 370126 101087 361356 4281 27674 359807 1.20 2999 64105 360289 7836 26325 359130 1.12 6871 70725
0.6 264546 370126 105580 361158 4380 27768 359608 1.19 3122 65182 360202 7923 26334 359064 1.12 6970 70684
0.7 260319 370126 109807 360976 4471 27853 359425 1.20 3161 64290 360123 8002 26342 359003 1.12 7057 70650
0.8 256329 370126 113797 360808 4555 27932 359257 1.20 3233 64368 360052 8074 26348 358949 1.13 7091 69393
0.9 252551 370126 117575 360651 4634 28003 359100 1.20 3299 64439 359986 8139 26353 358898 1.13 7163 69364
1.0 248965 370126 121161 360504 4707 28070 358955 1.20 3361 64502 359926 8199 26358 358853 1.13 7230 69336
1.1 245554 370126 124572 360367 4776 28131 358818 1.20 3419 64561 359871 8255 26362 358811 1.13 7291 69310
1.2 242301 370126 127825 360237 4840 28189 358690 1.19 3514 65586 359819 8306 26366 358772 1.13 7348 69286
1.3 239194 370126 130932 360115 4902 28243 358570 1.19 3565 65635 359771 8355 26368 358735 1.13 7401 69263
1.4 236220 370126 133906 360000 4959 28294 358457 1.20 3573 64711 359726 8399 26372 358701 1.13 7450 69242
1.5 233370 370126 136756 359890 5014 28342 358349 1.20 3618 64755 359684 8442 26374 358666 1.13 7493 69227
1.6 230633 370126 139493 359786 5066 28387 358248 1.19 3703 65763 359644 8481 26377 358637 1.14 7495 68028
1.7 228002 370126 142124 359687 5116 28429 358150 1.19 3744 65801 359607 8519 26378 358608 1.14 7535 68012
1.8 225470 370126 144656 359593 5163 28470 358058 1.20 3741 64871 359571 8554 26381 358581 1.14 7573 67996
1.9 223029 370126 147097 359502 5208 28509 357970 1.19 3821 65870 359538 8588 26382 358555 1.14 7609 67981
2.0 220673 370126 149453 359416 5251 28546 357887 1.19 3857 65901 359506 8619 26384 358531 1.14 7643 67967
4*O
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We also find that the total profit in case 2 is larger than that of its 
counterpart in case 1 when the unit inventory disposal cost is relatively high (the 
difference is close to 0 when the unit inventory disposal cost is between $1.8 and 
$1.9). Furthermore, the investment in forecasting in case 2 is larger than that of 
its counterpart However, the threshold forecast in case 2 is less than that of its 
counterpart
The above results show an interesting phenomenon. The company in case 
2 spends more money on forecasting. As a result of the larger investment, its 
total profit is greater than that of its counterpart (this happens when its 
investment is much larger than the break-even value). Since it spends more 
money on forecasting, its threshold forecast is lower.
Comparisons Among the Models
From table 5.3, we summarize the comparisons in case 1. The difference 
between TP^ and TP^ as well as the difference between TPC and TPw/0, 
increases. This indicates that the total profit of the centralized model deviates 
more significantly from the total profits with perfect information and without 
forecasting when the unit inventory disposal cost increases. Furthermore, the 
difference between TPC and TPX increases, then decreases. This shows that the 
performance of the decentralized model is closer to that of the centralized model 
when the unit inventory disposal cost is relatively low or high.
From table 5.3, we discuss the comparisons in case 2 as follows. The 
difference between TPC and TP^ decreases. This means that the performances
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of the centralized and the decentralized models are closer to each other when the 
unit inventory disposal cost is relatively high.
5.2.4. The Effect of Lost-Sales Cost
We increase the value of the unit lost-sales cost from $0.0 to $1.8 by 
increments of $0.1. The results of the effect of lost sales are shown in table 5.4. 
The Model Relating to the Value of Information
We have the following findings from table 5.4. The total profit with 
perfect information is stable since the amount of lost sales is stable under the 
situation of perfect information. However, the total profit without forecasting 
decreases when the unit lost-sales cost increases. Thus, the upper bound of the 
investment in forecasting increases.
The Centralized Model
From table 5.4, the total profit decreases, but the investment in forecasting 
increases. Moreover, the threshold forecast decreases. The reason is that when 
the unit lost-sales cost increases, the company is more likely to produce to 
prevent lost sales.
We also find that the total profit in case 2 is less than that of its counterpart 
in case 1, and the difference decreases when the unit lost-sales cost increases. 
This shows that the company in case 2 has disadvantages in the total profit, but the 
disadvantages decrease when the unit lost-sales cost increases. Moreover, the 
threshold forecast in case 2 is less than that in case 1, but the investment in case 
2 is larger.
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Table 5.4: The Effect of Lost-Sales Cost on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
cl TPw/o 77V/ upper cf TPC Cfc thresholdc TP11 oc P\o cfo threshold0 TPC Cfc thresholdc TP* * OC Plo Cf0 threshold0
0.0 291653 370125 78472 362424 3746 28167 360909 1.22 2584 66729 360796 7328 27234 359508 1.15 6307 73709
0.1 289307 370127 80820 362308 3805 26233 360770 1.16 2614 62436 360738 7388 25352 359472 1.07 6427 70751
0.2 287107 370129 83022 362200 3860 24545 360642 1.09 2675 59513 360686 7442 23713 359439 1.00 6488 66889
0.3 285034 370131 85097 362101 3911 23060 360520 1.02 2731 56854 360638 7492 22273 359406 0.92 6588 64455
0.4 283077 370133 87056 362008 3958 21744 360406 0.95 2782 54425 360595 7538 20997 359375 0.84 6678 62199
0.5 281223 370136 88913 361922 4003 20569 360296 0.88 2828 52199 360555 7580 19860 359343 0.78 6677 58333
0.6 279463 370139 90676 361842 4044 19513 360194 0.81 2872 50147 360518 7620 18839 359239 0.78 6443 50773
0.7 277789 370141 92352 361766 4084 18559 360086 0.79 2773 45576 360484 7656 17918 359058 0.78 6233 45024
0.8 276192 370144 93952 361694 4121 17693 359933 0.79 2635 40948 360453 7691 17082 358825 0.78 6042 40497
0.9 274667 370147 95480 361627 4156 16903 359748 0.79 2514 37176 360424 7723 16321 358552 0.78 5867 36829
1.0 273207 370150 96943 361564 4190 16180 359540 0.79 2407 34035 360396 7754 15625 358191 0.79 5671 33532
1.1 271808 370153 98345 361503 4222 15516 359312 0.79 2310 31372 360371 7783 14985 357846 0.79 5520 3100?
1.2 270465 370157 09692 361446 4252 14903 359072 0.79 2223 29080 360347 7810 14396 357474 0.79 5378 28825
1.3 269174 370160 100986 361391 4281 14336 358821 0.79 2144 27084 360324 7836 13851 357080 0.79 5245 26920
1.4 267931 370164 102233 361339 4309 13810 358521 0.80 2055 25160 360303 7860 13346 356660 0.79 5118 25234
1.5 266733 370167 103434 361290 4335 13321 358250 0.80 1989 23609 360283 7884 12876 356222 0.79 4998 23721
1.6 265577 370170 104593 361242 4361 12864 357974 0.80 1928 22216 360264 7906 12438 355671 0.80 4856 22220
1.7 264461 370174 105713 361197 4385 12437 357691 0.80 1871 20953 360246 7927 12029 355187 0.80 4747 20969
1.8 263381 370177 106796 361153 4409 12037 357404 0.80 1818 19802 360229 7948 11645 354682 0.80 4642 19810
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Comparisons Among the Models
Based on table 5.4, we discuss the results in case 1 as follows. The 
difference between TPn.t and TPC, as well as the difference between TPC and 
TPw/o, increases. This indicates that the total profit o f  the centralized model 
deviates more significantly from the total profits with perfect information and 
without forecasting when the unit lost sales cost increases. Also, the difference 
between TPC and TP0C increases. This suggests that the performances of the 
decentralized and centralized models deviate more significantly from each other 
when the unit lost sales cost increases.
Moreover, from figure 5.8, the difference between thresholdc and 
threshold0 decreases. This means that, in the decentralized and centralized 
models, production decisions about whether to produce are closer to each other 
when the unit lost sales cost is relatively high.
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Figure 5.8: The Effect o f Lost-Sales Cost on Threshold Forecasts 
in the One-Period Models
3 0 0
3  CN *T
3 0 0 O O
unit lost-sales cost (S)
. thrcsholdcl 
. thresholdc2 
thrcsholdol 
thrcsholdo2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
For case 2, from table 5.4, the difference between TPC and TP^ decreases, 
then increases. This suggests that the performances of the decentralized and 
centralized models deviate more significantly from each other when the unit lost 
sales cost is relatively low or high. Moreover, the difference between CfC and Cf0 
decreases, then increases. This indicates that marketing decisions about the 
investment in forecasting deviate significantly between the decentralized and 
centralized models when the unit lost sales cost is relatively low or high.
5.2.5. The Effect of Setup Cost
In the following analysis, we increase the value of the setup cost from $0 
to $100,000 by increments of $5,000. The results are given in table 5.5 in the 
next page.
The Model Relating to the Value of Information
From table 5.5, the total profits with perfect information and without 
forecasting both increase, but the former increases more rapidly. Therefore, the 
upper bound of the investment in forecasting increases slowly.
The Centralized Model
Based on table 5.5, we have the following findings for case 1. The total 
profit decreases and the investment in forecasting decreases slowly when the 
setup cost increases. The above suggests that the higher setup cost means a 
lower total profit, and the benefits of forecasting decrease slowly when the setup 
cost increases. Moreover, the threshold forecast increases. This shows that, 
when the setup cost increases, the company is less likely to start a new run.
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Table 5.5: The Effect of Setup Cost on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
TPw/o TPwi upper cf T P C Cfc thresholdc T P11 oc P lo Cfo thresholda T P C Cfc thresholdc T P1  1  OC P \o c fo threshold0
0 325461 405054 79593 397286 3779 2101 395939 1.13 2788 4968 395691 7362 1242 394816 0.98 6983 3028
5000 320461 400061 79600 392294 3779 5682 390945 1.13 2789 14444 390698 7362 4815 389819 0.98 6984 16196
10000 315461 395069 79608 387303 3778 9263 385948 1.12 2828 24289 385706 7361 8390 384812 0.99 6935 28725
15000 310461 390078 79617 382313 3778 12843 380947 1.13 2793 33391 380716 7361 11963 379787 1.00 6889 40626
20000 305461 385088 79627 377324 3778 16424 375936 1.14 2760 42156 375726 7360 15537 374741 1.03 6741 49758
25000 300461 380099 79638 372336 3777 20004 370915 1.15 2729 50601 370738 7360 19111 369675 1.06 6597 57715
30000 295461 375112 79651 367349 3777 23585 365883 1.17 2663 s i m 365751 7359 22685 364591 1.08 6508 65946
35000 290461 370126 79665 362365 3776 27166 360839 1.19 2599 64511 360766 7359 26259 359491 1.11 6370 72196
40000 285461 365142 79681 357382 3776 30746 355784 1.21 2538 70782 355782 7358 29833 354377 1.14 6233 77769
45000 280461 360159 79698 352401 3775 34327 350721 1.24 2445 75537 350801 7358 33407 349252 1.16 6150 84132
50000 275461 355179 79718 347422 3774 37908 345649 1.25 2422 82172 345821 7357 36981 344119 1.19 6016 88651
55000 270461 350200 79739 342445 3774 41488 340573 1.27 2368 87356 340844 7356 40556 338977 1.21 5935 94151
60000 265461 345224 79763 337471 3773 45069 335490 1.30 2279 91002 335869 7355 44130 333832 1.23 5859 99301
65000 260461 340251 79790 332499 3772 48650 330405 1.32 2227 95586 330896 7354 47704 328680 1.26 5723 102692
70000 255461 335281 79820 327531 3771 52231 325320 1.34 2177 99923 325927 7353 51278 323531 1.28 5648 107227
75000 250461 330313 79852 322566 3770 55812 320235 1.36 2128 104033 320961 7352 54853 318372 1.30 5568 111518
80000 245461 325349 79888 317605 3769 59393 315146 1.38 2078 107937 315998 7350 58427 313212 1.32 5488 115577
85000 240461 320389 79928 312648 3767 62974 310062 1.40 2030 111646 311040 7349 62002 308067 1.34 5415 119411
90000 235461 315433 79972 307695 3766 66555 304977 1.42 1981 115179 306085 7347 65577 302912 1.36 5335 123062
95000 230461 310481 80020 302746 3764 70136 299903 1.44 1935 118542 301135 7346 69151 297756 1.38 5253 126536
100000 225461 305534 80073 297803 3763 73717 294823 1.45 1920 123118 296190 7344 72726 292627 1.39 5244 131329
4*>
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We also find that the total profit in case 2 is less than that of its counterpart 
in case 1, and their difference increases slowly when the setup cost increases. 
This means that the company in case 2 has disadvantages in the total profit, and 
the disadvantages increase with the setup cost Furthermore, its threshold forecast 
is less than that of its counterpart, but its investment in forecasting is larger than 
that o f its counterpart.
Comparisons Among the Models
From table 5.5, we discuss the results in case 1 as follows. The difference 
between TP^ and TPC decreases, but the difference between TPC and T P ^  
increases. The above indicates that, when the setup cost increases, the total 
profit of the centralized model is closer to the total profit with perfect 
information, but it deviates more significantly from the total profit without 
forecasting. The difference between TPC and T P increases. This suggests that 
the performance of the decentralized model deviates more significantly from that 
of the centralized model when the setup cost increases.
Moreover, from figure 5.9 and table 5.5, the difference between Cfc and cfo 
decreases, then increases. This means that marketing decisions about the 
investment in forecasting deviate significantly between the decentralized and the 
centralized models when the setup cost is relatively low or high.
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Figure 5.9: The Effect of Setup Cost on the Investments in Forecasting 
in the One-Period Models
Based on figure 5.9 and table 5.5, the difference between cfc and cfo in case
2 decreases. This means that, in the decentralized and the centralized models,
marketing decisions about the investment in forecasting are closer to each other
when the setup cost increases.
5.2.6. The Effect of Prior Mean of Demand
In the following analysis, the value of the prior mean increases from
300,000 to 1,000,000 issues by increments of 100,000. The results of the effect
of the prior mean on the models are given in table 5.6 in the next page.
The Model Relating to the Value of Information
From table 5.6, the total profits with perfect information and without
forecasting both increase. At first, the former increases more slowly than the
latter. Then, the two total profits increase at almost the same pace. As a result,
the upper bound of the investment in forecasting decreases, then becomes stable.
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Table 5.6: The Effect of Prior Mean on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
0 TPw/o TPwt upper Cf TPC C f c threshold,. TPo c Plo C f o thresholds TPC Cfc thresholds TP1 1  OC P\o C f 0 thresholds
300000 290461 370126 79665 362365 3776 27166 360839 1.19 2599 64511 360766 7359 26259 359491 1.11 6370 72196
400000 425461 505003 79542 497231 3781 26911 495870 1.13 2791 70851 495638 7364 26193 494713 1.01 6835 88478
500000 560461 640000 79539 632228 3781 26659 630880 1.12 2827 71703 630634 7364 26130 629758 0.98 6985 95030
600000 695461 775000 79539 767228 3781 26407 765879 1.13 2789 69958 765634 7364 26066 764759 0.98 6985 94938
700000 830461 910000 79539 902228 3781 26154 900879 1.13 2789 69510 900634 7364 26003 899759 0.98 6985 94845
800000 965461 1045000 79539 1037228 3781 25902 1035879 1.13 2789 69062 1035634 7364 25940 1034759 0.98 6985 94753
900000 1100461 1180000 79539 1172228 3781 25649 1170879 1.13 2789 68615 1170634 7364 25876 1169759 0.98 6985 94660
1000000 1235461 1315000 79539 1307228 3781 25397 1305879 1.13 2789 68167 1305634 7364 25813 1304759 0.98 6985 94567
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The Centralized Model
From table 5.6, we discuss the results in case 1 as follows. The total profit 
increases, and the investment in forecasting increases, then becomes stable when 
the prior mean increases. Moreover, threshold forecast decreases. The reason is 
that when the prior mean increases, the total profit increases; thus, the company 
is more likely to produce.
Furthermore, the total profit in case 2 is less than that in case 1, and when 
the prior mean increases, their difference decreases, then becomes stable. This 
shows that the company in case 2 has disadvantages in the total profit, but the 
disadvantages decrease when the prior mean increases. Moreover, its investment 
in forecasting is larger than that of its counterpart in case 1. It is less likely to 
produce than its counterpart when prior mean is relatively high (the difference of 
threshold forecast is close to 0 when the prior mean is between 700,000 and
800,000 issues).
Comparisons Among the Models
From table 5.6, we analyze the results in case 1 as follows.
The difference between TPW and TPC increases, then becomes stable, when 
the prior mean increases. This shows that the total profit of the centralized 
model is closer to the total profit with perfect information when prior mean is 
relatively low. Moreover, the difference between TPC and TP^, as well as the 
difference between TPC and rP Wo, decreases, then becomes stable. This 
suggests that the total profit of the centralized model is closer to the total profit
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without forecasting and the total profit of the decentralized model when the prior 
mean is relatively high. In addition, the difference between thresholdc and 
threshold0 increases, then decreases. This means that, in the decentralized and 
the centralized models, production decisions about whether to produce are closer 
to each other when the prior mean is relatively low or high.
From table 5.6 and the following figure 5.10, the difference between Cfc 
and Cf0 decreases, increases, and then becomes stable. This shows that 
marketing decisions about the investment in forecasting deviate significantly 
between the decentralized and centralized models when the prior mean is 
relatively low or high.
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Figure 5.10: The Effect of Prior Mean on the Investments in Forecasting 
in the One-Period Models
As for case 2, from figure 5.10 and table 5.6, the difference between Cfc and
Cf0 decreases, then becomes stable. This shows that, in case 2 of the
decentralized and the centralized models, marketing decisions about the
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investment in forecasting are closer to each other when the prior mean is 
relatively high.
5.2.7. The Effect of Prior Standard Deviation of Demand
We increase the value of prior standard deviation from 10,000 to 100,000 
issues by increments of 10,000 issues. The results are given in table 5.7 in the 
next page.
The Model Relating to the Value of Information
From table 5.7, the total profit with perfect information is stable, then 
increases, and total profit without forecasting decreases when the prior standard 
deviation increases. Thus, the upper bound of the investment in forecasting 
increases.
The Centralized Model
From table 5.7, we find that the results o f cases 1 and 2 are different We 
discuss first the results in case 1. The total profit decreases, then increases, 
when the prior standard deviation increases. Furthermore, threshold forecast and 
the investment in forecasting increase. The above shows that when the- prior 
standard deviation increases, uncertainty increases; as a result the total profit 
decreases. Also, the company is willing to invest more money in forecasting to 
reduce the uncertainty, but it is less likely to produce. When the investment 
compensates its cost the total profit begins to increase.
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Table 5.7: The Effect of Prior Standard Deviation on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
X T P  w/o TPwt upper cf T P C Cfc thresholdc T Pl t oc P \o Cfo threshold0 T P C Cfc thresholdc T P1 1  OC P \o Cfo threshold0
10000 362046 370000 7954 364588 1050 0 364376 2.00 0 0 365310 2531 4781 364376 2.00 0 0
20000 354092 370000 15908 363152 2792 8974 361749 1.11 1812 46594 363869 4098 21910 362972 0.97 3752 93173
30000 346138 370000 23862 362746 3237 19932 361376 1.11 2296 63537 363049 4937 24476 362165 0.98 4548 93271
40000 338184 370000 31816 362555 3441 23480 361196 1.12 2474 67203 362470 5522 25340 361591 0.98 5138 94220
50000 330230 370000 39770 362443 3558 25077 361088 1.12 2596 69552 362023 5972 25735 361144 0.98 5591 94649
60000 322277 370000 47723 362370 3634 25933 361016 1.12 2676 70799 361657 6339 25948 360763 1.00 5856 90307
70000 314323 370001 55678 362320 3687 26445 360952 1.13 2696 70231 361349 6649 26076 360403 1.02 6071 86339
80000 306369 370008 63639 362290 3726 26776 360888 1.15 2669 68266 361090 6916 26159 360053 1.05 6198 80977
90000 298415 370039 71624 362295 3755 27003 360836 1.17 2636 66350 360887 7151 26217 359734 1.09 6244 74853
100000 290461 370126 79665 362365 3776 27166 360839 1.19 2599 64511 360766 7359 26259 359491 1.11 6370 72196
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Then, we discuss the results in case 2 as follows. The total profit 
decreases, but the investment in forecasting and the threshold forecast increase. 
This shows that, when prior standard deviation increases, uncertainty increases, 
and the company is willing to spend more money on forecasting to reduce the 
uncertainty, but it is less likely to produce. Since the investment does not 
compensate its cost, the total profit falls.
We also find that the total profit in case 2 is larger than that of its 
counterpart in case 1 when prior standard deviation is relatively small (the 
difference is close to 0 when the prior standard deviation is between 30,000 and
40.000 issues). Furthermore, the investment in forecasting in case 2 is larger 
than that of its counterpart. The threshold forecast in case 2 is less than that of 
its counterpart when the prior standard deviation is relatively high (the 
difference is close to 0 when the prior standard deviation is between 60,000 and
70.000 issues).
The above displays an interesting situation. The company in case 2 has a 
large investment in forecasting. It also has a larger total profit when the- prior 
standard deviation is relatively small. It is more likely to produce when the prior 
standard deviation is relatively high. The reason is that the company in case 2 
spends more money on forecasting. The investment may improve its total profit 
to the point that it is larger than that of its counterpart. However, threshold 
forecast is affected by the investment in forecasting, the form of standard 
deviation of forecast, and prior standard deviation.
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Comparisons Among the Models
From table 5.7, in case 1, the difference between TPwl and TP^ as well as 
the difference between TPC and TPw/o, increases. This shows that the total profit 
of the centralized model deviates more significantly from the total profits with 
perfect information and without forecasting when the prior standard deviation 
increases. In addition, the difference between Cfc and Cf0 decreases, then 
increases. This suggests that marketing decisions about the investment in 
forecasting deviate more significantly between the decentralized and centralized 
models when the prior standard deviation is relatively low or high.
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Figure 5.11: The Effect of Prior STD on Threshold Forecasts 
in the One-Period Models
Moreover, from table 5.7 and the above figure 5.11, the relationship 
threshold0 > threshold,, is true. The difference between thresholdc and 
threshold0 increases, then decreases (thresholdc and threshold0 are equal when 
prior standard deviation is 10,000 issues). This implies, that in the decentralized
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and the centralized models, production decisions about whether to produce are 
closer to each other when the prior standard deviation is relatively low or high.
We sum up the comparisons between the decentralized and centralized 
models as follows. The company in the centralized model has a larger total 
profit than the company in the decentralized model. It spends more money on 
forecasting, and it is no less likely to start a new production run.
Based on table 5.7, we have following findings for case 2. The difference 
between TPC and TP^ decreases, then increases. This shows that the 
performances of the decentralized and centralized models deviate more 
significantly from each other when the prior standard deviation is relatively low 
or high. Furthermore, from figure 5.11, thresholdc > threshold0 when the prior 
standard deviation is relatively low. This suggests that production in the 
decentralized model is more likely to produce than production in the centralized 
model when the prior standard deviation is relatively low.
In summary, the company in the centralized model has a larger total profit 
than the company in the decentralized model. It spends more money on 
forecasting, and it is not always more likely to produce.
5.2.8. The Effect of the Precision of the Forecast
In case 1, we change the value of y from 1.0E-8 to 1.5E-7 by increments of 
1 .OE-8. In case 2, we change the value of y from 1 .OE-4 to 1.5E-3 by increments 
of 1.0E-4. The results of the effect of coefficient y in the three models are 
reported in table 5.8 in the next page.
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Table 5.8: The Effect of Coefficient y on the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
Y TPC Cfo thresholdc TP1 1  OC P\o C(o threshold,, Y TPC Cfc thresholdc TP1 1  OC P\o c fo threshold0
1.0E-8 353365 7828 27948 350119 1.16 5416 71207 1.0E-4 339492 20478 27813 334315 1.04 17233 91032
2.0E-8 358049 5770 27796 355715 1.17 4017 68618 2.0E-4 351315 13793 27503 348574 1.07 11825 81842
3.0E-8 360185 4794 27539 358255 1.18 3318 66626 3.0E-4 356230 10557 26907 354294 1.08 9167 78287
4.0E-8 361476 4194 27331 359786 1.19 2877 64969 4.0E-4 358984 8640 26520 357458 1.10 7467 74293
5.0E-8 362365 3776 27166 360839 1.19 2599 64511 5.0E-4 360766 7359 26259 359491 1.11 6370 72196
6.0E-8 363024 3464 27031 361620 1.19 2390 64152 6.0E-4 362022 6437 26073 360916 1.12 5568 70379
7.0E-8 363539 3219 26920 362228 1.20 2195 62873 7.0E-4 362959 5738 25934 361980 1.13 4958 68739
8.0E-8 363956 3020 26826 362723 1.20 2063 62631 8.0E-4 363688 5187 25828 362803 1.14 4473 67238
9.0E-8 364302 2855 26744 363131 1.20 1952 62427 9.0E-4 364273 4742 25742 363462 1.14 4106 66988
l.OE-7 364595 2714 26673 363478 1.21 1833 61297 1.0E-3 364753 4373 25673 364004 1.15 3776 65633
1.1E-7 364848 2592 26611 363777 1.20 1776 62094 1.1E-3 365154 4062 25615 364456 1.16 3496 64354
1.2E-7 365069 2486 26554 364038 1.20 1704 61957 1.2E-3 365496 3796 25567 364841 1.16 3277 64208
1.3E-7 365264 2392 26504 364269 1.21 1619 60883 1.3E-3 365791 3566 25525 365173 1.16 3087 64082
1.4E-7 365438 2307 26459 364475 1.21 1563 60772 1.4E-3 366048 3364 25490 365462 1.17 2901 62901
1.5E-7 365595 2232 26417 364660 1.21 1512 60672 1.5E-3 366273 3186 25458 365715 1.17 2753 62807
Oi>0
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In the following part we do not discuss the model relating to the value of 
information because it does not associate with y. Also, we find that results in the 
two cases are the same.
The Centralized Model
From table 5.8, the results show that the effects of coefficient y in the two 
cases are the same. We discuss the results as follows. The total profit increases, 
but the investment in forecasting decreases when y increases. This means that 
the increase in the precision of forecast can cause an increase in the total profit, 
and less investment is needed in forecasting. Moreover, threshold forecast 
decreases. The reason is that when y increases, the company is more likely to 
produce.
Because the forms of the standard deviation of forecast in the two cases are 
different, we do not need to compare the values of total profit, the investment in 
forecasting, and threshold forecast in cases 2 with their counterparts in case 1. 
Comparisons Among the Models
Based on table 5.8, we find that the results in the two cases are almost the 
same. We discuss the results as follows. The difference between TPC and TP^ 
decreases. This means that the performance of the decentralized model is closer 
to that of the centralized model when y increases. The difference between cfc 
and Cfa decreases. This shows, that in the decentralized and the centralized 
models, marketing decisions about the investment in forecasting are closer to 
each other when y increases.
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Moreover, from figure 5.12 and table 5.8, the difference between 
threshold,, and threshold0 decreases. This suggests that, in the decentralized and 
the centralized models, production decisions about whether to produce are closer 
to each other when y increases.
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Figure 5.12: The Effect of Coefficient y on Threshold Forecasts 
in the One-Period Models
5.3. Summary of the Comparisons Among the Models
The results in the previous section are summarized in tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
We discuss the results from a management point of view as follows.
First, the total profit with perfect information is the greatest among the 
total profits in all models, and the total profit without forecasting is the smallest. 
Moreover, the upper bound of cy is the greatest among the investments in 
forecasting in all models.
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Table 5.10: Summary of the Comparisons Among the One-Period Models
Case 1 Case 2
difTPc d if C/c dif 
thresholdc
TPWI-
TPC
TPC-
TP w/o
TPC-
TPi r  OC
upper
cr cfo
cfc~cfo thresholdc-
threshold0
TPWI-
TPC
TPC-
TP w/o
77V
TPoc
upper
CfCfc
Cfc'Cfo thresholdc-
threshold0
p D ID D I I DI I IF ID I I DI I IF ID
(L) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L)
Cu DI ID DI ID ID IDI ID ID I ID ID DI ID DI DI
(L) (G) (GL) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L)
Cd DI ID I I I ID I IF F I I D I IDF DID
(LG) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L)
Cl D ID D I I I I IDI D I I DI I DI D
(L) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L)
Cs I S I D I I I DI IDI D I I I D IDI
(L) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L)
0 DS S DI IS DS DS DS DIS ID IS DS DS DS DS ID
(L) (G) (LG) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (L)
T DI DI IDI I I IDI I DI ID I I DI I DI DID
(GL) (G) (GL) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (EL) (G) (G) (G) (G) (G) (GL)
r DI D ID — — D — D D — — D D D
(LG) (G) (L) (G) (G) (L) (G) (G) (L)
Second, the effects of parameters in cases 2 and 1 in the centralized model 
are almost the same (except for the effect of prior standard deviation on the total 
profit). Furthermore, the company in case 2 has a smaller total profit than the 
company in case 1 (except in the analyses of inventory disposal cost and prior 
standard deviation). It spends more money on forecasting than its counterpart 
It is also more likely to produce (except in the analyses o f the effects of 
production cost prior mean, and prior standard deviation in both cases). The 
reason is that the company in case 2 spends more money on forecasting. Under 
most circumstances, its total profit is less than that of its counterpart However, 
when its investment is much larger than the break-even value, its total profit may 
be greater than that of its counterpart. Moreover, since it spends more money on 
forecasting, most of the time, it is more likely to produce.
Third, the company in the centralized model has a larger total profit than 
the company in the decentralized model. It spends more money on forecasting, 
and it is more likely to produce (except in the analysis of the effects of prior 
standard deviation in both cases). Moreover, the effects of parameters on the 
total profit, the investment in forecasting, and threshold forecast in the 
decentralized model are slightly different from those in the centralized model. 
Because the company with the coordination policy is a sort o f the centralized 
company, but each division has its own divisional decision. The differences 
may be attributed to be caused by the differences in organization structure and 
authorization.
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5.4. The Interaction Effects of Model Parameters
In this section, we consider an interesting situation. Assume that worker’s 
wages and raw material costs increase. As a result, the unit production cost 
increases. Assume that the increase in the unit selling price does not affect the 
demand. The centralized or decentralized companies may decide to raise the unit 
selling price by the amount of increase in the unit production cost This action will 
certainly affect the performance of the companies. To get a fair comparison base, 
we fix the values of other parameters, and we study the interaction effect of selling 
price and production cost through the following four settings. Note that the results 
of the following setting 1 are reported in table 5.11 in the next page.
Setting 1: The unit selling price and the unit production cost increase and cr(cy) is 
under case 1.
The Centralized Model
From table 5.11, we find that, if the difference between the unit selling price 
and the unit production cost is fixed, then the total profit decreases, and threshold 
forecast and the investment in forecasting increase when the unit selling increases. 
The above shows that the same increase in the unit selling price can not cover the 
increase in the unit production cost since the total profit decreases. Besides, after 
raising the unit selling price, the company invests more money in forecasting, but 
it is less likely to produce.
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Table 5.11: The Results in System Setting 1
p p-cu TPC Cfc thresholdc TP* * OC TPme TP* 1 PC P\o P\m Plp Cf0 cfm cfp threshold„ threshold,,, thresholdp
0.4 0.35 66652 1688 89983 64162 63937 57076 0.3 0.2 0.4 444 1189 0 116721 182401 0
0.8 0.35 65042 2493 93245 62787 62244 43923 0.7 0.6 0.8 955 1908 0 129668 185618 6363
1.2 0.35 64390 2819 94314 62144 61581 37363 1.1 1.0 1.2 1158 2185 0 131973 186545 40016
1.6 0.35 63996 3016 94927 61749 61184 61749 1.5 1.4 1.5 1281 2347 1281 133114 187076 133114
2.0 0.35 63720 3153 95347 61465 60910 61465 1.9 1.8 1.9 1366 2462 1366 133853 187426 133853
2.4 0.35 63510 3258 95659 61247 60701 61247 2.3 2.2 2.3 1430 2547 1430 134391 187697 134391
0.8 0.75 186066 1926 44189 184649 177244 173797 0.4 0.2 0.8 963 2230 0 89189 179826 0
1.2 0.75 183879 3021 46837 182429 174667 152948 0.8 0.6 1.2 1852 3432 0 94576 181416 0
1.6 0.75 182904 3509 47690 181452 173658 175452 1.2 1.0 1.5 2248 3901 778 95646 181911 58818
2.0 0.75 182292 3815 48184 180848 173062 174794 1.6 1.4 1.9 2495 4195 908 96181 182171 61569
2.4 0.75 181854 4034 48524 180419 172642 174323 2.0 1.8 2.3 2670 4385 1003 96526 182372 63140
1.2 1.15 305813 2049 28927 304492 290674 291920 0.5 0.2 1.2 1171 2946 0 70936 178871 0
1.6 1.15 303291 3312 31241 301816 287453 266084 0.9 0.6 1.6 2277 4481 0 75275 180041 0
2.0 1.15 302102 3906 31973 300592 286186 289134 1.3 1.0 1.9 2798 5067 608 76119 180430 34266
2.4 1.15 301334 4291 32398 299819 285436 288231 1.7 1.4 2.3 3128 5442 737 76538 180628 38834
1.6 1.55 425657 2130 21301 424360 404259 410623 0.6 0.2 1.6 1291 3509 0 58721 178346 0
2.0 1.55 422905 3508 23401 421350 400510 381101 1.0 0.6 2.0 2544 5340 0 62629 179288 0
2.4 1.55 421559 4181 24051 419950 399032 403054 1.5 1.0 2.3 2813 6033 498 55041 179611 19267
2.0 1.95 545549 2190 16731 544251 517963 529640 0.7 0.2 2.0 1368 4016 0 49979 177981 0
2.4 1.95 542624 3653 18679 541016 513744 497217 1.2 0.6 2.4 2453 6055 0 47246 178814 0
2.4 2.35 665468 2236 13686 664162 631743 648852 0.8 0.2 2.4 1422 4411 0 43413 177747 0
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From table 5.9, in which the effects of parameters in the centralized model 
are summarized, the effects of selling price and production cost on the total profit 
and threshold forecast are opposite. For example, the total profit increases with 
the unit selling price, but the total profit decreases when the unit production cost 
increases. It seems that production cost has more influence on the company since 
the trends (the increase or decrease) of the total profit, the investment in 
forecasting, and threshold forecast seem to follow the effect of production cost 
The Decentralized Model
Based on table 5.11, we find that, if the difference between the unit selling 
price and the unit production cost is fixed, TP^ (the total profit of the company 
with the coordination policy) and TP ^  (the total profit o f the company with 
marketing-oriented policy) decrease when the unit selling price increases. This 
shows that, after the increase in the unit selling price, the company with 
coordination or marketing-oriented policy can not cover the increase in the unit 
production cost. However, TPpc (the total profit of the company with the 
production-oriented policy) fluctuates. An interesting situation is that TP ^  is 
not always larger than T P ^  but no specific rule exists to guide that under what 
condition which type of the company has a better performance. In Chapter 4, 
the effects of parameters in the decentralized models are summarized in table 
4.18. From table 4.18, we find that the above situation may be an outcome of 
the mixed effect of selling price and production cost
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We also find that p Xo> p Xm and p Xp (the unit transfer prices in the three types 
of decentralized companies) increase. The reason is that more profits should be 
transferred to production to cover the increase in production cost Another 
interesting situation is that the difference between p Xp and p lm decreases. This 
means that after the same amount of increase in the unit selling price and 
production cost the conflicts between production and marketing become less 
intense. Again, from table 4.18, the above results may be caused by the mixed 
effect o f selling price and production cost
Furthermore, Cf0, Cfm, and c ,^ (the investments in forecasting in the three 
types of decentralized companies) all increase. From table 4.18, this situation 
suggests that, in the decision on the investment, selling price may be dominant 
over production cost.
Moreover, thresholdm, threshold0, and thresholdp (the threshold forecasts 
in the three types of decentralized companies) all increase. From table 4.18, the 
above suggests that production cost may be more dominant in the decisions on 
whether to start a new run.
Setting 2: The values of the unit selling price and the unit production cost 
increase, the prior standard deviation is 10000 issues, and the form of cr(cy) is case 
1.
The reason to study setting 2 is as follows. Consider the other companies 
which have the same cost structure as that in setting 1, but a smaller variance of 
customer demand. If they adopt the same strategy to solve the problem, we are
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interested to know in which setting the companies have more advantages to 
compete. The results in setting 2 are given in table 5.12 in the next page.
The Centralized Model
From tables 5.12 and 5.11, we find that the results of setting 2 are the same 
as those of setting 1, except that the threshold forecast in setting 2 is always 0. 
The reason is that the prior standard deviation in setting 2 is very .small; thus, 
production is more likely to produce.
We also find that the total profit in setting 2 is greater than that in setting 1, 
but the threshold forecast and the investment in forecasting in case 2 are less than 
those in setting 1. This means the company with a smaller variance of demand has 
more advantages in forecasting; hence, it invests less money in forecasting, and it 
more likely to produce.
The Decentralized Model
We have following the findings from table 5.12. We find that TP^ 
decreases when the unit selling price and the unit production cost increase by the 
same amount. This shows that the company with production-oriented policy can 
not cover the increase in the unit production cost, either. Furthermore, the 
relationship TP^ > TPmc > TPpc is always true. This means that, in setting 2, the 
performance of the company with the marketing-oriented policy is always better 
than that of the company with the production-oriented policy.
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Table 5.12: The Results in System Setting 2
p p-cu TPC Cfc thresholdc TP* * oc TP11 me TP11 pc Plo Plm Pxp °fo Cfm c fp threshold0 thresholdm threshold,,
0.4 0.35 68708 0 0 68708 68583 68708 0.4 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 59715 0
0.8 0.35 67373 0 0 67372 67147 67373 0.8 0.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 67426 0
1.2 0.35 66700 0 0 66700 66452 66700 1.2 1.0 1.2 0 0 0 0 70879 0
1.6 0.35 66256 0 0 66256 66003 66256 1.6 1.4 1.6 0 0 0 0 73066 0
2.0 0.35 65928 69 0 65928 65674 65928 2.0 1.8 2.0 0 0 0 0 74649 0
2.4 0.35 65681 283 0 65670 65417 65670 2.4 2.2 2.4 0 0 0 0 75882 0
0.8 0.75 188380 0 0 188380 187690 188380 0.8 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 59715 0
1.2 0.75 186295 0 0 186295 184925 186295 1.2 0.6 1.2 0 0 0 0 67426 0
1.6 0.75 185168 665 0 185092 183708 185092 1.6 1.0 1.6 0 320 0 0 98908 0
2.0 0.75 184491 1112 0 184249 183117 184249 2.0 1.4 2.0 0 760 0 0 123958 0
2.4 0.75 184015 1405 0 183606 182701 183606 2.4 1.8 2.4 0 1030 0 0 134324 0
1.2 1.15 308192 0 0 308192 306798 308192 1.2 0.2 1.2 0 0 0 0 59715 0
1.6 1.15 305625 329 0 305608 303281 305608 1.6 0.6 1.6 0 1015 0 0 129804 0
2.0 1.15 304302 1229 0 303999 302009 303999 2.0 1.0 2.0 0 1774 0 0 148750 0
2.4 1.15 303476 1725 0 302826 301256 302826 2.4 1.4 2.4 0 2193 0 0 156180 0
1.6 1.55 428062 0 0 428062 425906 428062 1.6 0.2 1.6 0 0 0 0 59715 0
2.0 1.55 425184 654 0 425110 421970 425110 2.0 0.6 2.0 0 1952 0 0 149975 0
2.4 1.55 423714 1585 0 423177 420498 423177 2.4 1.0 2.4 0 2759 0 0 159653 0
2.0 1.95 547964 0 0 547964 545018 547964 2.0 0.2 2.0 0 14 0 0 61345 0
2.4 1.95 544862 873 0 544722 541858 544722 2.4 0.7 2.4 0 1813 0 0 72462 0
2.4 2.35 667885 0 0 667885 664345 667885 2.4 0.2 2.4 0 664 0 0 110996 0
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Moreover, the difference between p Xp and p lm seems to be stable. This 
means that the same increase in the unit selling price and production cost may 
have little impact on the conflicts between production and marketing with regard 
to the unit transfer price.
Furthermore, m, threshold^ and thresholdp are 0. The reason is that 
the variance of demand is very small in setting 2; thus, under most situations, the 
companies in setting 2 spend nothing on forecasting, but they are more likely to 
produce.
We also find that, in all the three types o f decentralized companies, the 
total profits in setting 2 is larger than those in setting 1 since the companies in 
setting 2 have advantages in the prior standard deviation than do those in setting 
1. Also, the companies in setting 2 are more likely to produce, but they spend 
less money on forecasting.
Setting 3: The values of the unit selling price and the unit production cost 
increase, coefficient y is equal to 0.0001, and the form of c(cy) is case 1.
Consider that the companies in setting 3, which also have the same cost 
structure as that in setting 1, decide not only to raise the unit selling price but also 
to improve the forecast It is interesting to know the results of this action. The 
results in setting 3 are shown in table 5.13 in the next page.
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Table 5.13: The Results in System Setting 3
p p-cu T P C Cfc threshold,. T P1 1  OC T P11 me T P1 1  DC P lo Plm Pip c fo c fm c fp threshold0 thresholdm threshold0
0.4 0.35 67660 1239 89737 65989 65184 57076 0.3 0.2 0.4 383 890 0 120339 180699 0
0.8 0.35 66521 1808 91791 64901 63981 43923 0.7 0.6 0.8 724 1390 0 126835 182725 6363
1.2 0.35 66059 2038 92499 64437 63510 37363 1.1 1.0 1.2 865 1582 0 123193 183351 40016
1.6 0.35 65781 2177 92910 64152 63231 64152 1.5 1.4 1.5 950 1698 950 128898 183699 128898
2.0 0.35 65586 2275 93191 63951 63035 63951 1.9 1.8 1.9 1010 1777 1010 129354 183944 129354
2.4 0.35 65438 2349 93403 63797 62889 63797 2.3 2.2 2.3 1055 1055 1430 129693 184118 129693
0.8 0.75 187213 1407 44527 186159 177244 173797 0.4 0.2 0.8 736 1624 0 89964 178571 0
1.2 0.75 185667 2181 46132 184575 177055 152948 0.8 0.6 1.2 1356 2467 0 92892 179614 0
1.6 0.75 184978 2525 46686 183882 176343 179748 1.2 1.0 1.5 1634 2800 602 93534 179945 58213
2.0 0.75 184545 2742 47012 183453 175920 179277 1.6 1.4 1.9 1807 2999 693 93867 180136 59686
2.4 0.75 184235 2897 47238 183151 175624 178934 2,0 1.8 2.3 1931 3133 759 94082 180274 60555
1.2 1.15 307032 1494 29440 306046 292651 291920 0.5 0.2 1.2 880 2117 0 71662 177847 0
1.6 1.15 305249 2386 30812 304145 290383 296409 0.9 0.6 1.5 1655 3215 354 74026 178605 31108
2.0 1.15 304409 2806 31281 303279 289492 295353 1.3 1.0 1.9 2022 3648 465 74529 178851 36821
2.4 1.15 303865 3078 31560 302734 288955 294681 1.7 1.4 2.3 2256 3875 574 74786 179025 39133
1.6 1.55 426924 1551 21894 425961 406541 410623 0.6 0.2 1.6 963 2511 0 59501 177449 0
2.0 1.55 424978 2524 23119 423850 403900 412533 1.1 0.6 1.9 1626 3820 287 53248 178063 16882
2.4 1.55 424026 3000 23532 422863 402853 411132 1.5 1.0 2.3 2033 4288 409 53784 178300 25181
2.0 1.95 546850 1593 17366 545896 520518 529640 0.7 0.2 2.0 1017 2879 0 50825 177166 0
2.4 1.95 544783 2627 18490 543622 517539 528761 1.2 0.6 2.3 1780 4296 239 46514 177739 5798
2.4 2.35 666797 1626 14349 665842 634553 648852 0.8 0.2 2.4 1054 3209 0 44317 176963 0
-sio
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The Centralized Model
Based on tables 5.13 and 5.11, we find that the results of setting 3 are the 
same as those of setting 1. Moreover, the total profit in setting 3 is greater than 
that in setting 1, but the investment in forecasting in setting 3 is less than that of its 
counterpart This means that the company with a more accurate forecast has a 
greater total profit than that of its counterpart in setting 1. Since its forecast is 
more accurate, the company in setting 3 spends less money on forecasting than its 
counterpart in setting 1. Moreover, under most circumstances, the threshold 
forecast in setting 3 is less than that in setting 1. It seems that the company in 
setting 3 is more likely to produce.
The Decentralized Model
From tables 5.13 and 5.11, TPmc is larger than TPpc when the unit selling 
price is relatively low. This suggests that the company with production-oriented 
policy has a better performance than does the company with the marketing- 
oriented policy when the unit selling price is relatively low.
We also find that TP0C, TPmc and TPpc in setting 3 are greater than those in 
setting 1. This shows that, in the decentralized companies, the companies in 
setting 3 have more advantages in profits than do the companies in setting 1. 
Moreover, Cj0 and are less than those in setting 1, and under most 
circumstances, in setting 3 is less than that in setting 1. This means that, the 
company with the coordination or marketing-oriented policy in setting 3 spends 
less money on forecasting because its forecast is more precise, but for the
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company with production-oriented policy, there is no conclusion about the 
company in which setting will spend more money on forecasting. We also find 
that threshold0 and thresholdm in setting 3 are less than those in setting 1, and 
thresholdp in setting 3 is not always less than that in setting 1. This situation 
may also be explained by the fact that the forecast in setting 3 is more accurate. 
Setting 4: The values of the unit selling price and the unit production cost 
increase, and a(cj) is under case 2.
Consider that the companies in setting 4 have the same cost structure as that 
in setting 1, but their forecast standard deviations c(cy) are different It is 
interesting to compare the performances of the companies between setting 1 and 4. 
The results are reported in table 5.14 in the next page.
The Centralized Model
From tables 5.14 and 5.11, we find that the results of setting 4 are the same 
as those of setting 1. Moreover, the total profit in setting 4 is less than that in 
setting 1, but the investment in forecasting in setting 4 is greater than that o f its 
counterpart
The Decentralized Model
Based on tables 5.14 and 5.11, TP^ seems to decrease, then increase when 
the unit selling price increases. We find that TP^. and 77^ in setting 4 are less 
than those in setting 1. However, T P ^  in setting 4 is not always less than its 
counterpart in setting 1 (TP^ in setting 4 is larger than its counterpart when 
is much larger than the break-even point).
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Furthermore, p lp, p l0, and p lm in setting 4 are not always less than their 
counterparts (in most situations, they are equal to their counterpart). Moreover, 
Cf0 and Cfi„ are larger than those in setting 1. This indicates that if the unit 
transfer price is decided by marketing, or by considering the overall profit, the 
company spends more money on forecasting than the company in setting 1. As 
for threshold forecast, thresholdm in setting 4 is less than that in setting 1, but 
thresholda and thresholdp in setting 4 are not always less than their counterparts 
in setting 1. This suggests that, the company with marketing-oriented policy in 
setting 4 is more likely to produce than its counterpart in setting 1.
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CHAPTER 6
THE MULTI-PERIOD MODELS FOR THE CENTRALIZED SYSTEMS 
AND THE SYSTEMS WITH FIXED PRODUCTION BATCH SIZE
AND LEAD TIME
6.1. Introduction
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, we extend the one-period 
centralized model in Section 3.5 into a multi-period centralized model with a 
finite planning horizon. In the second part, we further investigate the effect of 
demand forecasting on the production policy of a specific multi-period model 
with a fixed production batch size and lead time.
The first part of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we 
consider the assumptions imposed in the process of demand forecasting in the 
multi-period centralized model. In Section 6.3, we discuss the process to revise 
the distribution of demand forecast and the learning effect in the process of 
demand forecasting. Then, in Section 6.4, we develop the multi-period centralized 
model with a finite planning horizon. Several examples are given in Section 6.5.
In the second part of this chapter, starting with Section 6.6, we present a 
problem description about the specific production system. In Section 6.7, we 
discuss the process of demand forecasting in the specific system. Then, in 
Section 6.8, we formulate the models based on the approaches of SDP 
(stochastic dynamic programming) and MDP (Markov decision processes). In 
Section 6.9, we propose computation procedures, and, in Section 6.10, give 
several examples for the specific production system.
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6.2. The Assumptions and Process of Demand Forecasting
in the Multi-Period Centralized Model
The process of demand forecasting in the multi-period model is slightly 
different from that in the one-period model.
We consider a periodic review system that produces only one type of 
product. Assume that the production lead time and forecast horizon is one 
period, and the planning horizon is finite, e.g., t = 0, 1,..., T. At the beginning of 
each period, the marketing manager decides the investment in forecasting in 
order to estimate demand in the current period. After forecasting, the marketing 
manager gives the forecast to the production manager., who uses it to determine 
production quantity. We assume that all unfulfilled orders are lost In each 
period, the unsold products are carried over to the next period, and inventories at 
the end of the final period of the planning horizon are disposed at a cost Setup 
time and maintenance of the production system are not considered.
Assume that Xt is the customer demand in period t, X( follows a known 
distribution with mean 0 and variance x2, and Xt is iid for each period during the 
planning horizon. For convenience, we omit the subscription and let X  denote 
the iid demand in each period. The distribution of X  is considered as the prior 
information of demand and can be obtained from the records of past demands.
Let x, be the outcome of X  in period t and p(xt) be the probability function 
of X  = xt. However, x, is unknown at the beginning of period t, and must, be 
estimated by the marketing manager. Let Wt be the forecast (a random variable)
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for x„ and cfi be the dollar value spent on forecasting in period t. Define the
realized forecast in period / to be w„ which can be interpreted as the observation of
the forecast Wt. Since the precision of forecasts on the investment in forecasting
and the nature of demand, we assume that the mean of Wt is a function of x, and
Cp and its standard deviation is a decrease function of Cp Hence, let \ifcp x,)
and o Xc//) denote the mean and standard deviation of W„ respectively. Further,
define p(yvt \x= xt) to be the probability function of Wt\x= xt. Then, from the
above and the results in Section 3.2, x\ Wt = w, can be treated as a posterior
random variable. To derive the posterior probability, we define p(wn xt), p(wt),
and p(x, | W, = w,) to be the joint probability function of wt and x„ the
unconditional probability function of w„ and the posterior probability function of
xt \w t = w ,m periodt ,respectively. Since
POn x t) = P ( x t)P(w t \ X - x t), (6.1)
P(Xi)=  ^ P iw ^ x , ) ,  (6.2)
*,
we have the posterior probability function
p(x, | W, = wt) =piw„ xj/p(wt). (6.3)
As a special case, if Wt is unbiased and both X  and Wt follow normal 
distribution, from the result of Section 3.2, Wt\x = x, follows N(x„ a 2/^ ) )  and 
X \w t = w, follows NQifcp wt), p 2(c/r)), where
t 2W. + C  .2 (Cjj )0
tiU C fiW i-E W W ,-* ,)  , (6.4)
a , (cfi)+ x 2
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,  T 2CT| 2(C /})
p fay) = VarQC\Wt = w,) = \
o , \ c fi)+ x2
(6-5)
Note that one of the characteristics of a good forecast is that the variance of 
its associated posterior demand is less than that of prior demand. Another 
characteristic is lack of bias. We assume, therefore, that all forecasts in our model
63. Forecast Revisions and Learning Effect
In our model, the process to revise the distribution of the forecast is a 
learning process. The process is discussed as follows.
Let x,^ be the realized demand in period t -  k, k = 1, 2,..., and w,_* be the 
realized forecast in that period. Then, the forecast error in period t - k  is wt.k -  x,^. 
Using past records, we can employ statistical methods to test whether the forecast 
is unbiased. If the forecast is unbiased, the average value of forecast error is close 
to 0. Define TCf to be the set of time which elements are the periods, and in these 
periods the system has the same investment in forecasting cy. Let \ T c f \  denote the 
number of elements (periods) in T C f The value of forecast standard deviation for a 
specific Cyis calculated as follows.
Then, in period t, the form of cr/cy), which describes the relationship 
between the standard deviation of forecast and the investment, can be obtained by
have these two characteristics; that is, \i^Cp x,) = xt and p,2(cy) < t 2.
(6.6)
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using regression methods or other methods. Usually, is a decreasing
function of cfi. Two possible forms of are as follows.
The learning effect in the process of demand forecasting is that the skill and 
experience of forecasting are accumulated over the planning horizon. As a result, 
when the investments in forecasting in each period are the same, the forecast 
standard deviation decreases with time; that is, if cfi = c ^ ,  then <s{cjd > c^hCc/m)- 
Consider another way to represent the learning effect in the process of 
demand forecasting. Define the rate of learning to be rt. Assume that marketing 
makes the first forecasting in period 0 and the investment in forecasting in period 0 
is Cjq. According to the theory of learning curve, when marketing makes the 
second forecasting, it can obtain the same precision of the first forecast by a 
investment which is a 1 -  r, percent reduction in the investment of the first
forecasting. A logarithmic model of learning curve (Krajewski and Ritzman, 
1987) describes the required cost in period t to obtain the same precision of 
forecast in period 0 as follows.
=  1 !  ( J tC f ,  +  P ) , 
a Xcyr) =  P  e x p C - ^ f y ) , P, Y,> 0.
P> J t > (6.7)
(6.8)
b = logrll log 2. (6.9)
From (6.7) and (6.8), the new forms of cr^ c )^ may be as follows. 
aXc/,) = 1 / (7 /cfit b + P), p,y  > 0,
cXc/f) = P exp(-Y/ cft p, y > 0. (6.11)
(6.10)
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Marketing can decide how often to revise the learning rate and the 
distribution of forecast, based on the possible change of demand and forecasts.
The process of deriving the posterior distribution of demand discussed in our 
models can also be considered as a learning process since the prior distribution of 
demand is revised by the realized forecast and becomes the posterior distribution 
of demand.
If we assume that the prior distribution of customer demand is not iid and is 
updated in each period, the process of demand forecasting will become too 
complicated to be formulated. In practice, customer demand is rather stable during 
the planning horizon. In following model formulation, therefore, we simply 
assume that, during the planning horizon, prior demand is iid and forecasts are not 
revised, but the effect of the learning curve is considered.
6.4. Formulation of the Multi-Period Centralized Model
Assume that the demand, production quantity, and investment in forecasting 
in each period are discrete and finite. The problem in the multi-period centralized 
modei can then be formulated and solved by the method of stochastic dynamic 
programming (SDP). For a review of SDP, refer to Section 2.4.
Because the decision process in our model is sequential, two decision points 
exist in each period: the marketing manager makes a decision, then the production 
manager. Define the state of system to be (/, w,), where i is the beginning 
inventory level and w, is the realized forecast in period t. Since no current forecast
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exists at the first decision point in each period, we denote the state of the system at 
the first decision point as (/, wH).
The system is assumed to operate as follows. At the first decision point in 
period t, the state of the system is (z, wM). At this point, the marketing manager 
needs to determine the investment in forecasting in order to obtain w„ and then 
passes the information of the forecast to the production manager. After 
marketing’s action, the system transits to the second decision point, and the state 
of the system becomes (/, w,). At the beginning of the second decision point, the 
production manager needs to decide the production quantity Yt based on the 
forecast and the prior information of demand. After the production manager’s 
decision, the system moves to the first decision point of the next period, and the 
new state of the system is (z‘ + Yt - x p wf), where x, is the demand in the period t. 
This decision process is repeated in each period until the end of the planning 
horizon.
To formulate the problem in the marketing sector, let pmtiyv  ^be the transition 
probability at the first decision point in period t, which is the probability when the 
result of forecasting is w? From (3.49) and (3.50), we have the following 
equation.
=  P M  = 1 L p < K \X  ~  x , ) P ( x r ) • (6 -12)
•*<
Because p(w,) is related to Cj„ p jyt'b  is also dependent on Cft. When 
incorporating the effect of the learning curve, we could assume that forecast
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standard deviation follows (6.10) or (6.11). In this situation, however, we must 
stipulate that the investment in each period should be greater than 0 (marketing 
should make forecasting in each period), or the model will become too 
complicated to be solved since the state of the system will depend on the decisions 
made by marketing in the previous periods.
The immediate expected reward at the first decision point is as follows.
Rmfi, cft) = -Cfi- (6.13)
Define TPJii, wM) to be the total profit at the first decision point in period t 
when the state of the system is (z, wM); and TPpt{i, wj to be the total profit at the 
second decision point when the state of the system is (i, w,). Then, the recursion 
equation at time t at the first decision point is as follows.
TPmiU wM)
= max {R Ji, wM, cfi) + K \x  = ) TPp&
* wi
f = 0 ,l,...,r . (6.14)
Note that the realized forecast w, can not influence the inventory level at the 
beginning of the second decision point Moreover, since the next decision point is 
within the same period, we do not need to discount TPpt.
Consider the case when the system is in the second decision point Let p, 
ch cd, ch and a  be unit selling price, production setup cost, unit inventory holding 
cost, unit inventory disposal cost, unit lost-sales cost, and discount factor, 
respectively. Define the step function H(Yt) = 1, if Yt > 0; H(Yt) = 0, otherwise.
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Then, the immediate expected reward at the second decision point in period t is 
represented by the following equation-
i+Yt oo
Rpfo Yi) =P[2 X,P,(x,\W, = w,) + ^ ( i  + Y,)p,(x,|W ,= w,)]
o i+r,+1
/+r,
-  [cJRXb + cuY, + ck£ ( /  + Y, - x ,)p ,(x,\Wt -  w,)
0
09
+ C/ £ ( X, - i - Y ^ p ^ W ,  = w,)]. (6.15)
/+r,+1
Note that when the system is at the second decision point in the final period 
of the planning horizon, i.e., when t= T ,cd should replace ch in (6.15).
The recursion equation at the second decision point in period t is as follows. 
TPpl(i, w,) = max {R&  FJ + a ]T  ppt(xt)TPmt+l(i +Yt -x„  w,)},
* t
f = 0,l,...,r, (6.16)
where, ppt(Xt) is the transition probability (the posterior probability function of 
demand) at the second decision point in period t, and pp£x,) = p£xt | Wt = w,).
To solve the above SDP problem, we assume that the total profit beyond the 
planning horizon is 0, i.e., TPmT+l(i, wr) = 0, for all i and wT. The computation 
complexity of the above model depends on the number of discrete levels of 
production quantity and the investment in forecasting, and the length of the 
planning horizon.
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6.5. Experiment Examples for the Multi-Period Centralized Model
In this section, we study five system settings of the multi-period centralized 
model to investigate the effects of model parameters on the decisions regarding the 
investment in forecasting and production policy.
System Setting 1
Consider a company that produces a new product of special film. All film 
are manufactured in the company’s own plant The setup cost is $35,000 per 
production run and the production cost is $0.65 per roll. The film is sold at a price 
of $2.00 per roll. Because of fierce competition in consumer marketing, the life 
of this new product is estimated to be 12 months. After 12 months, the product 
may be replaced by other competitive products. The company decides, however, 
that the length of the planning horizon for this product is also 12 months. All 
unsold rolls at the end of the current month are carried over the next month with a 
cost $0.05 per roll, but are disposed of at the end of the planning horizon at a cost 
of $0.10 per roll. Moreover, all unsatisfied demands are lost at an estimated cost 
of $0.05 per roll, and the discount rate is 0.98.
We assume that all levels of production quantity and the investment in 
forecasting are discrete. The available levels of production quantities are 0,
200,000 and 600,000 rolls. With regard to investment in forecasting, there are two 
choices: high level and low level, and the initial investments for the high and low 
levels are $1,000 and $1,400, respectively. The learning rate in forecasting is 
assumed to be 0.90. Based on past records, the prior probabilities of customer
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demand aiep(x = 100,000) = 0.2, p(x = 200,000) = 0.3, p(x = 300,000) = 0.3, and 
p(x = 400,000) = 0.2. As a result, E(X) = 250,000 and Var{X) = 1.45E10. The 
conditional probability of w I x  and the posterior probability of x  | w under the two 
investment levels in forecasting are reported in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: The Probabilities in the Example of Multi-Period 
Centralized Model
low investment level high investment level
w X p(w \x) p(x\w) p(w\x) p{w\x)
100,000 100,000 1.0 0.989 1.00 0.994
200,000 100,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
300,000 100,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
400,000 100,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
100,000 200,000 0.1 0.011 0.05 0.006
200,000 200,000 0.8 0.889 0.90 0.947
300,000 200,000 0.1 0.111 0.05 0.053
400,000 200,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
100,000 300,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
200,000 300,000 0.1 0.111 0.05 0.053
300,000 300,000 0.8 0.889 0.90 0.947
400,000 300,000 0.1 0.011 0.05 0.006
100,000 400,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
200,000 400,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
300,000 400,000 0.0 0.000 0.00 0.000
400,000 400,000 1.0 0.989 1.00 0.994
The mean of w \ x ~ x  is unbiased for x. Moreover, the standard deviation 
o fX\ lV = w is less than the prior standard deviation Var(X) = 1.45E10. However, 
the forecast revision is not considered. The results of the decision on the 
investment in forecasting of five system settings are given in table 6.2 in the next 
page. Note that for those inventory levels not listed in table 6.2, the associated 
investment level is low.
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Table 6.2: The Investment in Forecasting in the Multi-Period
Centralized Model
m o n th in v en to ry in v es tm en t 
o f  se ttin g  1
in v e s tm e n t 
o f  se ttin g  2
in v e s tm e n t 
o f  s e ttin g  3
in v es tm en t 
o f  se ttin g  4
in v es tm e n t 
o f  se ttin g  3
0 0 low low low low low
0 100,000 high high low high high
0 200,000 high high low high high
0 300,000 low low low low high
i 0 low low low low low
i 100,000 high high low high high
l 200,000 high high low high high
l 300,000 low low low low high
2 0 low high low low low
2 100,000 high high low high high
2 200,000 high high low high high
2 300,000 high high low high high
3 0 low high low low low
3 100,000 high high low high high
3 200,000 high high high high high
3 300,000 high high low high high
4 0 low high low low low
4 100,000 high high low high high
4 200,000 high high high high high
4 300,000 high high low high high
5 0 high high low high low
5 100,000 high high low high high
5 200,000 high high high high high
5 300,000 high high low high high
6 0 low high high low low
6 100.000 high high low high high
6 200,000 high high high high high
6 300,000 high high low high high
7 0 low high low high low
7 100,000 high high high high high
7 200,000 r high high high high high
7 300,000 high high low high high
8 0 high high high high high
8 100,000 high high high low high
8 200,000 high high high low high
8 300,000 high high low high high
8 400,000 low low low high low
9 0 low low low high low
9 100,000 high high high high high
9 200,000 high high high high high
9 300,000 high high low high high
10 0 high high high — high
10 100,000 high high high — high
10 200,000 high high high — high
10 300,000 high high low — high
11 0 high high high — high
11 100,000 low high low — high
11 200,000 low high low — low
11 300,000 high high high — high
11 400,000 high high low — high
12 0 high high low — high
12 100,000 high high low — high
12 200,000 high high high — high
12 300,000 high high high —  high
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Besides, the results of the decision on the production quantity in the first 
month and the last month are also shown in tables 6.3 and 6.4.
Table 6.3: The Results of Optimal Production Quantity in the First Month
in the Multi-Period Model
inventory investment realized
forecast
production 
level in 
setting 1
production 
level in 
setting 2
production 
level in 
setting 3
production 
level in 
setting 4
production 
level in 
setting 5
0 low 100,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 low 200,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
0 low 300,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
0 low 400,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
0 high 100,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 high 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 high 300,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
0 high 400,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
100,000 low 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
100,000 low 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 low 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 low 400,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
100,000 high 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
100,000 high 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 high 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 high 400,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
200,000 low 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 low 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 low 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
200,000 low 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 2oa,ooo 200,000
200,000 high 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 high 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 high 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
200,000 high 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
300,000 low 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 low 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 low 300,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 low 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
300,000 high 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 high 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 high 300,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 high 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
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Table 6.4: The Results of Optimal Production Quantity in the Last Month
in the Multi-Period Model
inventory investmen
t
result of 
forecast
production 
level in 
setting 1
production 
level in 
setting 2
production 
level in 
setting 3
production 
level in 
setting 4
production 
level in 
setting 5
0 low 100,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 low 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 low 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 low 400,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
0 high 100,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 high 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 high 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
0 high 400,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
100,000 low 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
100,000 low 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 low 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 low 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 high 100,000 r 0 0 0 0 0
100,000 high 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 high 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
100,000 high 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
200,000 low 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 low 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 low 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 0
200,000 low 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
200,000 high 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 high 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
200,000 high 300,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
200,000 high 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
300,000 low 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 low 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 low 300,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 low 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
300,000 high 100,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 high 200,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 high 300,000 0 0 0 0 0
300,000 high 400,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
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We discuss the results in system setting 1 as follows.
The Results in System Setting 1
From table 6.2, we find that, if the on-hand inventory level is greater than
400.000 rolls (the maximal demand), then the level of the invesment in forecasting 
is low (this is true in all five system settings). The reason is that there are enough 
inventories to cope with the next month’s demand. As a result, demand 
forecasting seems to be less important, and marketing chooses the low investment 
level. However, the company is more willing to choose the high investment level 
in the last several months. The reason is that in the last several months the 
learning effect is more significant; thus, the high investment level becomes 
affordable.
With regard to the decision on production quantity, we find, from tables 6.3 
and 6.4, that if on-hand inventory level is greater than the 400,000 rolls (maximum 
customer demand), production quantity is 0 (this is true in all five system settings). 
Moreover, in the first month, when inventory level is 0 and the forecast is 200,000 
rolls, if the company adopts the low investment level, its production quantity is
600.000 rolls; however, if it adopts the high investment level, its production 
quantity is 200,000 rolls. This indicates that the high investment level, for which 
forecast is also more accurate, can generate a more appropriate production plan. 
We also find that the production plan in each month is rather stable (it changes 
slightly) over the time horizon. The reason may be that the numbers of the
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investment levels and production levels are too .small for marketing and production 
to change their decision dramatically in each month.
System Setting 2
The rate of learning is assumed to be 0.50. Other settings are the same as 
those in system setting 1.
The Results in System Setting 2
The company is willing to adopt the high investment level more rapidly than 
in system setting 1. The reason is that the learning rate in system setting 2 is lower 
than that in system setting 1. In other words, the learning effect in setting 2 is 
more significant than that in system setting 1.
As for the decision on production quantity, we find that production plans in 
the first and last month are the same as those in system setting 1. The situation 
may be explained as follows. The production plan in each month is based on the 
precision of forecast and current inventory level. Since the precision of forecast 
for the two investment levels are quite high, the production plan is stable.
Other results are the same as those in system setting 1. Note that we also try 
several similar examples for setting 2, and we find that, if the learning rate is 
smaller, the learning effect become more significant 
System Setting 3
We consider the situation that the prior standard deviation of demand 
increases. In system setting 3, the prior probabilities of customer demand are p(x 
= 100,000) = 0.45, p(x = 200,000) = 0.05, p(x = 300,000) = 0.05, and p(x =
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400.000) = 0.45. Thus, E(X) = 250,000 and Var(X) = 2.05E10. Other settings are 
the same as those in system setting 1.
The Results in System Setting 3
The company in setting 3 is more willing to choose the low investment level 
from the beginning of the planning horizon. The reason may be that the standard 
deviations of posterior demand X \w  = w in both investments decrease since for 
both investment levels p(w = 100,0001 x  = 100,000) = p(w  = 400,000 \x =
400.000) = 1.0 (the restriction of unbiased estimate). When the investment level is 
low, the standard deviation of posterior demand x\ W=w seems to decrease much 
faster than when the investment level is high. Thus, the low investment level 
seems to dominate at the beginning of the time horizon.
Other results are the same as those in system setting 1.
For another example, however, that the prior standard deviation is larger than 
that in setting 1, but less than that in the above example, we find that the high 
investment level seems to dominate from the beginning of the planning horizon. 
This may indicate that when prior standard deviation is relatively low and 
increasing, the company is willing to invest more in forecasting. When the prior 
standard deviation is relatively high, the uncertainty of demand is too high; thus, 
forecasting becomes less important, and the company prefers a low investment 
level in forecasting. From the results of several other similar examples, the above 
conclusion is confirmed.
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System Setting 4
In system setting 4, the planning horizon is 9 months. Other settings are the 
same as those in system setting 1.
The Results in System Setting 4
Comparing the result of setting 4 with that of setting 1, we find that it is less 
clear whether the high investment level dominates over the low investment level in 
the last several months. The reason is that the effect of the learning curve is less 
significant in system setting 4 since its learning time is shorter.
Other results are the same as those in system setting I. From the results of 
several similar examples for setting 4, we find that, if the planning horizon is 
shorter, the learning effect becomes less significantly.
System Setting 5
In system setting 5, we consider the effect of forecast standard deviation. 
Assume that when the investment level is low, we have p(w -  100,000 \x =
100,000) = 1.0, p(w  = 400,000|x = 400,000) = 1.0, p(w = 100,000|x = 200,000) =
0.13, p(w = 200,000 |x  = 200,000) = 0.74, p(w = 300,000 |x  = 200,000) =.0.13, 
p(w = 200,0001 x = 300,000) = 0.13, p(yv = 300,0001 x = 300,000) = 0.74, p(w =
400,0001 x = 300,000) = 0.13. The low investment level in setting 5 has a larger 
standard deviation than its counterpart in setting 1. Other settings are the same as 
those in setting 1.
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The Results in System Setting 5
From table 6.2, we find that in setting 5 the high investment level seems to 
be significantly more dominant over the low investment level than that in setting
1. The reason is that the precision of forecast for the low investment level 
decreases. Thus, the company is willing to adopt the high investment level.
Furthermore, from table 6.3 and 6.4, the production plan in the last months is 
slightly different For example, if inventory level and forecast are 200,000 and
300,000 rolls, and the investment level is low, then the production quantity is 0 in 
system setting 5, but it is 200,000 in system setting 1. This may imply that a less 
accurate forecast prefers a lower production quantity.
Other results are the same as those of setting 1. From the results of several 
similar examples for setting 5, if forecast standard deviation is larger, the above 
results become more significant
6.6. Problem Description of the Specific Production System
In the following sections, we focus on studying the effect of demand 
forecasting on a periodic review production system with a fixed production 
batch size and lead time. Assume that the system operates as follows. At the 
beginning of each period, the production manager receives the information on 
the forecasts for a given forecast horizon from the marketing division. Then, 
based on the information of the forecast and prior demand, the production 
manager makes a production decision. The production decision is dependent on
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the existing conditions of the system. That is, if the production system is not 
idle (the previously started production run is not finished), the production 
manager will stay on the predetermined schedule. On the other hand, if the 
production system is idle, the production manager has to decide whether or not 
to set up a new production batch. The batch is set up at a fixed cost, but the 
setup time is assumed to be negligible. Also, considered are production cost, 
inventory holding cost, and backorder cost. The production manager’s objective 
is to minimize the discounted total cost over an infinite time horizon.
Our model can be applied to a system with the following features:
1. A mixed make-to-order and make-to-stock system, where production is for 
present as well as future demands. Hence, the forecasts for different periods 
have great influence on the production decision.
2. A system with a high investment in facility or setup cost, where economies 
of scale and production at full capacity are important.
3. A mature system, where the production lead time and yield are rather stable.
One example of such a production system is the ceramics and pottery 
industry, which has a large investment in kilns and related equipment. Since the 
capacity of each kiln is fixed, and the setup cost is expensive, the plants of the 
ceramics and pottery industry usually produce at a full capacity. Moreover, the 
production process of ceramics and pottery is very special. The temperature of 
each kiln during the production process is strictly monitored, and the chemical 
components of raw materials are also under careful control. No process
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interruption is allowed once a batch is started. The production manager must 
decide whether to start a new production run whenever the kilns are empty.
6.7. The Assumptions and Process of Demand Forecasting 
in the Specific Production System
In practice, we are unable to determine exactly what the demands in the 
future will be. A common practice is to predict the demands for a certain time 
span in the future and to make production decisions based on the forecasts.
Assume that X, is the random variable representing the periodic demand in 
period t and Xt is iid in each period and follows a known distribution with mean 
0 and variance x2. The distribution of Xt can be interpreted as the prior 
information of customer demand and can be obtained from the data on past 
demands.
At the beginning of period t, the marketing manager needs to forecast the 
demand xl+h which is an outcome of X^k in period t + k ,k  = 0 , 1 , 2 xt+k is 
unknown at the beginning of the period t and H  is the forecast horizon. Let 
Wl t+k be the forecast (a random variable) in period t for *,+*. Similar to the case 
in Chapter 3, we assume that Wt t+k follows a known distribution, and the realized 
forecast is wu+h which can be interpreted as an observation of Wu+h Then, the 
demand X^k for given wu+k can be treated as a posterior random variable. Let the 
posterior random variable X ^  Wu+k = wu+k be ,^u+k- Then, the distribution of ^ u+k
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can be derived from the prior information of X„k and the realized forecast wu++k 
(note that prior demand is iid in each period)
The closeness (or forecast error) between ^u+k and xl+k depends on the 
efforts and money invested in forecasting and the nature of customer demand. 
Assume that ^u+k is an unbiased estimate of xt+h then E(^tl+k -  x,+/fc) = 0. 
Moreover, we assume that the variance of £,u+k — xl+k is an increasing function of 
k, since as k increases, the time span becomes longer from the forecast period t 
to the period t + k, and more uncertainties are involved.
The marketing division updates the forecasts at the beginning of each 
period; k can be considered as the revision of Let A^u+k = %u+k -
u+k, k = 0, 1,2,..., H, be the revision made in period t for the demand in period t 
+ k. If both t,u+k and ^,.u+k are unbiased estimates of xt+h then £(A^a+/k) = 0. 
However, the revisions may be independent from period to period or may be 
correlated with each other.
For k> H, we assume that all demands beyond the forecast horizon follow 
the same demand pattern. Thus, let £,u+h+i be the posterior demand in the period 
t for all demands beyond period t + H. Since there is no forecast for the 
demands beyond period t + H, prior information is used; therefore, we have
Let pu+lt be the mean and p2u+k be the variance of ^ u+k. From the above 
discussion, we define „ , 4/./+W t0 be the vector of posterior
demand in period t. Let p., = (p,„ pff+1,..., p ,;+/^ [) be the mean-vector of
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posterior demand and p2, = (p2f„ p2,^ , . . . ,  p2a+w.[) be the variance-vector of 
posterior demand. Note that p2tl+k > p2u+J, k > j .  For the demands beyond the 
forecast horizon, we have p,i/+/w= 0 and p2a+/m = z2, where 0 can be 
interpreted as the long-run average demand, and z2 as the long-run average 
variance (the prior information).
6.8. Model Formulation for the Specific Production Systems
The production system in our model is assumed to operate as follows.
Assume that a system always produces a fixed batch size that equals its 
capacity y0. Let L be the production lead time, which is a constant. At the 
beginning of period t, after receiving the information of beginning inventory 
level i and the forecasts, the production manager has to decide whether to start a 
new production run for given the present conditions of the production system. 
Let at= 0 be the action not to start a new production run, and a, = 1 be the action 
to start a new batch or to continue the started batch. Assume that the manager 
will not interrupt a started batch; that is, when the system is not idle, the 
manager will stay on the predetermined schedule, i.e., a, = 1. However, when 
the system is idle, the manager has to decide whether to set up a new batch, i.e., 
a, = 0 or 1. Each new production run is started with a setup cost cs. Assume that 
the setup time is negligible. Let the unit production cost be cu, then the 
production cost in one period is cp = cjy^L whenever the system is under 
production. Moreover, assume that the decision is made at the beginning of
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each period, and demand occurs after the decision making. All demands that are 
not satisfied immediately will be backordered. Let cb denote unit inventory 
holding cost per period, and cb be unit backorder cost per period. Let a  be the 
discount factor. The manager’s objective is to minimize the discounted total 
cost over an infinite time horizon.
We illustrate the sequence of activities in period t by the following 
diagram:
forecasting demands update inventory
1- ' _ '11
t decision-making t+1
f
actual demand 
Figure 6.1. Sequence of Activities in Period t.
Since the forecasts are provided for H  periods ahead, the information on 
demand can be divided into two patterns: from time t to t + H  and beyond t + H. 
Based on the patterns of information, we decompose the problem into two 
subproblems. The first subproblem, covering the demands within the forecast 
horizon, is formulated as an SDP. The second subproblem, covering the demand
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beyond the forecast horizon, is formulated as an MDP. Then, the entire problem 
can be solved by the backward recursion algorithm.
Formulation of Finite-Stage Stochastic Dynamic Programming
To formulate the SDP problem easily, we first define the states of the 
system to be two-dimensional. Let the two-dimension state be (i, Z), where 
variables i  and /  denote the beginning inventory level and the number of 
remaining production periods, respectively. Note that i is an integer, and -  i 
represents the backorder quantity. Moreover, I is an integer within [0, L -  1], 
and / = 0 indicates the system is idle. The decision space consists of two actions 
{a, = 0, a, = 1}, where a, = 0 represents the action not to start a new production 
run at time t, and a, = 1 represents the action to start a new batch or to continue 
an unfinished batch. From the problem description in the previous section, we 
know that when 1*0, only action a, = 1 is possible. On the other hand, when I = 
0, the producer has to choose between two actions, a, = 0 or 1. The process state 
in period t + 1 is dependent on the current state and on the decision selected in 
period t. Moreover, in each period the immediate cost is associated with the 
current state and the decision. The objective of the process is to minimize the 
total discounted cost from time t to infinitive.
At first, we define some notations that will be used later. Let
k -1xfk)~ Il & u+j denote ^-period convolution posterior demand, from period t to
7=0
period t + k -  1, andp fk\x)  be the corresponding density function. Define
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C'l% 7 =ch'£ ( i - x ) p « )(x)+cl,'£i (x - i)p ? )(x), 0< t< H . (6.17)
x»0 X=»
C,(1)(i) is the one-period immediate expected cost on inventory and 
backorder for period t. Then, the k-period immediate expected cost on inventory 
and backorder, from t to t + k  -  1, can be expressed as Ctw(0, and
C ®(0 = 2 >  7"‘ fo  Z  (j ~ x)p Y] O) + i ) p ^  (x)},
y = l  *=0 xmi
0 < t<H . (6.18)
Since in each period the available actions depend on /, we consider three 
situations o f process state based on the value / = 0, / = 1 and 1 < / < L -  1. 
Situation 1: / = 0
When 1 = 0, the system is idle at the beginning of this period. The 
producer has to decide whether to start a new production run or not. If the 
producer decides not to start a new production run, and the demand for this 
period is x, the state at the beginning of the next period will be (i -  x, 0) with 
probability /?,(l)(x). The associated inventory holding cost and backorder cost 
(the immediate expected cost) are calculated as C,(i, 0, 0) = C,(l)(0, 0 < t < H. 
The total cost can be expressed by the following recursion equation of SDP.
0)Oi=0=C,(i, 0, 0 ) + a 5 > ;(1)W +I0‘- * ,  0 ) , 0 <t<H. (6.19)
x
If the producer decides to start a new production run, the state at the 
beginning of the next period will be (z -  x, L -  1). The associated setup cost,
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production cost, inventory holding and backorder costs are calculated as (6.20), 
and the total cost as (6.21).
CXi.O, l ) - c 1+c, + C,<1’(0, OSfSH. (6.20)
K0.  0).,., = C,(i, 0. i - 1 ) .
X
0 < t< H . (6.21)
The decision on whether to start a production run is determined by 
Vt(i,0) = mm{Vf(i, 0)a^ 0,Vr(i, 0 )^ ,} , Q <t<H . (6.22)
Situation 2: 1 = 1
When / =1, the system is not idle at the beginning of this period. The 
producer has one choice only, i.e., complete the unfinished production run. 
Since the production run will be finished at the end of the period, the state at the 
beginning of the next period will be (z + y 0 -  x, 0) with probability pf~[\x). The 
associated production cost, inventory holding cost, and backorder cost are 
calculated as Cr(z', 1, 1) = cp + Cf(1)(i), 0 < t < H. Hence, the total cost is 
represented by the following equation.
V,(i, 1).,., -  c , ( i ,  1, 0),
X
0 < t< H . (6.23)
Situation 3: 2 < I < L -  1
When 2 < / < I - l , t h e  system is not idle in this period. The producer has 
only one choice, i.e., to continue the started production run. The state at the 
beginning of the next period will be (z - x .  I -  1) with probability p,(I)(x)- The
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associated cost will be C fa  /, 1) = cp + C,(1)(0, 0 <t<H. Thus, the total cost is 
= C,(i, /, l ) + a 2 > f(l)(x)r,+I( / -x , l - l ) ,Q  < t< H . (6.24)
X
The above equations seem complicated. However, we notice that only in 
situation 1 does the producer need to make a decision. Therefore, by the 
recursive relation, we can plug (6.24) and (6.23) into (6.21) and have the 
following equation.
K0, °)«,=i = U,G, 0, I) + a L^ p l L)WV,+L(i+y0 - x ,  0),
X
0 < t<H . (6.25)
1 —a  L~l
where Ufa 0,1) =ct + ---------- c + C,(L) (i), 0 < t < H. (6.26)1  - a  F
Clearly, our problem can also be represented by (6.19), (6.22), and 
(6.25). However, in (6.19), (6.22), and (6.25), the value of I is zero, so we do 
not need to define the system with two-dimension state space. Consequently, 
we replace Vfa 0) with Vfa, Ufa 0,1) with Cfa 1), and Cfa  0, 0) with Cfa  0). 
Our new model is
K(0,.„ = c,(/, 0)+a
X
= C,fa l ) + a L^ p l L\x )V ^ L(i + y 0- x ) ,
X
C,(/,0) = C,(l)(0,
« / ,  1) - c ,  + 1- ^ —  c , + C,‘“ (i),1  - a  p
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VXO = min {V,(i)a .0, VtQ)astl}, 0 <t< H . (6.27)
Our problem can be reinterpreted as follows. At each decision point, the 
producer must decide whether to set up a new production batch or not If  he 
decides not to start a batch, one-period immediate expected cost occurs. The 
process transits to the next period, and the state in the next decision point is 
influenced by one-period demand. If he decides to produce, X-period immediate 
expected cost occurs. The system transits directly to X periods later, and the 
state of the next decision point is influenced by X-period convolution demand 
and a fixed batch size.
In the SDP problems, we usually assume that the cost at the end of the 
planning horizon is 0. However, the cost in our model is not equal to
zero. We continue to formulate the second subproblem as an MDP to obtain
Formulation of the Markov Decision Process
We continue to formulate the second subproblem as an MDP, in which 
demands are assumed to be iid, and the time horizon is from period t + H  + 1 to 
infinitive.
At first, we need to define some notations to be used later. Let
k
)6k)= be the ^-period convolution posterior demand, and p {k\x)  be its
7=1
density function. Define &k\f)  to be the ^-period expected immediate cost, 
excluding production and setup costs.
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&k)(0= Z ay_1 ^ “  X^PU) W  + c* Z  (* “ 0 p U)00} , (6.28)
y = l  x=0 x=i
As indicated in the discussion in section 2.4, when the transition 
probabilities and expected immediate costs are stationary, and the time horizon 
is infinite, an SDP process becomes an MDP. Since demands beyond the 
forecast horizon are assumed to be iid, the transition probabilities are stationary 
in the second subproblem. Also, in the second subproblem, the expected 
immediate costs (which may include setup, production, and inventory holding 
and backorder costs) are stationary. Thus, the second subproblem can be 
formulated as an MDP. By eliminating the time index in (6.27), we have the 
following
m ..o -  C(i, 0 ) + a
X
^(0a=i = C(i, l) + a L^ p U)(x)V(i+y0- x ) ,
X
V(i) = min { V(i)a=0 > V(i)0=i } >
where C(/, 0) = C*,}(0, C(z, 1) =ct + 1-~ a * ' c + CU)(/). (6.29)
l - a
Let xm to be the maximum one-period demand beyond the forecast horizon. 
Based on the discussion in section 2.4, the corresponding LP problem for (6.29) 
is as follows.
i
min (z)C(z, a)
/ a=0
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subjectto ' Z z^ - a T za=o(OPlj ( 0 ) - a L'£ z ^ ( i ) Pj(l) = XJ ,
za(/)>0, 
where p^O) = p ° \ i- / ) ,
=  0 ,
Pif})=p{% +yo~A
= o, otherwise.
i+ y0-L x m< j< i+ y0,
otherwise.
for all j ,  a,
(6.30)
We can obtain the optimal policy za(i) by solving (6.30); then, we can 
calculate V{i) by solving (6.29). Further, using the backward recursion 
algorithm, we can solve the entire problem by solving (6.27).
6.9. Computation Procedure and Results
In this section, we first describe the methods to generate demands. Then, 
we present the computation procedures to solve the first and second 
subproblems.
Methods to Generate Demands
We place no restriction on the distribution of demands; so, it could be any 
discrete distribution. Moreover, we also “discretize” a continuous distribution to 
approach the distribution of demands. Note that the “discretized” distribution is 
also truncated, for demand is nonegative and finite.
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Computation Procedure in MDP
Define za to be the policy vector whose elements are za(z)’s. Let P(a) be 
the transition matrix, and its element in the (z,y)th position is Pt/a). Each row of 
P(a) is a probability distribution, i.e., the sum of each row equals one. Let ca 
denote the vector of expected immediate cost, and the immediate costs are its 
elements. Define A to be the initial state probability vector whose/th element is 
Xj.. Then, (6.30) can be rewritten into the following matrix-vector LP model.
min X
a
subject to {I -  aP(0)} + {I -  a £P(l)} zFl = A,
zo>0, for a = 0,1,
where I -  aP(0) = foy],
7i,y = - a / j (1)(z-y), i - x m< j< i,
= 1 - a p {l)(0),  j  = i,
= 0, otherwise.
I - a iP(l) = [0,y],
Qff = - a Lp{L\ i  + y0- j ) ,  i+ yo~ kx ^ 1 + y<h * *J\
= 1 -  aLp(L)(yQ), j  = i,
= 0, otherwise. (6.31)
Note that different combinations of X/s do not influence the solution of 
(6.31). The computation complexity of (6.31) depends on the structure of P(<ar)
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and the number of process states. Moreover, in (6.31) both P(0) and P(l) are 
skew matrices.
In our MDP, the number of states is countable infinite; therefore, we 
should consider our process a denumerable MDP. Blackwell (1965) and 
Derman (1965) showed that, for a discounted cost criterion (the discount factor 
strictly less than one), if the action space is finite, and all immediate expected 
costs are bounded, then there always exists a non-randomized stationary policy 
that is optimal. If either condition is violated, an optimal policy may not exist.
However, in practice, the producer can not accumulate indefinite 
backorders or carry indefinite inventories. Consequently, the inventory level i 
has a lower bound /, and an upper bound iu, and we are justified to treat our 
problem as a finite-state MDP and SDP. As a result, we do not need to calculate 
the value of za(i) for all i in (6.31). The decision maker can specify a reasonable 
range [zft of inventory level and cut off the redundant states. However, both 
P(0) and P(l) are skew matrices. If we cut off some states, some rows of P(0) 
and P(l) will no longer be probability distributions.
There are two approaches to deal with this situation. First, we can stipulate 
that, when / > iu, there is only one action to choose, and the action is not to start 
a new production run. Therefore, for each row with an uncompleted 
distribution, we add the sum of probabilities of cut-off states to the probability 
of state /„. On the other hand, when i < ib there is only one action, and the action 
is to set up a production run. Thus, for each row with an uncompleted
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distribution, we add the sum of probabilities of cut-off states to the probability 
of state ij. Since the actual values of it and iu are unknown, and this approach 
will change the original transition probabilities, we adopt the second approach. 
The second approach does not change the transition probability of state z) and z'a. 
It cuts off the states beyond the range, and lets rows with uncompleted 
distributions remain intact.
We use the utility functions in IMSL to calculate za(f). The size of 
matrices used in our programs is as large as 800x800 to cover the possible 
ranges of z) and z‘„. In the programs, we use double precision for all variables.
Then, by the following iteration procedure, we obtain a stationary policy. 
Procedure 6.1:
Step 1. Specify a range of inventory level.
Step 2. Solve (6.31).
Step 3. If  a stationary policy can not be obtained, enlarge the range and 
return to step 2; otherwise, stop.
To find out the stationary policy, we must choose the range of inventory 
level carefully. Using procedure 6.1, usually, we can obtain the stationary 
policy after enlarging the range for several trials. Once we obtain the stationary 
policy, we continue to enlarge the range and rerun the programs, but the 
stationary policy remains the same. This confirms that the stationary policy 
does exist. In our model, the stationary policy is a threshold inventory level. 
The threshold inventory level z* is defined as follows.
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Definition 6.1:
A threshold inventory level is time invariant. At the beginning of each 
period, if / < / and the manufacturing system is idle, the producer should 
set up a new batch; otherwise, keep the system idle.
Assume that the threshold inventory level exists. Considering (6.30) and 
the threshold value, we use the following equation to calculate the value of V(f). 
Note that the value of V(f) is used later in (6.27) to calculate the optimal policy 
in the SDP.
C(i, 0 )+ a ]T p (')(x) y ( i - x ) ,  f< i ,
X
K 0 r H ' V i = C ( / ,  l ) * a LY p w ( y m i + y , - y ) ,  i z i -  (6.32)
X
We can rewrite (6.32) into the following matrix-vector equation (6.33). 
Then, we obtain the value of V(f) by solving (6.34).
V = C + Q V, 
where V = |Y(t)],
Q = [?,],
qij ~ - j ) ,  i -  xm<j < i, i > i \
=  1  -  a p ( l ) ( 0 ) ,  /  =  / , / > / * ,
= - a Lp {L)(i + y0 - / ) ,  i + yo -Lx" £ j  ^  i + y^  i * j \ i ^
= 1 -  a p (i)O0), j  = /, i < i \
= 0, otherwise. (6.33)
V = tI -Q r ‘C, wheny0< Ix m. (6.34)
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However, when yQ is greater than Lxm, Q is not a square matrix, since the 
number of columns is greater than the number of rows. Thus, we need to place a 
restriction on the value of V(i), wheny0 is greater than Lxm.
Restriction 6.1:
Whenj/Q is greater than Lxm, we force the following equation to be held.
Restriction 6.1 is reasonable. When ib is a substantially small negative 
number (the amount of backorder is quite large), the difference between V(i -  k) 
and V(i) could be approximate by kcb. This means that the cost difference is 
incurred by the difference in backorder quantity. We substitute (6.35) into those 
equations in (6.33), which need modification, and rearrange (6.33). We have 
obtain the following matrix-vector equation (6.36), and can obtain the value of 
V(i) by solving (6.37).
V (i-k ) = V(t) + kcb, i> ib, k=  l,2,...,Zxm (6.35)
V = C + R V, wheny0> Ix m,
V=[F(/)],
ib < i < ib+y0 -  Lxm,
j=i+U”-y 0
tfip otherwise.
B = [b¥]t
by = Cy + a Lcb J  {ih -  j ) , ib < i < ib+ yQ -  Lxm,
j= ,*U m-y 0
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= Cjj, otherwise. (6.36)
V = [I - R]*1 B, when yQ > Lxm. (6.37)
Computation Procedure for the SDP
After solving the MDP in the second subproblem, we can solve (6.27) to 
obtain the values of F0(r),..., V^f), and the optimal policy in SDP.
In summary, the computation procedure for the entire problem is as 
follows.
Procedure 6.2:
Step 1. Obtain the optimal policy in MDP by procedure 6.1.
Step 2. Calculate the value of V(i) in MDP by solving (6.33).
Step 3. Obtain the optimal policy and the value of V(f) in SDP by solving
(6.27).
Note that the complexity of computation depends on the distribution of 
forecasts and the length of the forecast horizon.
6.10. Experiment Examples
In this section, several examples are presented for the multi-period model 
of the system with a fixed production batch size and lead time.
Consider a dinnerware manufacturer that has a great investment in kilns 
and other related equipment. Because of stiff competition in the market and 
economies of scale to reduce the average production cost, the kilns always 
produce on a fixed batch size that equals their total capacity, 70,000 units.
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At the beginning of each month, the production manager receives the 
forecasts for demands within the next 6 months from the marketing division. 
Then, based on the information of the forecasts and prior distribution of 
demands, the posterior distributions of demands are derived. Based on the 
information of the posterior distributions of demands, the production manager 
has to decide whether to start a new production run whenever the kilns are 
empty. However, if the kilns are not empty, the production manager will stay on 
the previous production schedule.
The dinnerware is manufactured at a cost of $0.03 per unit and the 
production lead time is two months. Each new production run is set up at a cost 
of $150 per run. The inventory holding cost is $0,002 per unit per month, and 
unsatisfied customer demands are backlogged with an estimated penalty of 
$0,004 per unit per month. The discount rate is estimated to be 0.97.
The posterior distributions of demands for the next 6 months (current 
month is month 0 and the last month is month 6) are considered to follow 
normal distributions with means 13,000, 14,000, 15,000, 16,000, 17,000,
18,000, and 19,000 units and standard deviations 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, 
2,500, 3,000, and 3,500 units. Moreover, from past records of customer 
demand, we assume that the monthly demands beyond the forecast horizon 
(month 6) are iid, and that they follow a normal distribution. The mean of the 
normal distribution equals the long-run average monthly demand, 20,000 units,
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and the standard deviation equals the long-run average standard deviation, 6,500 
units.
From Section 6.8, the problem in the period from month 0 to month 6 
can be formulated as a finite-stage SDP model, and the problem with a time 
horizon beyond month 6 can be formulated as an MDP. The production 
manager can solve the MDP; then use the results of MDP to solve the SDP. We 
discuss the results of MDP first 
The Results in MDP
Several FORTRAN programs are written to solve the problem in MDP. 
From a computer printout we find that there is a threshold inventory level 
equaling 24,000 units. This means that if the current inventory level is less than
24,000 units, and the kilns are empty, the production manager should set up a 
new production run. To further study the effects of parameters on the threshold 
inventory level, we do a sensitivity analysis for the problem in MDP, and the 
results are summarized into table 6.5 in the next page.
From table 6.5, we have the following findings.
1. If setup cost increases, threshold inventory level decreases.
2. If production cost increases, threshold inventory level decreases.
3. If backorder cost increases, threshold inventory level increases.
4. If holding cost increases, threshold inventory level decreases.
5. If lead time increases, threshold inventory level increases.
6. If capacity increases, threshold inventory level decreases.
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7. If discounted factor increases, threshold inventory level increases.
Table 6.5: The Effects of Parameters on Threshold Inventory Level 
in the Specific Multi-Period Model
C, ob ch capacity lead
time
discounted
rate
threshold 
inventory level
10 0.03 0.004 0.002 70 2 0.97 25
150 0.03 0.004 0.002 70 2 0.97 24
500 0.03 0.004 0.002 70 2 0.97 22
150 0.01 0.004 0.002 70 2 0.97 32
150 0.05 0.004 0.002 70 2 0.97 17
150 0.03 0.003 0.002 70 2 0.97 17
150 0.03 0.006 0.002 70 2 0.97 33
150 0.03 0.004 0.001 70 2 0.97 31
150 0.03 0.004 0.003 70 2 0.97 19
150 0.03 0.004 0.002 50 2 0.97 35
150 0.03 0.004 0.002 80 2 0.97 19
150 0.03 0.004 0.002 70 3 0.97 45
150 0.03 0.004 0.002 70 2 0.95 16
150 0.03 r  0 .0 0 4 0.002 70 2 0.98 28
In fact, the system in our model can be considered as an (s, Q) inventory
management system. In other words, the threshold inventory level and 
production batch size can be regarded as a reorder point and a reorder quantity, 
respectively. Then, the above results can be clearly explained.
The Results in SDP
We consider two cases about the forecast mean. In case 1, the mean 
increases with time. In case 2, however, the mean decreases when time 
increases. The results are shown in table 6.6.
From table 6.6, we find that in case 1 the threshold inventory also increases 
with time. On the other hand, in case 2 the threshold inventory level also
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decreases when time increases. This situation can be explained by the property 
of an (s, Q) inventory management system.
Table'6.6: The Effects of the Means of Forecasting on Threshold 
Inventory Level in the Specific Multi-Period Model—(I)
Case 1 Case 2
period mean standard
deviation
threshold
inventory
level
mean standard
deviation
threshold
inventory
level
0 13 0.57 6 27 0.57 42
1 14 1.04 9 26 1.04 39
2 15 1.52 12 25 1.52 36
3 16 2.01 15 24 2.01 33
4 17 2.50 18 23 2.50 30
5 18 2.98 21 22 2.98 27
6 19 3.46 23 21 3.46 25
7 20 6.38 24 20 6.38 24
We are also interested in the effects of forecast standard deviation and 
mean on threshold inventory level. Several authors have the same concern as 
ours. For a detailed discussion, refer to the literature review about demand 
forecasting and production policy.
To study the effect of standard deviation of forecast on threshold inventory 
level, we fix the forecast mean in each month at 200,000 units, and change the 
standard deviations of forecast in each month, but we find that threshold 
inventory level in each month does not change. This may confirm that forecast 
mean has a greater influence on the performance of the system than the standard 
deviation of forecast.
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Then, to study that the mean in which month has a greater influence on 
threshold inventory level, we consider the following cases 3 and 4. In case 3, 
the standard deviation in each month is equal to its counterpart in case 4. 
Furthermore, in case 3, the means of forecast from month 0 to month 6 are
210,000, 200,000, 200,000, 200,000, 200,000, 200,000 units; on the other hand, 
in case 4, they are 200,000, 200,000, 200,000, 200,000, 200,000, 210,000 units. 
The results of cases 3 and 4 are shown in table 6.7.
Table 6.7: The Effects of the Means of Forecasting on Threshold Inventory
Level
in the Specific Multi-Period Model—(II)
Case 3 Case 4
period mean standard
deviation
threshold
inventory
level
mean standard
deviation
threshold
inventory
level
0 21 1.04 25 20 1.04 24
1 20 1.52 24 20 1.52 24
2 20 2.01 24 20 2.01 24
3 20 2.50 24 20 2.50 24
4 20 2.98 24 20 2.98 25
5 20 3.46 24 20 3.46 25
6 20 3.97 24 21 3.97 25
7 20 6.38 24 20 6.38 24
From table 6.7, we find that the mean in a more recent month has a greater
influence on the current threshold inventory level.
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1 Introduction and Summary
Conflicts between marketing and production are common in a modem 
company. These conflicts can be dangerous because they not only may cause 
the disruption of day-to-day operations of the company, but also may inhibit the 
company’s ability to compete. In addition, because of the increasing 
competition in the world market, decreasing availability of key resources, and 
decreasing product life cycles, the problem of how to close the gap between 
marketing and production is becoming an increasingly important factor in the 
survival of a.manufacturing company (Hill, 1980).
Demand forecasting is one of the main activities of marketing, which 
interacts with production planning, and is often an area of conflict between the 
two. In this research, we focused on the effect of demand forecasting on 
divisional coordination and production policies in manufacturing companies.
In Chapter 2, we presented a literature review not only to highlight the 
importance of demand forecasting and divisional coordination, but also to 
provide a survey for the development of research in this field.
In Chapter 3, we considered a sequential decision process between 
marketing and production in a periodic review production system. That is, at the 
beginning of each period, marketing needs to decide how much money and 
effort should be invested in forecasting. After reaching this decision, marketing
217
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generates the forecast and passes it on to production, which then determines 
production quantity.
The situation in the one-period models was considered. An approach to 
calculate the upper bound on the investment in forecasting was proposed. Then, 
two types of one-period models were studied. In a centralized model, the 
decisions made by marketing and production are both based on the total profit of 
the company. On the other hand, in a decentralized model, there is a unit 
transfer price, the price which is paid by marketing to production for every 
product sold. The unit transfer price is assumed to be given, and the two 
divisions make their decisions based on divisional profits. During model 
formulation, we found that there exists a threshold forecast in the centralized and 
decentralized models. The threshold forecast has a property; namely, if the 
forecast is less than the threshold, then production quantity is 0 ; otherwise, 
production quantity is larger than 0. The forecast is a random variable. Thus, if 
the threshold is low, production is more likely to produce; otherwise, production 
is less likely-to produce.
An example was given to illustrate that forecasting can improve the total 
profits of the centralized and decentralized companies. Comparing the result in 
the centralized company with that in the decentralized company, we found that 
the total profit of the centralized company is larger than that of the decentralized 
company. Furthermore, marketing in the centralized company spends less 
money on forecasting, and production is more likely to start a new production
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run. This shows the benefits of forecasting and cooperation between divisions in 
a centralized company.
Then, we considered three types of policies about the decision on the unit 
transfer price in the decentralized companies. In the decentralized companies 
with the marketing-oriented, production-oriented, or coordination policies, the 
unit transfer price is decided by marketing, or production, or by taking into 
consideration the overall profit of the company, respectively. For each type of 
company, we developed a new one-period model.
In Chapter 4, we provided numerical analyses for the decentralized 
companies. In addition, we considered two cases of forecast standard deviation, 
which can influence the precision of forecast. We found that there is a break­
even value of the investment in forecasting. Assume that all other parameters in 
the two cases are the same. Then, if the investments in both cases are less than 
the break-even point, the forecast in case 1 is more accurate than that in case 2 . 
However, if the investments in both cases are greater than the break-even point, 
the forecast in case 1 is less accurate than that in case 2 .
From the results of numerical analysis, we found that the company with 
the coordination policy has the best performance among the decentralized 
companies. Moreover, each division acts on its own interest in the 
decentralized companies. As a result, in the company with production-oriented 
policy, production tries to take all the profits it possibly can, but marketing tends 
to spend nothing on forecasting. On the other hand, in the company with
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marketing-oriented policy, marketing tends to invest as much in forecasting as it 
possibly can, but production is less likely to produce. Moreover, the results in 
the company with coordination policy are outcomes of cooperation. The above 
behaviors of these two divisions become more significant in case 2 .
The different results of numerical analysis for the three types of 
decentralized companies may be attributed to differences in organization 
structure and authorization. We also found that the effects of model parameters 
on the company with the production-oriented policy are much different from 
those on the other two types of companies.
Moreover, in most circumstances, the three types of decentralized 
companies in case 2  invest more money in forecasting than their counterparts in 
case 1. Their total profits could be larger or smaller than those of their 
counterparts, depending on whether their investments are much larger than the 
break-even value. However, their investments are not worthwhile most of the 
time.
In Chapter 5, we performed the numerical analyses for the one-period 
models. In the centralized model, for cases 1 and 2, the effects of parameters on 
the total profit of company, unit transfer price, the investment in forecasting, and 
threshold forecast are almost the same. Under most circumstances, however, the 
centralized company in case 2  has a lower total profit than its counterpart in case 
1. It is willing to spend more money on forecasting, but it is less likely to 
produce.
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Since the company with the coordination policy has best performance 
among the decentralized companies, it is chosen to represent the decentralized 
company. Comparing the results of the centralized and decentralized models, 
we had the following findings. The centralized company has a larger total profit 
than does the decentralized company. It spends more money on forecasting, and 
it is more likely to produce most of the time. Moreover, the differences between 
the two models may also be caused by the differences in organization structure 
and authorization.
Then, we considered the following situation to study the interaction effect 
of selling price and production cost Assume that unit production cost increases. 
The centralized and decentralized companies may decide to raise unit selling price 
by the same amount as the increase in unit production cost. Assume that the above 
action does not affect customer demand. Four settings of the companies are 
examined.
In setting 1, forecast standard deviation is under case 1. We found that, for 
the centralized company and the companies with marketing-oriented or 
coordination policies, the same increase in the unit selling price can not cover the 
increase in the unit production cost There is no conclusion, however, for the 
company with production-oriented policy.
In setting 2, the companies considered are almost the same as those in 
setting 1, except that the companies in setting 2  have a smaller variance of 
customer demand. We found that, for all the centralized and decentralized
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
companies, the same increase in unit selling price can not cover the increase in 
production cost, but the companies in setting 2  have a larger total profit than do 
their counterparts in setting 1 .
In setting 3, the companies, which are the same as those in setting 1, decide 
not only to raise the unit price, but also to improve the precision of the forecast 
We found that the results of whether the increase in selling price could cover the 
increase in production cost are the same as those in setting 1, but, for all the 
centralized and decentralized companies, the companies in setting 3  have a larger 
total profit than do the companies in setting 1 .
In setting 4, the companies have the same cost structure and strategy as 
those in setting 1, but forecast standard deviation is under case 2. We found that 
the results of whether the increase in selling price could cover the increase in 
production cost are the same as those in setting 1. Furthermore, in the centralized 
company and the company with marketing-oriented or coordination policy, the 
total profits are less than those in setting 1. In the company with marketing- 
oriented policy, however, the company may have a larger total profit than that of 
its counterpart in setting 1 when the investment in forecasting is much larger than 
the break-even value.
In Chapter 6 , we developed two multi-period models: a general 
centralized multi-period model with a finite planning horizon, and a specific 
multi-period model with an infinite planning horizon. In the multi-period 
centralized model, we incorporated the learning effect into the process of
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demand forecasting. Several examples were presented. We found that the 
learning effect can induce the company to adopt a forecasting method with high 
cost and high precision.
As to the specific multi-period model, we focused on the effect of 
demand forecasting on the production policy of a periodic system with fixed 
production batch size, fixed lead time, and infinite planning horizon. We also 
provided several examples for the above model. The important result is that 
there exists a threshold inventory level. The property of the threshold inventory 
level is similar to that of an (s, Q) inventory management system. The threshold 
inventory level and batch size can be considered as the reorder point and order 
quantity, respectively. If the inventory level is less than the threshold, then 
production starts a new production run; otherwise, no new run is set up. 
Moreover, we found that forecast mean has a greater influence on the threshold 
than forecast variability.
7.2 Future Research
The models developed in this research provide a sound analytical 
framework to study the effect of demand forecasting on the divisional decisions 
and coordination between marketing and production. Many related topics can be 
explored. For instance, the following topics may be pursued in future research.
1. Investigate the effects of other forms of standard deviation of forecast on 
the performances of the one-period models.
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2. Apply our models to practice to verify their feasibility.
3. Study a multi-period centralized production system with forecast 
revisions.
4. Develop the rolling horizon procedures for a multi-period centralized 
production system.
5. Explore a multi-period centralized production system with a fixed 
production lead time and infinite forecast horizon.
6 . Formulate a multi-period decentralized model.
7. Study a multi-period specific production system with the modified 
assumptions of perishable products, total lost sales, yield loss, and 
uncertain production lead time.
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APPENDIX A: THE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION OF DEMAND
(3 .D
£g(>v|jr=x)fc(x)<fr
where W \ x = x  follows a normal distribution N(x, g2(cj)) andX follows a normal 
distribution A^ G, t 2). To derive posterior density function from (3.1), we define 
fix , w) to be the joint density function o fX and W. Then,
fix ,w ) = h(x)g(w |x) = (27tra(cfi)A exp{-V *  ~ P  + ^ ' - X- ]} ■
2 X G {Cf )
(B.l)
Furtheimore, we define
, t  2Gz(cf )
(7 (C7 )+ T
From (B.l),
1 ( x - 9 ) 2 (w -x )2.
^  I  2 2 ✓ \2 X G (cf )
_  1 r ,  1 1 X 2 0  W 0 2 W 22/ 2 ( 2 + 2 )x + ( 2 +  2 )]
2 x c7 (cf ) x a  (cr ) x cj (Cj)
1  r  2  o  /■ \ /  ®  w  \  i  1  / ®  w-[x - 2 p(c/ )(—  + —7 — )x]+ - ( —  + -
2 p(c7) T2 a  (c7) 2  t 2 O- (C/)
1 r /  w  9  w  . 0  ( w - 0 ) 2■ [x -  p (c ,)(—  + - - 2 ) ] 2 + — 2-------------- - (B.3)
2 p(c7) t 2 a  (cf ) 2 (x + a  (Cy))
Hence,
fix ,w )
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=(27rca(c/))-lexp{ — — [x -  p(cf  )(-^- + ) f  -  ^  }.
2p(C/) t 2 a \ c f ) 2(r +a (cf ))
(BA)
Let g(w) be the unconditional density function of W. Then,
SO) = £  f(x,w )dx  = (27t/p(c/))'iy2(Tg(c/))'1 exp{ - -~2(w ~ f  * }.
2(x + CT (Cy))
It follows that
Therefore, we have
t 2 w + c t 2 ( c , ) 0r= uA — _ _ _ _ ^
a 2(c7 )+T:
where w) = £(Z|JF = w) = 2 2 ,
(3.2b)
t 2g 2 ( c , )
(B-5)
„) = . (B.6)
J° g (v\X  = x)h(x)dx S (w)
w) = _exp( — -■ — ), (3.2a)
V27t p(cf ) 2p (c7)
P2(9) = Far(^fF = w) = ~ -J~- . (3.2c)
ffz(c/ ) + T 2
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APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS OF NOTATIONS IN TABLES
T P „
T P  W/o
upper Cf 
TPC
Cfc
thresholdc
TPM l  OC
Plo
C/0
threshold.,,
TP* *  n
Pu
Cfm
thresholdm
TP,PC
= the total profit of the company with perfect information.
= the total profit of the company without forecasting.
= the upper bound of the investment in forecasting.
= the total profit of the company in the centralized model. 
s the investment in forecasting in the centralized model.
= threshold forecast in the centralized model.
- the total profit of the company with the coordination policy.
= unit transfer price of the company with the coordination policy. 
= the investment in forecasting of the company with the 
coordination policy.
= threshold forecast of the company with the coordination policy. 
: the total profit of the company with the marketing-oriented 
policy.
: unit transfer price of the company with the marketing-oriented 
policy.
: the investment in forecasting of the company with the 
marketing-oriented policy.
: threshold forecast of the company with the marketing-oriented 
policy.
: the total profit of the company with the production-oriented 
policy.
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Pip = unit transfer price of the company with the production-oriented
policy.
Cjj, = the investment in forecasting of the company with the
production-oriented policy. 
thresholdp = threshold forecast of the company with the production-oriented
policy.
difTPgc = (TPocin case 2) - (TP^ in case 1).
difTPmc = (TPmc in case 2) - (TPmc in case 1).
di/TPpc = (TPpcin case 2) - (TP^ in case 1).
difP \o  = (P\o in case 2) - (plo in case 1).
difPim = (Pim in case 2) - (pXm in case 1).
difP \P = (P\P in case 2) - (plp in case 1).
d if Cf0 = (Cf0 in case 2) - (cfo in case 1).
difcfr, =(Cfi„ incase 2) - (c^ in case 1).
d if 0^  = (cjp in case 2) - (c^ in case 1).
d if threshold0 = (threshold0 in case 2) - (threshold0 in case 1).
d if thresholdm = (thresholdm in case 2) - (thresholdm in case 1).
d if thresholdp = (thresholdp in case 2) - (thresholdp in case 1).
d if TPc = (TPC in case 2) - (TPC in case 1).
d if cfc = (Cfc in case 2) - (Cjc in case 1).
d if thresholdc = (ithresholdc in case 2) - (thresholdc in case 1).
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